



Evaluation of the Education Cannot Wait First Emergency Response funding modality

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Mokoro Ltd

The Old Music Hall
106-108 Cowley Road
Oxford OX4 1JE

+44 (0)1865 403179
mokoro@mokoro.co.uk

mokoro.co.uk

Prepared by

Alta Fölscher, Team Leader

Allison Anderson, Education in Emergencies Specialist

Nick Maunder, Humanitarian Specialist

Mark Minford, Education Economist and PFM Specialist

Javier Pereira, Evaluator and Analyst

Cyril Brandt, Researcher (Education in Emergencies)

Zoe Driscoll, Research Coordinator

Executive Summary

E1. This report presents the findings of an independent evaluation of the Education Cannot Wait (ECW) First Emergency Response (FER) funding, conducted by Mokoro Limited. The FER is one of three ECW funding modalities and provides an immediate and rapid response to education needs in sudden onset emergencies and in escalating crises. Its purpose is to restore the education function, especially access to and equitable inclusion in education.

E2. The purpose of the evaluation is to assess the overall relevance/appropriateness, reach/coverage, efficiency, effectiveness, and coherence/connectedness of the FER modality, and to measure its progress towards systemic and collective results. The objectives of the evaluation are to determine the extent to which the FER modality is meeting its envisioned purpose and to better understand what aspects of its design and approach are working or require improvements in the future; and to assess the FER project portfolio's collective outcomes at global and country level. The evaluation is expected to provide important lessons learnt and recommendations to specific actors to improve the FER modality as part of ECW's strategic direction and engagement in the broader global Education in Emergencies and Protracted Crises (EiEPC) sector.

Methodology and limitations

E3. The evaluation is a formative evaluation, drawing on the experience of the FER's operation across the 32 countries in which it is or has been active from the start of operations in 2017 to the end of April 2020, taking into account the fact that improvements to the operating model have been made throughout. The evaluation therefore includes the FERs that ECW approved by the end of April 2020 in response to the global COVID-19 pandemic, but not the second round of FERs approved end July.

E4. This evaluation used a mixed-method, theory-based approach. Key elements include a FER theory of change (TOC), based on the overall ECW theory of change, and a detailed evaluation matrix reflecting the questions to be answered and the criteria to be considered. Data were collected against the evaluation framework through several instruments, including global level interviews; analyses of the FER global data and document base and financial flows; country case studies conducted in Colombia, Niger, Nigeria and Mozambique; in-depth desk-based analysis of FERs in Afghanistan and Nepal and the first round of COVID-19 FER proposals; and a survey of FER grantees on the performance of FER operations and systems at country level. The evaluation also assessed the complementarity with and alignment between FERs and other funds financing education interventions in emergencies. The team used mixed methods of data analysis, mining both qualitative and quantitative data, to facilitate triangulation between sources. A key instrument was systematic contribution analysis using the evidence and findings at project/country and global level of the FER to investigate how the observed FER inputs, activities and outputs contributed to observed systemic and beneficiary results.

E5. The evaluation scope and process were affected by the global COVID-19 pandemic. Its scope was adjusted to include the first ECW COVID-19 round of FERs. Also, data collection and team synthesis processes were conducted mostly at a distance, although some in-person site visits were possible in the country case studies. Some data collection processes would

have introduced bias. Where bias was a risk, the evaluation triangulated data with other information sources. The evaluation findings are also limited by the lack of systematic and comprehensive multi-year databases on humanitarian need, action and financing and the evaluation report notes where findings use partial or incomplete data.

Evaluation Findings

E6. The relevance/appropriateness of the FER modality and FERs. The objective of the FER modality, to deliver rapid funding to restore education in emergencies, remains highly relevant to global EiEPC needs and is seen as critical to ensuring children's immediate safety and long-term education outcomes. The modality is relevant to the mandate of the ECW, as it has contributed to repositioning education as a priority on the humanitarian agenda at global and country levels and can support humanitarian-development coherence through linkages between the FERs and ECW's Multi-Year Resilience Programs (MYRPs). In sudden onset and escalating emergencies, the FER as a pooled funding instrument is designed to add value because it is fast and flexible. Moreover, the FER is uniquely designed to contribute to EiEPC coordination, as it requires country actors to work together early, assists in early needs assessments, can deliver context appropriate responses with accountability, and uses organizations that are best placed on the ground to respond quickly. There is some evidence that the FER modality has also been important to catalyse additional resources at the global level, but less so at country level.

E7. The FER modality in its current form is most appropriate in sudden onset emergency contexts where needs are escalating significantly and it is more likely to trigger the systemic change that ECW aims for. Amongst the case studies conducted for this evaluation, the most effective uses of the FER have been in Colombia and Mozambique, where it was catalytic, and in the COVID-19 response in Niger and Nigeria, where it was important to trigger the sector's fast response to an additional, sudden crisis. When ECW has used the modality in protracted crises without escalating needs, the FER is a less appropriate instrument because of its size, duration and scope.

E8. The design of the FER modality generally translates to relevant FER-financed interventions at country level, where the sector as a whole is underfunded and most interventions are relevant to address needs. Multiple FER rounds and the division of a FER between multiple grants, result in FERs that are overly fragmented and run the risk of being less than strategic. The emphasis on speed means that in practice the FERs may fall short on tailoring to local context, effectively targeting the most vulnerable and delivering through a diverse and localized set of grantees. Financing immediate needs for a short period of time is not a catalytic use of funding, especially when FERs are used in protracted crises without being explicitly linked to MYRPs.

E9. Reach and coverage of the FER modality. Over the three years of implementing FERs, ECW has used the FER increasingly well to cover more urgent crises with greater needs. However, within a crisis the modality's reach is limited when the need is high. The cap on the ECW Executive Director FER approval mandate is at USD 3 million and few FERs have disbursed higher amounts, resulting in too little money in big emergencies with high needs. Unless FERs are supported by additional funding, strong capacity and field-presence to strategically direct FER funding, their reach can be limited in high need crises.

E10. While there is evidence of targeting vulnerability through FERs, evidence on the degree to which the most marginalized and vulnerable are reached with tailored interventions is mixed. On the one hand evidence shows that FER grantees target the most marginalized children – including girls and at least to some degree, children with disabilities – and perform well in reaching the targets. Most grantees applied such criteria for prioritization of the most vulnerable children across their work, also outside of the FERs. On the other hand, it was not clear in our country cases that the most marginalized and vulnerable populations were reached effectively with interventions that tailored to the specific features of marginalisation in each country context. Where it was done well, such as in Colombia, it required high country capacity and field presence. The FERs also disproportionately target and reach primary age children, despite ECW commitments to increase interventions for early childhood and secondary education. Our analysis shows the prioritization of primary-age children often reflects the distribution of learners in the country’s education-system, and the prioritization of primary learners in Humanitarian Response Plans (HRP).

E11. While FERs have and are responding to many refugee emergencies, the ability of FERs to target and reach refugees in complex emergencies with many vulnerable groups is more limited. A key reason is that the education of refugees is coordinated in refugee coordination groups outside the EiEPC coordination groups. The connection between these coordinating groups is often not tightly forged in complex emergencies. Since the end of 2019 ECW and its global partners – including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), the Global Education Cluster and the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) – have agreed to strengthen cross-agency coordination on refugees, to address these issues. In the recent COVID-19 2nd round FERs, the UNHCR already coordinated processes at country level.

E12. **Coherence and connectedness.** Because FERs are designed through existing country-based EiEPC coordination mechanisms and draw on humanitarian sector plans, they are coherent and well-aligned with the humanitarian system. FERs are generally complementary to other EiEPC funding, including the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) Rapid Response Window grants, Country-Based Pooled Funds (CBPF) and the Global Partnership for Education’s Accelerated Facility window, due to the active management of funds by FER grantees and, in some cases, at the cluster level. Duplication and fund displacement effects do occur, however, and transparency and coordination are often imperfect.

E13. FERs can pave the way for a stronger humanitarian/development nexus to provide a platform for longer-term solutions but are often too small and too rapid to do so. Here the direct linkage between a FER and a MYRP to support humanitarian-development coherence is critical, but in many cases FERs are not followed by MYRPs or do not connect well enough to them. When a FER/MYRP connection is explicitly established, FER activities are built upon to focus on systemic issues and connections, as in the cases of Afghanistan and Colombia.

E14. The FER processes ensure that FERs are coherent among grants in design, but then do not facilitate in-country coherence or learning during implementation. FER grantees are, however, interested in learning from each other, and Colombia offers a good example of the value of effective inter-grantee coordination and learning processes during implementation.

E15. Efficiency and transparency of the FERs. Because of the architecture of ECW and the EIEPC cluster coordination system, FERs are vulnerable to conflict of interest issues. These issues have not been addressed sufficiently in FERs in substance or transparency, although this has improved over time. The reasoning behind the amounts allocated to countries was not clear to stakeholders, and country FER processes were not consistently transparent, especially in early FERs. While the announcement of the availability of a FER has generally been communicated via the cluster, communication within the cluster and to all potential grantees have been less robust, and processes not always open. This is because ECW's guidance on grantee selection processes was not tightly specified initially, and the FERs were not well known or understood. The multiple roles of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in FER management at global and country level, in the absence of the modality being well understood by stakeholders, have led to country processes that are insufficiently robust, resulting in concerns that UNICEF monopolizes funding. The Executive Committee no-objection procedure has not visibly contributed to protecting ECW and UNICEF from conflict of interest allegations, but has delayed grant approvals and disbursements. There has been a positive evolution toward greater transparency on the part of the ECW Secretariat, which has made efforts to address these challenges through new guidance issued in 2020.

E16. FER processes are efficient, guidelines are generally thought to be clear and templates light enough and easy to apply for global actors with capacity. The ECW's overall project design timeline strikes the right balance between being fast, and the quality of design, but for sudden-onset and escalating emergencies. The tight specification of timelines has consequences though for the scope of grantees that can apply, with especially national NGOs being excluded because they lack the capacity for fast responses to requests for proposals and may not use English as a first language. There is also little time to form consortia that include national NGOs. High emphasis on speed also impacts the strategic quality of FERs. We noted that tight timelines for countries' proposal drafting, which contributes significantly to these trade-offs, cause delays when the ECW Secretariat reviews and approves proposals. Longer provision for proposal writing may ease the trade-offs, without affecting the overall duration of the design phase up to disbursement. FER contracting and reporting processes are seen as light, manageable and more flexible and efficient than those of many donors.

E17. There are drivers of cost-efficiencies and inefficiencies in FERs. FERs are more efficient than funding modalities that require dedicated capacity at country level. They also achieve cost efficiencies when they build on existing capacities and activities of grantees. However, a key driver of inefficiency is fragmentation of the grants between grantees/sub-grantees and further between sub-contractors. This drives up the share of overhead cost for each dollar spent.

E18. Effectiveness of global support for FERs. The replenishment financing model for FERs works well. More systematic in-year reporting to the Executive Committee on the FERs could raise development donor support for the mechanism. The FERs would also benefit from more systematic global support, such as ECW Secretariat in-country missions, especially when they are first implemented in a region, and from better coordination between ECW and its global partners to assess and support country capacities. Such surge capacity has complemented Secretariat support to date, where it was available. FERs in regional emergency contexts would also benefit from more strategic thinking and planning from ECW around the

strategic value-add and focus of a regional role vis-à-vis the national FER, and more clear guidance on communication between the levels. Generally, all FERs would benefit from global learning on rapid education sector responses in EiEPC contexts.

E19. Effectiveness of FERs in promoting coordinated, inclusive EiEPC processes and timely responses. FERs can promote inclusive EiEPC processes by bringing actors together around FERs when there is strong leadership and capacity at country level, especially in new emergencies. In protracted emergencies, FER processes tend to initially reinforce poor cluster leadership dynamics, but may ultimately strengthen coordination. FER processes are often inclusive of government actors, in many countries in substantive ways that can contribute to continuation of their results. FERs, however, have not been sufficiently inclusive of national NGOs and are unlikely to become so under current FER arrangements, due to the speed of proposal design processes and the requirement that grantees are assessed in line with the Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers (HACT) rules. FERs mostly fall short of the prescribed eight-week timeline from concept note to disbursement. The timeline consists of a project proposal, project approval, contracting and disbursement phases. Over time delays in the contracting phase have been significantly reduced. Delays also occur in implementation, some of which could have been foreseen. Project disbursement and implementation delays often have consequences for timely project implementation, such as when interventions become misaligned with the school calendar.

E20. Capacity development through the FERs. While the FERs are relatively small grants and have much lower ambition than MYRPs for strengthening capacity, they have contributed to developing the coordination capacities of EiEPC groups, grantees and local state actors. Especially in new emergencies, FERs strengthen the capacities of grantees to plan, implement and monitor EiEPC responses. FERs have also contributed to strengthened government capacities through interventions that range from awareness raising and inclusion in coordination activities and trainings, to the development of guiding frameworks, implementation of needs assessments and joint monitoring.

E21. Beneficiary outcomes of the FERs. By the end of July 2020, the FERs had reached over 2.1 million boys and girls and trained 27,000 teachers in 28 countries. FERs have been effective in restoring access to improved education, if measured by number of affected boys and girls reached. There is evidence that activities to improve the quality of learning, promote socio-emotional learning and implement holistic learning practices are present across FERs. There is some subjective evidence that these activities at least prevented deterioration of outcomes, and good objective evidence in Nigeria of a case where a grantee measured positive learning outcomes. Significant attention to gender issues is a common thread across FERs, and while grantees have succeeded in reaching girls, there is less evidence of tailoring efforts to specifically reach girls' differentiated needs.

Conclusion

E22. Overall, we conclude that the FERs are relevant to EiEPC needs, and can be relevant, coherent, connected and effective instruments in rapid onset and escalating emergencies when they are used well, and supported by country coordination capacity, or by assistance from the ECW Secretariat and ECW's global partners such as the Global Education Cluster, when country coordination capacity is low or emerging.

E23. Overall, there is enough evidence that the FER theory of change is valid. We were able to observe key elements of the TOC results chain working in practice within and across cases, to conclude that broadly the FERs are well designed for their stated purpose. Where breakdowns in the result-chains of FERs against the FER TOC have been observed, they were driven by three separate sets of factors: firstly they occur when the FER is used in protracted emergencies without clear escalating needs when the ECW was not (yet) in a position to use a MYRP.

E24. Secondly, while the overall theory of change is valid, there are some aspects of the FER's design that need to be adjusted even for sudden onset emergencies. For example, the guideline time for proposal preparation needs to be extended; ECW by design should be more open about how amounts were allocated to countries; there should be more limitations, even if procedural, on the share of FERs granted to the parent organizations of cluster coordinators and on FER fragmentation; by design coordination in complex crises that involve refugees should enable appropriate attention to their needs; and implementation processes should adjust to anchor more cross-grantee coordination and learning. Over and above these specific issues in FER design and guidance, is the degree to which flexibility is explicitly formalized in FERs. FER in practice are flexible and as such represent key trade-offs between competing ECW objectives: such as between speed and better targeting and tailoring; between speed and localization; and between fragmentation, localization, coherence and grantee diversity. However, these trade-offs are not necessarily considered up front, and made strategically. There is therefore cause for regularising these key flexibilities, so that it is a norm for these central strategic trade-offs in each FER, but also so that how the flexibility is applied, is clear and understood, the trade-offs understood and better decisions made.

E25. Thirdly, across cases some breakdowns in the result chain occurred because assumptions in the theory of change were not met about the FERs being well understood and applied as directed, by country structures that have the necessary capacity or are supported to develop capacities. This resulted for example, in country mechanisms that were insufficiently transparent and inclusive, as well as in potentially sub-optimal FERs in the absence of competition and thorough country-level review. This highlights the importance of improving country education in emergency capacity for FERs. In contexts where country capacities for coordinating a strategic response are low, global level support for FERs is critical, but is often not in place early enough. Relatedly, investment in preparedness can help improve FER implementation.

E26. Our recommendations below pick up on key aspects of each of these drivers. It is also important to note that our observations are based on evidence across the evaluation scope (FERs approved from 2017 to the end of April 2020), often reflecting shortfalls that were more prevalent in earlier FERs. We indicated in the findings when this is the case. Some observations however remain valid for recent FER practices. For many of these we have noted where important steps are already taken to address the issues, such as on clearer guidance on more open and transparent country processes and steps to strengthen inter-agency coordination. Our recommendations therefore focus on key outstanding issues.

Recommendations

E27. Recommendation 1: ECW should continue to use FERs to respond rapidly to sudden onset emergencies and crises that are clearly escalating.

E28. Recommendation 2: ECW should not default to using the FER in its current form, to respond in protracted emergencies without sudden escalating needs, as it is unlikely to catalyse systemic outcomes. It should adjust either the FER or the MYRP design for responses in protracted crises without escalating needs where it cannot use a MYRP, or design a third instrument.

E29. Recommendation 3: Some design features of the FERs contribute to their relevance, efficiency, coherence, effectiveness and impact in sudden onset and escalating crises, and should remain in place, such as the reliance on country-level structures and processes, an overall rapid timeline, high flexibility and light reporting requirements.

E30. Recommendation 4: Some design features of the FERs should be reconsidered, including how the timeline for its design is structured, the transparency on allocations between and within countries, rules on fund distribution between grantees, and arrangements for when country coordinators are grantees.

- When FERs are used in rapid onset emergencies, the early phase timeline up to approval stage should allow more time for preparing the first proposal. The overall timeline should be determined more flexibly around the current norms to allow for specific country cases, where more localisation or better tailoring and targeting may be key. Guidance on timelines should be updated to discuss key trade-offs, and to indicate when a country-specific timeline would be determined. An option is to link it to the announcement of a FER.
- The ECW Secretariat should be more open to stakeholders on how it has made decisions about country allocations. This will aid the confidence of the Fund's global and country partners, and potential donors, in the instrument. In addition, the ECW Secretariat should further systematize how FERs are announced, and ensure that ECW procedures are consistently followed in this regard.
- ECW should (re-)consider procedural regulations for FER grants when UNICEF, Save the Children (STC) or any other organization is both EiEPC coordinator and a FER grantee. Ex ante controls could be an additional process that is triggered before country selection of grantees is done when the share to a co-coordinator is beyond a specified threshold. These processes should include a review by the Secretariat of the quality of the process and the reasons for the proposal. They should also include some form of engagement by the Executive Committee. This may be simply through ex post reporting of the final allocation decision and its justification, and assurance that the original proposal was reached through an open country process. If the Executive Committee mechanism remains an ex ante check, it is important to ensure that the check is robust, so that it is more meaningful, but fast. The use of a sub-committee of the Executive Committee is an option.
- ECW should consider setting a guideline floor for minimum individual grants, which can also trigger a Secretariat review when a country proposes grants below the threshold, before the country proposal is submitted. It should also require better

transparency on sub-contracting and the combined overhead costs of the full implementation chain.

E31. Recommendation 5: ECW should be more open to awarding larger FERs when needed, even if it would trigger an Executive Committee (ExCom) process. To make the Executive Committee process faster with lower coordination needs, the use of a sub-committee can also be considered, potentially the same committee. It is recognized that larger FERs have been approved, but that this is not consistently the case for large emergencies, where the reach of FERs and their ability to be catalytic is increasingly limited as the scale of the emergency becomes greater.

E32. Recommendation 6: Global support for FERs should be strengthened between the ECW Secretariat and ECW's global partners like the Global Education Cluster and UNHCR. A rapid assessment of country capabilities before a FER is announced, and agreement on how to support the country coordination groups when capabilities are low, would go far in improving the quality of FER processes and projects.

E33. Recommendation 7: ECW, and its global partners, should invest more rapidly in preparedness, especially so that FERs can contribute better to the localisation agenda. ECW should consider financing efforts to address the information gap and information management coordination gap in countries.

E34. Recommendation 8: ECW should consider ways in which more country-level coordination of implementation can occur, without procedural overload on country structures. Annual learning events between grantees could be a starting point.

E35. Recommendation 9: Overall, more review and learning are needed in the FERs, and through FERs on key EiEPC issues. The ECW should consider ways of ensuring that this learning happens, e.g. by using Acceleration Facility (AF) funds, or more targeted evaluations.

E36. Recommendation 10: ECW should think strategically on how to use FERs in regional emergencies, when coherence and learning across countries are important.

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Acronyms and abbreviations

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AF	Acceleration Facility
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
ALP	Accelerated Learning Programs
AVSI	Association of Volunteers in International Service
BCG	Boston Consulting Group
CBE	Community-based education
CBPF	Country-based pooled funds
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CESS	Centro de Aprendizagem e Capacitação da Sociedade Civil
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
CRS	Creditor Reporting System
CSO	Civil society organization
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EC	Education Cluster
ECCD	Early Childhood and Care Development
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid
ECW	Education Cannot Wait
EiE	Education in Emergencies
EiEPC	Education in Emergencies and Protracted Crises
EiEWG	Education in Emergencies Working Group
EQ	Evaluation Question
ERC	Emergency Relief Coordinator
ESPIG	education sector program implementation grant
EU	European Union
ExCom	Executive Committee
FER	First Emergency Response
FGD	Focus group discussion
FSO	Funds Support Office
FTS	Fund Transfer System
GCL	Grant confirmation letter
GCPEA	Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack
GIFMM	Interagency Group for Mixed Migration Flows Education Working Group
GPE	Global Partnership for Education
HACT	Harmonized approach to cash transfers
HLSG	High-Level Steering Group
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee

ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally displaced person
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
INEE	Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies
INGO	International non-governmental organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JENA	Joint Education Needs Assessment
KI	Key informant
LEG	Local Education Group
MEAL	Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning
MHPSS	Mental health and psycho-social support
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MYRP	Multi-Year Resilience Program
NFE	Non-Formal Education
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NNGO	National non-governmental organization
NRC	The Norwegian Refugee Council
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PSEA	Prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse
PSS	Psycho-social support
Q&A	Question and answer
ROHI	Restoration of Home Initiative
RRT	Rapid Response Team
RRW	Rapid Response Window
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
STC	Save the Children
TLC	Temporary Learning Centre
TLS	Temporary Learning Space
TOC	Theory of Change
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States dollar
WASH	Water, sanitation and hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WHS	World Humanitarian Summit
WVI	World Vision International

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Full responsibility for this Evaluation Report remains with the authors and the views it contains should not be attributed to ECW.

1. Introduction

1. This is the evaluation report of the Education Cannot Wait (ECW) First Emergency Response (FER) funding, undertaken by Mokoro Limited. The FER is one of three ECW funding modalities and is aimed at responding to the most immediate and urgent education needs in sudden onset and escalating crises. Its purpose is to restore the education function, especially access to and equitable inclusion in education. Section 3 below provides more information on ECW and the FER.
2. Table 1 below provides an overview of the main text and annexes of the evaluation report. In addition, a bibliography of referenced document and key information sources is provided in Annex 10 below.

Table 1 Structure of the Report

Section	Annexes
Section 1: Introduction This section provides the scope, purpose and objectives of the evaluation.	Annex 1: Terms of Reference (TOR) Annex 2: Interview respondents
Section 2: Evaluation methodology Section 2 provides the evaluation methodology.	Annex 3: Evaluation Methodology Annex 5: Grantee survey
Section 3: Evaluation context This section sets out the context for the evaluation, including a discussion of the background to ECW and the FER, and an analysis of stakeholders for the evaluation	Annex 7: Chronology
Section 4: Evaluation findings This section sets out the evaluation findings, in line with the evaluation criteria and questions.	Annex 4: Data and additional graphs Annex 6: Grantee survey summary of responses Annex 8: Evidence from case studies and deep dives Annex 9: Comparative analysis of other funds
Sections 5 and 6: Conclusions and recommendations	

Scope, purpose and objectives of the evaluation

3. The evaluation was conducted as a formative evaluation, aimed at drawing on experience of initial FER operations to increase the effectiveness and impact of the FER. It evaluates the FER's operation across the 32 countries in which it is or has been active, in the context of ECW as a whole from the start of operations (in 2017) to the end of April 2020, taking into account the fact that improvements of the operating model have been made throughout. The evaluation scope was expanded to include the FERs that ECW approved by the end of April 2020 in response to the global COVID-19 pandemic.
4. The purpose of the evaluation is to assess the overall relevance/appropriateness, reach/coverage, efficiency, effectiveness, and coherence/connectedness¹ of the FER modality, and to measure its progress towards systemic and collective results.
5. The objectives of the evaluation are:
 - *To determine the extent to which the FER modality is meeting its envisioned purpose and to better understand what aspects of its design and approach are working or require*

¹ Please see below under Section 2 (Methodology) for a definition of these terms.

improvements in the future. Key aspects of this objective in the Terms of Reference (TOR) are to assess whether the global design for the FER adapts well to country context and dynamics, in comparison and in coordination with other funding mechanisms in the Education in Emergencies and Protracted Crises (EiEPC) sector.

- *To assess the FER project portfolio's collective outcomes at global and country level, with specific attention to the implementation approach and whether ECW and its grantees are fulfilling their expected roles and responsibilities efficiently and effectively throughout the project cycle.*

6. Furthermore, the evaluation is expected to provide important lessons learnt and recommendations to specific actors to improve the FER modality as part of ECW's strategic direction and engagement in the broader global EiEPC sector.

7. Finally, the TOR require recommendations on how ECW should organize the evaluation of its FER modality in future.

2. Evaluation methodology and limitations

8. This section provides an overview of the methodology. A more complete discussion is presented in Annex 3 below.

Evaluation approach and instruments

9. The evaluation is a formative, qualitative evaluation against the evaluation criteria, to assess the degree to which the FER modality is contributing to restoring education functions in sudden onset and escalating crises.

10. The evaluation scope and process were affected by the global COVID-19 pandemic. Its scope was adjusted to include the first ECW COVID-19 round of FERs. Also, data collection and team synthesis processes were conducted mostly at a distance, although some in-person site visits were possible in the country case studies.

Theory of change

11. The evaluation is theory-based, meaning that it investigates whether ECW's theories of how the FERs will result in systemic and beneficiary outcomes at country level are valid – and, in particular, it assesses whether the assumptions, explicit or implicit, that were made in designing the FER, hold in practice.


12. The FER Theory of Change (TOC), drafted for the evaluation and confirmed with the ECW Secretariat through the inception report process, is based on the overall ECW Theory of Change, as set out in the Strategic Plan 2018–2022. The TOC, the basis for the evaluation, is presented below in Figure 1.

13. The FER TOC shows the ECW overall global results chain and operations and illustrates that the global ECW inputs, outputs and systemic outcomes (the vertically arranged results chain on top) are expected to contribute at two levels to FER implementation at country level, namely by providing the underpinning for (i) country- or FER-specific inputs (the yellow column on the left of the country FER results chain); and (ii) country systemic outcomes, which should also be influenced by the FERs at country level, within the scope of the FER modality. The country inputs and outputs (the green

columns) are expected to result in the country beneficiary outcomes (blue column on the far right), which in turn contribute to the global beneficiary outcomes.

14. The key assumptions of the TOC that were tested, are shown in the small white circles in Figure 1 below. Their positioning in the TOC is only approximate and the sequencing of numbers unimportant, but some refer more clearly to the relationship between inputs and activities, or between activities and outputs, and so on.

Figure 1 Generic FER theory of change



15. In summary, the key assumptions are as follows:²

1. ECW efforts at the global level translate into a more enabling environment and funding.
2. ECW selects the right emergencies and issues to reach the most vulnerable.
3. The funding provided by the FERs will act as an incentive for Education in Emergencies (EiE) actors to coordinate.
4. The ECW Secretariat provides relevant support to country processes.
5. Country coordination mechanisms are sufficiently inclusive and transparent to contribute to legitimate, country-owned applications/FERs.
6. The FER templates and question and answer (Q&A) strike the right balance between enabling a rapid response, increasing the reach and improving the quality of the FERs.
7. There is a minimum of country data available, and enough information about the needs of affected populations, including the most vulnerable.

² Please see a full description of the assumptions in Annex 3.

8. The country coordination mechanism/EiEPC actors understand the needs and priorities of the most marginalized affected populations, especially women and girls.
9. Grantees and sub-grantees are sufficiently diverse and can reach the most vulnerable.
10. Grantees have or develop capacity to implement FERs in ways that are sensitive to the needs of the most vulnerable, and to provide accurate reports and results data.
11. The right projects/interventions and grantees were chosen.
12. The right outputs were achieved on time to deliver beneficiary results.

Evaluation criteria

16. The TOR require the assessment of the FER modality on its relevance/appropriateness, reach/coverage, efficiency, effectiveness, and coherence/connectedness. The evaluation developed definitions for the criteria based on the revised Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) evaluation criteria definitions³ and the criteria for the evaluation of humanitarian programmes devised by the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP).⁴ Please see Annex 3 Table 18 for the definitions.

Evaluation questions and evaluation framework

17. The evaluation framework streamlined the TOR questions into a more manageable set of evaluation questions. The main questions are provided below. Annex 3 below provides a detailed framework, including the judgement criteria against each sub-question.

Table 2 Summarized evaluation framework and questions

Criterion	Evaluation questions
Relevance/ Appropriateness	EQ1: How relevant and appropriate are the FER modality and the approved FER proposals?
Coverage/Reach	EQ2: Is the coverage/reach of the FER portfolio optimal? Why (not)?
Coherence/ Connectedness	EQ3: Are the FERs coherent with the humanitarian system and connected to development efforts? Why (not)?
Efficiency	EQ4: Are the FERs managed in an efficient, timely and transparent manner?
Effectiveness	EQ5: Do ECW's fund mobilization efforts support FERs, and have the FERs contributed to education in humanitarian situations at country, regional and global levels?
	EQ6: Systemic outcomes: Did the FER modality and the FERs promote a rapid, timely, joint, coordinated and inclusive approach to EiEPC in countries towards the achievement of country outcomes? Why (not)?
	EQ7: Systemic outcomes: Has ECW strengthened country capacities for effective immediate and rapid response to the educational needs of affected populations, especially girls/women and the most marginalized through the FERs? Why (not)?
	EQ8: Beneficiary outcomes: How effective are the FERs in restoring safe, equitable access to quality education in sudden onset and escalating emergencies? Why (not)?

Data collection methods and processes

18. Data were collected against the evaluation framework through several global and country-based instruments.

³ OECD DAC, 2019.

⁴ ALNAP, 2016.

- **Interviews at the global level** were conducted with members of the ECW Secretariat, the ECW executive committee, representatives of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Funds Support Office (FSO) and additional stakeholders in ECW. Across these categories, interviews were conducted with representatives from key education sector global institutions, relevant UN Agencies, selected ECW current and potential donors, and key International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO) partners. Annex 2 provides a list of people interviewed.
- **Country case studies** were conducted in Colombia, Niger, Nigeria and Mozambique. The purpose of the case studies was to collect and analyse data on FER implementation at country level, against the generic FER theory of change, and the evaluation framework.
- A **survey of FER grantees** was conducted to collect grantees’ perceptions on the performance of FER operations and systems at country level. A total of 133 different grantee focal points were targeted by the survey in 32 countries. The team received 81 completed surveys (a response rate of 61 per cent), and validated two partial answers. Annex 5 and Annex 6 provides more detail on the survey questions and a summary of responses.
- **Analyses of the FER global data and document base and financial flows** were undertaken, drawing on the FER quantitative, qualitative and financial data as consolidated by the ECW Secretariat, as well as the primary documentation on each FER.
- The evaluation also undertook an assessment of the **complementarity with and alignment between FERs and three other modalities**: the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), Common Humanitarian Funds (CHF), and accelerated funding of the Global Partnership for Education (GPE). The assessment comprised interviews with representatives from the modalities and a review of documentation, and drew on interviews with global and country respondents.
- Finally, the evaluation undertook **additional in-depth desk-based analysis of specific FERs**. These focused on the FERs in Nepal and Afghanistan, to supplement the country case studies, and on the COVID-19 FERs, with a specific focus on distance learning.

Analysis and reporting

19. The team used mixed methods of data analysis, mining and triangulating qualitative and quantitative data. A key instrument was systematic **contribution analysis** using the evidence and findings at project/country and global level of the FER to investigate how the observed FER inputs, activities and outputs (the FER package) contributed to observed systemic and beneficiary results, taking other non-FER inputs and context into account.

20. This evaluation report is the main output of the evaluation and was presented virtually to the ECW Secretariat to validate findings. This process was supported by written comments by the ECW Secretariat and other stakeholders, including the Evaluation Advisory Group, as selected by the Secretariat.

Limitations of the evaluation

21. The evaluation research was done mostly virtually, given the COVID-19 pandemic. While the team undertook field-work in Mozambique and Niger via the country-based team members undertaking visits to sub-national regions, all other interviews were conducted remotely. The validation workshops were also virtual. The team was mostly able to reach key stakeholders, but in some cases communication was difficult and individual stakeholders could not be reached. We were

for example not able to undertake project site visits in two of the country case studies: our primary data on the views of affected populations are therefore limited.

22. The team worked with the ECW Secretariat and country coordinators to identify individual national stakeholders, such as government officials and grantees. This may have introduced bias in the interview data. Interview data are triangulated, unless otherwise indicated.

23. The grantee survey has a positive bias, especially on FER processes and decisions, as it includes only applicant grantees that were successful. We have used survey data in the evaluation therefore only when triangulated with interview or other data, including interviews at country level with potential grantees who were not successful.

24. We were able to undertake case studies in four countries out of 32. The country sample was pre-selected by ECW. However, we agreed with the rationale for selection. We supplemented the four country cases with two in-depth cases, but even six out of 32 countries are a relatively small sample to work with. In analysis of evidence we aimed to confirm case country data with other evidence sources.

25. While we received an extensive document base from ECW, not all documents for all countries were present, and not all data sets that we used had complete data points for all cases. Similarly, global data on humanitarian action is incomplete and can be inconsistent. We note in the report which findings are affected.

3. The FER modality: a background

26. This section provides an overview of the Education in Emergencies context, the establishment, purpose and key institutional arrangements of ECW, and the purpose, investments, procedures and rules of the FER modality. It should be read in conjunction with Annex 7, which provides a chronology from 2015 to date against all three areas.

Education in Emergencies and ECW

27. **Establishment of ECW:** Education has been historically neglected as a humanitarian priority, resulting in the fact that more than 75 million children and young people are in urgent need of educational support in crisis-affected countries.⁵ In 2016, the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) showcased Education in Emergencies (EiE), and the ECW Fund was launched as a new funding mechanism to join up humanitarian and development efforts made by various actors, including governments, the United Nations (UN), bilateral and other public donors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the private sector and philanthropy organizations, as well as affected communities, to deliver a more collaborative and rapid response. ECW is the only global multilateral fund dedicated to education in emergencies and protracted crises.⁶

28. ECW was created with a broad mandate to generate greater political, operational and financial commitment across stakeholders towards meeting the educational needs of children and young people affected by crises. Its focus is on more agile, connected and faster responses that span the

⁵ ODI, 2016; Visser et al., 2019.

⁶ ECW, 2020a; ECW, 2018a.

humanitarian-development continuum to lay the ground for sustainable education systems.⁷ Specifically, the activity of ECW is part of the third core responsibility of the WHS Agenda for Humanity (“Leave No One Behind”). It called for reaching those at most risk of being left behind and “reducing displacement, supporting refugees and migrants, endings gaps in education and fighting to eradicate sexual and gender-based violence.”⁸

29. ECW was established in 2016. In late 2016 the fund made four initial investments (in Ethiopia, Syria, Yemen and Chad). The Fund fully started operations in mid-2017 and developed its first strategic plan for the period April 2018 to 2021. This strategic plan built on the preparatory and early strategic work undertaken respectively by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and the Boston Consulting Group (BCG). In 2020 the ECW High-Level Steering Group (HLSG) approved a revised operational manual that sets out ECW’s goal, results, functions and modalities, as well as governance and operational structures and processes.

30. **Funding ECW:** By the end of April 2020, it had attracted USD 573.5 million in funding, of which USD 513.9 was from 13 bilateral donors, USD 19.1 million from a single multilateral donor, and USD 40.6 million from private donors. It had a further USD 67.2 billion in commitments that were not yet signed. The Fund operates as a pooled fund, although some donors have earmarked contributions.

31. **Governance structures:** The Fund’s day-to-day work is led by a senior Director. The overall operations of the Fund are guided by a High-Level Steering Group (HLSG) and overseen by an Executive Committee (ExCom). The HLSG provides strategic guidance to the Fund’s operations and includes heads of UN agencies and multilateral organizations, as well as donor, government and civil society representatives. The ExCom serves as the operational oversight body of ECW. As such it comprises senior staff from UN agencies, multilateral organizations, donors, civil society organizations (CSOs) and governments from crisis-affected countries involved in education or education in emergencies. Both the Global Education Cluster Coordinators (from UNICEF and Save the Children respectively) also have seats on the ExCom.

32. While an independent global fund, ECW is hosted by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), which is the Fund Custodian. The responsibility for facilitating administrative operations for ECW, supporting grant management and ensuring the compliance of grantees with UNICEF rules, regulations and procedures (to which ECW must adhere as a hosted Fund) lies with the Funds Support Office (FSO). The FSO also supports the financial management of ECW, including receiving and holding donor funds, and managing the distribution of ECW funds to grantees.⁹

33. The ECW Secretariat has offices in New York and Geneva, and fulfils key roles in ECW governance, strategy and operations. It acts as a secretariat for the HLSG and the ExCom, it supports the Director on strategy, advocacy and fundraising, and it manages the implementation of the Fund’s modalities. In terms of the latter, the Secretariat’s roles include developing guidance for all grantees, quality-assuring proposals, managing grants in coordination with the UNICEF FSO, working collaboratively with and building the capacity of in-country partners, and developing and implementing monitoring and evaluation frameworks.

⁷ ECW, 2020a, p. 6.

⁸ Agenda for Humanity, 2020.

⁹ ECW, 2020a.


34. The ECW Secretariat is assisted by reference groups (an advisory role overall to the ECW Secretariat on managing the modalities) and an External Review Panel (active on its other funding windows, the Multi-Year Resilience Programs and the Acceleration Facility grants).

35. ECW has three funding windows:

- The **First Emergency Response** (FER) investment window supports education programmes immediately in sudden onset or escalating crises.
- The **Multi-Year Resilience Program** (MYRP) investment window addresses longer-term needs through multi-year joint programmes in protracted crises, enabling humanitarian and development actors to work together on delivering collective education outcomes.
- ECW's third window of investment, the **Acceleration Facility** (AF), complements the FER and MYRP funds by investing in strategic initiatives that will tackle systemic barriers to the effective provision of inclusive, quality education in emergencies and protracted crises, namely: insufficient funding; weak political will, policies and programmatic guidance; a lack of up-to-date quality data and analysis; and inadequate response and coordination capacities.

36. The majority of ECW funding is allocated to support country-level programming through the FER and MYRP (see Figure 2 below). By the end of October 2020, ECW had approved grants of about USD 362 million, of which USD 348 million had been disbursed. Altogether 42 per cent of ECW grants (by value, see Figure 4 below) was approved as FER grants and 42 per cent as MYRPs. Initial investments comprise 15 per cent of total grants approved. The ECW Secretariat expects MYRPs to be more dominant in future as the number of countries with active MYRPs increase. By 2022 the expectation is that MYRPs will disburse about USD 129 million, compared to a FER reserve of USD 24.7 million.

Figure 2 Disbursements to FERs relative to other ECW modalities



Source: ECW Secretariat, Finance Update end April 2020.

37. The implementation of the modalities is governed by an operational manual and other policies, frameworks and strategies, including on gender, resource mobilization and evaluation, as well as a Results Framework. Its financial and human resource administration follows UNICEF's administrative rules and regulations.

ECW's First Emergency Response window

38. The FER window aims to respond to the most immediate and urgent education needs as a crisis suddenly occurs or escalates, providing rapid funding against an inter-agency coordinated proposal and aligning with inter-agency planning and resource mobilization strategies, such as Flash Appeals and Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs). FER projects have a duration of six months to one year, although some receive a no-cost extension. ECW's target is to deliver funds "as expediently as possible" after the declaration of the emergency, or of ECW entering into a dialogue with field emergency coordination mechanisms, such as an Education Cluster, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), an EiE Working Group, or a Local Education Group (LEG).¹⁰

39. **FER financing and investments.** Within the funding raised for ECW, a reserve is set aside for quick responses to emergencies through the FERs. When needed, if it is exhausted before the end of the year, the ECW ExCom approves a replenishment of the reserve based on a request from the Secretariat and a recommendation from the ECW Director. In 2018 the FER reserve was initially set at USD 15 million by ECW's ExCom, and increased the following February to USD 24.7 million. In June 2019 the ExCom approved the replenishment of the FER reserve to USD 24.7 million for 2019, following Cyclone Idai in Southern Africa in March 2019 and the Venezuela crisis soon after. In April 2020, faced with the COVID-19 pandemic, ECW called on the private sector, foundations, governments and other donors to urgently replenish its emergency funds reserve with at least USD 50 million, which was required to respond to expected additional needs and emergencies in the immediate future. As a result of these replenishments, it is expected that during the 2018–2021 strategic period, FER expenditure is likely to double from the initially expected approximately USD 75 million and comprise up to 25 per cent of ECW funding, making it more prominent in the ECW's operations than initially expected.

40. FER investments primarily focus on restoring the education function, and results focus on access, inclusion and equity, based on the differentiated needs of girls, women, boys and men, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Thus, activities often relate to the restoration of facilities, school grants, provision of teaching and learning materials, community engagement and teacher training/motivation. However, the FER also funds necessary system-strengthening and ECW aims to facilitate and strengthen an EiEPC response via joint advocacy efforts, funding and support to coordination structures.¹¹ Although this is rare, some FERs have also looked at holistic learning outcomes, e.g. in northeast Nigeria and in Afghanistan.

41. The value-added contributions of FERs are seen by ECW to be the following:¹²

- their speed – the FERs are set up to deliver an immediate and rapid response to sudden onset and escalating crises;
- the repositioning of education as a priority within humanitarian response;

¹⁰ ECW, 2020a.

¹¹ ECW, 2019a.

¹² See for example, ECW Operational Manual (ECW, 2020a).

- their ability to leverage additional funding for education in emergencies;
- their focus on gender and equity in an education response, and on reaching the most vulnerable and often marginalized boys and girls, and youth; and
- their ability to strengthen the education system and bridge the gap between humanitarian and development actors.

42. Between its inception in 2017 through to the end of 2019, FER investments funded projects in 29 countries in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and South Asia, investing a total of USD 86 million.¹³ In 2017, before the ECW Director was in place, ECW began to operationalize the FER window with a USD 20 million investment to Peru, the Central African Republic, Madagascar, Somalia, Ukraine, Afghanistan and Uganda. Subsequent FER grants were made that year in Ukraine and Somalia. In 2018, six new FER grants were launched in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Indonesia, Lebanon, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea and Syria. In 2019, FER allocations were launched for countries responding to Cyclone Kenneth, Cyclone Idai, the Sahel insecurity, the Venezuelan refugee and migrant crisis, conflict and displacement in Cameroon and the refugee influx in Greece. Each FER has between two and five grantees in each country, or 100 in total (see Figure 3 for a distribution by type of recipient).¹⁴ Between January and April 2020 three further FERs were approved: additional rounds in Mali and Niger, and a FER responding to insecurity in Yemen.

43. In April 2020, ECW announced a new series of FERs to 24 countries/emergency contexts¹⁵ in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, totalling USD 23 million.¹⁶ The supported interventions are for alternative delivery models to continue education in emergency-affected areas, especially of social-emotional learning and psycho-social support; for messaging and support around COVID-19 risks; and upgrading of water and sanitation facilities in schools. Two countries benefitted that had previously not had FERs (Ethiopia and Chad) but had MYRP processes or grants underway. Figure 3 below provides an overview of the FERs included in the scope of this study, by country, USD value and year.

44. In July 2020 ECW announced the allocation of a further USD 19 million in a second COVID-19 FER round, focused on refugee, internally displaced and host community children in Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Iraq, Kenya, Lebanon, Libya, South Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia. This brought the total number of countries reached through FERs to 38, and the total amount of resources allocated through the modality to USD 135.1 million.


¹³ ECW Secretariat, FER Summary Database as of the end of January 2020. These are: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Colombia, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ecuador, Greece, Indonesia, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine and Palestinian Refugees, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Somalia, Syria, Uganda, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.

¹⁴ ECW, 2019b.

¹⁵ The 24 FERs include two COVID-19 FER grants that were made related to the Palestinian conflict, one linked to the response in Palestine and the second the response in the region.

¹⁶ ECW, 2020c; ECW, 2020d.

Figure 3 FER grants: By country, USD value and year of approval (2017–July 2020)



Source: Data received from ECW Secretariat; ECW, 2020, COVID-19 press releases (ECW, 2020c; ECW, 2020d).

45. **FER processes, frameworks and rules.** There has been significant evolution in FER processes, frameworks and rules since its inception, with an increase in detailed operational guidance and technical support within the ECW Secretariat; a move toward more rapid processes and disbursements of funds; and, most recently, a paring down of FER processes and templates used in the COVID-19 response, to ensure a more rapid response to the pandemic. The initial FERs in 2017 were managed using a lean template modelled on the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). The guidance was formalized in the 2017 Grantee Operating Manual. Between 2018 and 2019, however, this FER template was expanded as a result of increased demands primarily from ECW’s Executive Committee,

who often raised many questions on incoming applications, which caused the ECW Secretariat to undertake a constant process of revision.

46. In July 2019 ECW's detailed updated guidance on the FER window was published within the *Guide for Applying for First Emergency Response Grants*, which provides in-country partners with information on how to develop a FER application for funding. The guide includes separate templates for drafting FER Concept Notes, for FER grant applications by potential grantees and for their implementing partner organizations. It covers crisis selection criteria for FER grants, an overview of the FER application process and timeline, the responsibilities of in-country Coordination Leads to establish wide and transparent communication channels involving government and all in-country partners, process requirements for successful applications, programmatic guidance, grantee selection criteria, detailed guidance for completing the FER application template, an overview of quality assurance processes, the monitoring responsibilities of FER grantees, reporting requirements, and interactions with the Secretariat and Fund Custodian that grantees may anticipate during programme implementation. Appendices to the guide provide the actual templates required by applicants.

47. The 2019 Guidance on the proposal-writing and internal quality assurance review processes was heavier and more time consuming for both grantees and Secretariat staff, with some grantee proposals topping 80 pages. By early 2020 ECW was again considering how to pare down the FER templates to the essentials that are required to manage grants well, while allowing quick applications, approvals and disbursements. In March the need for a rapid response to the COVID-19 emergency provided an opportunity for the ECW Secretariat to rapidly revise the template back to a leaner form, removing unnecessary sections and shedding bureaucracy for the sake of rapidness.

48. The ECW HLSG approved an updated cross-modality Operational Manual in April 2020, which includes updated guidance on the FER that had been developed alongside. The manual incorporates several appendices, which provide updated detailed guidance and templates for FER application, reporting and results monitoring. In 2020 the Secretariat also developed a detailed grantee selection guide. The ECW Secretariat manages crisis review and selection processes flexibly, but within the confines of the manual. The paragraphs below (49 to 59) provide a summary of how FER processes have evolved.

49. *Identification of crises and initiation of FER grants:* ECW aims to be proactive, especially in large-scale, acute emergencies. The ECW Secretariat actively monitors classifications by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), UNICEF and UNHCR, and where there are sudden onset crises or escalations in existing crises, it approaches coordination mechanisms to test the demand and need for ECW support. In addition, ECW also responds to requests from in-country stakeholders regarding emerging or escalating crises, communicated by the humanitarian coordinator, coordination mechanism(s) or national government. The ECW Secretariat aims to review the requests and make the crisis selection decision within one week of the triggering of a crisis review, and will base its decision on eligibility (e.g. emergency classification and occurrence of new displacements and/or increases of out-of-school children), assistance needs, gaps in support, likely value-add and alignment with ECW strategic priorities. The size of the investment should be determined by the extent of the needs, the size of the response, available financial resources, and capacity of partners to implement.¹⁷

¹⁷ ECW, 2020a.


50. *Designing a FER and selecting and approving grantees:* FERs are meant to be designed at country level in a process facilitated by the country coordination mechanism. Once ECW has made the decision to fund a response through FER grants and outlined the available budget, the coordination lead – a representative from an institution that leads the country coordination mechanism – announces ECW funding and leads the drafting of a consultative Concept Note.¹⁸ The purpose of the short Concept Note step is for the ECW Secretariat to gauge the needs and the other funding to the response, and thus the appropriate level of ECW funding. Country-level partners are expected to then develop a full application based on an indication of available resources from ECW.

51. The full application proceeds once the ECW Secretariat has invited the country coordination mechanism to submit an application. Subsequent processes of joint needs assessment, the development and prioritization of grantees’ proposals, and the completion of the FER application form also occur under the leadership of the coordination leads but require the involvement of all country partners and grantees. The ECW Secretariat may support the development of the application.

52. The country application must already include decisions about which organizations will receive FER grants. A consistent central principle of the FER has been that decisions about grantees are made at country level. The 2020 Operational Manual allows for grantee flexibility, specifying that ECW is “committed to diversification” and that ECW can directly fund NGOs which have been micro-assessed in line with the Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers (HACT) with a risk rating of ‘low’ or ‘moderate.’ Other organizations are eligible to receive funds as sub-grantees of directly funded grantees, in line with the sub-granting procedures of the grantee. In exceptional circumstances, for example in response to rapid onset natural disasters, ECW may fund a non-HACT-assessed grantee and treat them as ‘high risk’ pending the completion of a HACT micro-assessment.¹⁹

53. In practice, the spread of FER grantees between UN agencies and international and national NGOs has evolved under these principles. Figure 3 below reflects the distribution of FER grants by value between direct grants to local NGOs (LNGOs), international NGOs (INGOs) and UN agencies for the FER grants under review.

Figure 4 FER grants under review: by year and type of grantee (2017–April 2020)



Source: Excludes 2020 FERs. Calculated from data received from ECW Secretariat.

54. While ECW depends on country processes to design a FER and select grantees, the ECW Secretariat influences the design of FERs, through its FER application review processes. The initial Secretariat was small and consisted of the Director and a few advisors who guided on the

¹⁸ Note that concept notes were not required for the COVID-19 FERs.

¹⁹ ECW, 2020a, p. 25.

development of policies and procedures but also undertook the work associated with the first FERs in 2017. The Secretariat gradually expanded, and by the start of the inception mission was at full planned strength, comprising six units (Monitoring and Evaluation, Education Quality, Partnerships, Advocacy and Communication, Governance and Accountability, and Finance and Administration), in addition to the Director, Deputy Director and two advisors. Within the Governance Unit, the ECW Secretariat has created a Risk Management and Child Safeguarding Manager position, reflecting risk management as a key component of ECW programme management.

55. With the expansion of Secretariat staff to include staff with specific technical expertise, ECW has increased quality control processes in FER applications in terms of education results and cross-cutting issues such as gender, inclusion, protection, mental health and psycho-social support (MHPSS). This process has been supported through the development of ECW's technical policies, such as its Gender Strategy 2018–2021, a Gender Equality Policy 2019–2021 and an accompanying accountability framework, and a MHPSS Guidance Note.

56. For FERs up to USD 3 million, the ECW Director approves the FER on the basis of recommendations from the ECW Secretariat, without referral to the ExCom, provided that UNICEF (while it is the fund custodian) is not a grantee.²⁰ Larger FERs are approved by the ExCom on the basis of recommendations from the ECW Director, and FERs for investments of less than USD 3 million require a no-objection to the Director's approval from the ExCom when UNICEF is a grantee.

57. *Disbursement, implementation and reporting.* The UNICEF FSO performs due diligence on all FER grantees before disbursing funds. This includes checking their HACT status; screening against the UN Security Council Sanction list, assessment for prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA, since 2019); and an assessment against UNICEF's core values. For grantees other than UNICEF, a standard grant confirmation letter (GCL) must be signed by both UNICEF as the fund custodian and the grantee before disbursement can occur.

58. Grantees are required to submit progress and completion reports in accordance with their GCL, which follows the FER reporting schedule. Grantees submit six-monthly financial reports on the use and expenditure of funds, as well as a final financial report for the entire period of the grant. Grantees produce annual reports, which includes narrative reporting and an annual financial statement. The narrative report checks on implementation progress and requires detailed reporting against the outputs and outcomes targeted in the FER application for each grantee, including on the mandatory indicators for grantees. There are generally fewer mandatory indicators for FER grantees than for MYRPs, given the short implementation period and rapid design processes.

59. In addition, ECW may conduct or participate in programmatic reviews of grantees. For FERs ECW also may institute third-party monitoring visits of grantees and fiduciary risk spot checks such as in Indonesia. The ECW Secretariat reviews, analyses and approves the FER grantee annual reports, and reports across FERs through its own annual report.

²⁰ For the COVID-19 FERs, a blanket approval was given for UNICEF as a grantee.

4. Evaluation Findings

RELEVANCE AND APPROPRIATENESS

EQ 1: How relevant and appropriate are the FER modality and the approved FER proposals?

60. This section sets out the evaluation's findings against the three sub-questions of EQ1, namely whether the FER as a modality is likely to add value to EiEPC responses, whether FERs are appropriate to local needs and conditions, and how relevant the support of the ECW Secretariat is to the FER grants.

61. Based on the findings, we find the FER modality added value to EiEPC responses, because it delivers rapid funding and repositions education as a priority on the humanitarian agenda. Its design, including the emphasis on speed, local coordination and flexibility, makes it especially relevant in sudden onset and escalating crises. The modality is, however, less relevant in protracted crises where there is not a clear escalation in need, and its speed and flexibility do not trigger the same added value as in sudden onset and escalating crises. The FERs contribute to raising more resources for EiEPC responses, at global and country level, even if not necessarily in all countries where they are deployed.

62. We also find that the FERs finance relevant interventions because they occur in an underfunded sector, respond to identified needs, and vary responses according to the emergency context. Driven by a desire to give more organizations access to resources, FERs are, however, fragmented into multiple small grants in a number of countries, which impacts the extent to which these FERs can be strategic.

63. The support given by the ECW Secretariat was appropriate, and in-country missions where they occurred, important for FER roll-out.

Findings on the relevance/appropriateness of the FER modality

Finding 1. The objective of the FER modality, to deliver rapid funding to restore education in emergencies, remains relevant to global EiEPC needs.

64. **The FER modality is seen as important to contribute to children's immediate safety as well as to both short- and long-term education outcomes.** Many global respondents emphasized the importance of an early education sector response to secure, safe, child-friendly spaces for children and youth affected by the emergency, to prevent risks, such as child labour, and early marriage and pregnancy. Country cases confirmed this: in Niger, Nigeria and Afghanistan, for example, the FER EiEPC response was found to be critical to help protect children.

65. Similarly, education sector actors at global and country levels, saw rapid restoration of education access as contributing to children returning to education, thereby minimizing the impact of emergencies on learning. "The longer children are not learning, the greater the impacts on learning in the long-term."

66. The FER modality was seen as highly important to these effects of restoring education access, because it is simultaneously earmarked for education, pooled, flexible and designed to be disbursed fast. This raises the likelihood of fast, coordinated, and country and crisis-appropriate responses in the education sector.

67. ECW's rapid COVID-19 response is a good example of why the modality is an important component in ECW's capability to support the sector. The flexibility of the FER modality and the arrangements for its management meant that ECW could respond quickly to the pandemic through using its FER reserves, and seeking replenishment funds.

Finding 2. The FERs are important to reposition education as a priority on the humanitarian agenda.

68. **The FERs are seen as important to fulfil this ambition of ECW.** Global education actors emphasized the value of the FERs as a proof of concept because they demonstrated what ECW had been set up to do.

69. Similarly, many respondents emphasized that ECW's fast response to COVID-19, through the first FER round which was announced at the end of March 2020, was important to highlight the impact on education for emergency-affected populations of the global pandemic, globally and at country level. This built the profile of ECW and furthered the broader agenda of promoting the role of education in emergencies.

Finding 3. The design of the FER modality – its speed, emphasis on local coordination and flexibility – is relevant to EiEPC objectives and needs in sudden onset and escalating crises.

70. **As a rapid, pooled funding instrument, the FER is uniquely set to contribute to critical early coordination and agreement on needs, and kickstart a multi-stakeholder coordinated EiEPC response when a fast response is needed.** Other rapid funding streams are available for EiEPC, such as responding with organizations' internal funds or direct funding from donors. Such funding streams, however, do not have the same potential to bring together different but complementary actors under one plan. Other pooled mechanisms are available, such as the UNOCHA Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and the Country-Based Pooled Funds (CBPFs), but they are not education-specific. The Global Partnership for Education (GPE) Accelerated Funding is an education-specific pooled funding mechanism that countries with a GPE allocation can access to respond to emergencies and finance recovery, but it is not set up like the FERs for immediate response in humanitarian situations. The FERs, due to their design, are uniquely positioned to incentivize country education actors to coordinate early and assess education needs when crises strike, kick-starting a coordinated response. As such it has a complementary role to mechanisms such as the CERF, CBPFs and the GPE Accelerated Funding.

71. In Mozambique, for example, the modality was relevant to the needs as it kick-started the post-disaster education response through rapid initial funding, highlighting educational needs and catalysing coordination between responders. It also helped to rapidly establish coordination between humanitarian education actors, development actors and Government. In Colombia, processes around the FER brought education as an emergency issue to the foreground for the Government of Columbia.

72. In Nigeria, respondents strongly emphasized the value of the COVID-19 FER to initiate an education response to the pandemic amongst EiEPC actors in the north-east. While the funding was small, grantees felt that it pushed them quickly into thinking through how they would support affected children through the emergency.

73. Global respondents also pointed out that the FER reserve is an important design feature of the modality. As said by an INGO respondent: "The advantage of the FER is that there is always a reserve

to be allocated. Decisions can be made in sudden emergencies quickly without waiting for donors to allocate funds.” The accountability of ECW that arises out of its governance arrangements, and that it is housed in a UN Agency, contributes to the willingness of donors to contribute to ECW/the FER reserve.

74. Anchoring FERs in country-driven processes and within the UN coordination structure, and Humanitarian Response Plans, is seen as important for appropriate, coherent and connected responses. The requirements that FER proposals and grantee decisions must be made by country-based processes and structures, and aligned to the country HRP if in place, are seen as needed to ensure an appropriated, coordinated and funded response. In Nigeria, for example, a joint education needs assessment in the north-east was enabled through ECW, allowing the FER strategy to target assessed immediate needs. In Mozambique, the case study found that the activities selected were appropriate and relevant to ensure rapid resumption of learning.

75. Many global respondents also noted that working with existing structures avoided duplication of processes and structures, which is especially relevant in an emergency situation where capacities and time for coordination are limited.

76. Working through the UN structures is also thought to be important for facilitating access to high-risk areas when grantees are not UN organizations themselves. Respondents at global level and some country cases, however, noted that strong connections to the HRPs when these significantly reflect government policies in internal conflict context, may affect whether the FERs are neutral humanitarian instruments. This was seen as being a broader problem for humanitarian engagement, and not specific to the FERs. The FERs could be highly relevant instruments to deliver funding to address the immediate needs of affected youths and children, because they can be implemented through non-governmental organizations. Similarly, they are also relevant instruments in geographic areas that are not under state control.

77. The flexibility of the FERs in terms of the kind of organizations that can be grantees, and what is funded, increases the potential for better quality responses. Respondents thought that the ability to provide rapid funding directly not only to UN but also to non-UN actors who are on the ground with the knowledge and capability to act, is an important value-add of the FERs. This raises the likelihood of more crisis- and context-sensitive responses, or an improved capability to reach more marginalized affected populations. The importance of NGOs, and especially national NGOs, participating in emergency responses was raised both by many global respondents and some country respondents, who pointed out the cost of not including more local organizations as FER grantees. The evaluation found some evidence of where having local grantees enabled better responses. For example, in Afghanistan national NGO grantees were able to better work with communities to provide education access for returning refugees in a setting where education facilities were still targeted, because of their well-developed existing community relationships. In Mozambique, national NGOs were seen to be better able to reach the most remote communities affected by the 2018 cyclones.

78. The flexibility of the FERs to finance what country actors prioritize as important to restore education, was also seen as relevant to needed crisis-sensitivity. For example, in Colombia the agreement to fund education services for refugees and marginalized host community children alike, was important for the relevance of the response.

79. Finally, the flexibility built into the FER design to adjust response plans in response to EiEPC technical issues during implementation, has been critical to the relevance of the FERs. The flexibility allowed by FER operating procedures is well supported by the EiEPC capabilities of the ECW Secretariat, which is staffed primarily with EiEPC specialists, unlike other funds supporting the sector. In Colombia, the evaluation found that ECW responded quickly and with flexibility to approve menstrual hygiene management kits when the NGO consortium presented evidence of need during implementation. The Mozambique case study also found that the flexibility to adjust implementation locations was important for the response.

Finding 4. Because it is fast and it helps demonstrate early EiEPC coordination, the FERs can catalyse additional resources, but does not always do so.

80. **Deployment of the FER modality raises the profile of education as an emergency sector at country level, and there are cases where it is also catalytic, contributing to additional resources for the sector.** Key elements of the FER design that can trigger additional contributions from donors are that it is fast, raises the profile of education needs early in sudden onset or escalating emergencies and helps the sector to organize; this can give donors – especially donors that are more experienced in the development sector – the confidence to finance education in emergencies at country level.

81. In at least two cases, in the 2017 Lebanon and 2019 Mozambique FERs, additional bilateral resources were channelled through the ECW for the education emergency response. In Mozambique, DFID and Dubai Cares earmarked USD 2.5 million via a second FER round. France contributed USD 2.3 million to finance education via ECW in Lebanon. Furthermore, in interviews, ECW bilateral donors raised the issue that the environment created by FERs make it easier for them to finance EiEPC interventions directly. “Our colleagues in the field report that there is a feasible environment because of the ECW,” one headquarters representative noted. Cases that were cited where development donors (especially bilaterals) financed EiE interventions were Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso and Mozambique.

82. **There are also cases where FERs do not trigger additional resources.** The three other country case studies – in Colombia, Niger and Nigeria – found little evidence of additional resources to the sector outside of the FERs, even though the FERs in all cases raised the profile of education as an emergency sector. International respondents with country experience similarly noted that the FERs are not followed by additional resources for the EiEPC response. For example, one respondent noted that the COVID-19 FER in Chad did not trigger additional resources. Furthermore, some UN agency and civil society respondents raised the fear that once a FER is in place, allocations to the education sector from other emergency funds do not happen, because humanitarian donors view the sector as already funded through ECW.

83. Global data also suggest that the FERs are generally not associated with better funding for the education sector in emergencies *at the country level*. While there is no database that provides comprehensive, consistent and appropriately disaggregated data on education in emergency expenditure,²¹ we used the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database on emergency and

²¹ The OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) does not have EiE as a subcategory of education spending, nor education as a subcategory of humanitarian flows, and includes only some private donors. The Fund Transfer System (FTS) of UNOCHA, reports by source donor and destination country, but is not comprehensive. Furthermore, funding to ECW is often designated as funding to UNICEF, because of the hosting arrangement, so that is difficult to exclude all flows to ECW from calculations.

education spending, and the UNOCHA Fund Transfer System (FTS) database to assess broad trends in spending in FER countries, versus spending in all other countries, in the year when the FERs were triggered and in subsequent years. Analysis of the FTS database shows that in 2017, 2018 and 2019 countries with FERs did not have a higher proportion of education needs funded (in US dollar terms) against associated Humanitarian Plans than countries without FERs. Furthermore, an analysis of reported Central Emergency Response Fund allocations to education, shows that in 2017, 2018 and 2019 these allocations in FER countries (as a share of total allocations) were about half of allocations in all other countries, which gives some credence to fears that humanitarian actors shift funding from education because it is perceived to have its own fund. CERF, however, is intended as a source for countries that are not funded fast enough, or are underfunded. If ECW becomes active, the country's education sector is ipso facto less neglected, so it is quite possible that its share of CERF funds may decline.

84. However, the FERs have built the profile of ECW, bringing in additional resources to ECW, additional donors to EiEPC via ECW, and may have contributed to additional resources to EiEPC as a sector. The ECW Secretariat noted that the FERs can be credited with attracting more donors to the ECW, and supporting existing donors to increase their contributions, because FERs were quick and delivered results from the outset of ECW. Most recently, the use of the FER modality in ECW's response to COVID-19 is also widely credited with attracting new donors and more resources to the Fund.

85. More recent ECW donors interviewed, noted that the resources allocated to ECW are indeed new, additional contributions from their side to the EiEPC sector. Some of the donors, such as the Government of Finland and the Lego Foundation, are entirely new to the sector itself. Some earlier donors were also clear that their ECW contribution was additional, such as the European Union (EU) and the Department for International Development (DFID). Donors noted the speed with which the ECW moves as a factor in contributing to ECW: "As we learnt about sector, we saw ECW being able to move fast and also to push the education agenda in the humanitarian field. It was particularly the speed of the FERs that attracted us." Furthermore, the emphasis in FERs on sources of higher vulnerability such as gender and disability, was cited by some donors as a factor in the decision to fund ECW.

86. On the balance of evidence, however, the flows to ECW seem additional and only a portion of the additional funding from ECW donors to EiEPC. Some UN agency and civil society respondents noted a continued concern that while ECW may result in some additional funding, donors may just be re-channelling existing allocations through ECW. Both the FTS and CRS data, however, suggest that this is not the case. We compared ECW donors' outlays on education in emergencies before 2016 (when the first donations to ECW were made) to after 2016, relative to all other donors' outlays, excluding transfers to ECW. It shows on both the CRS²² and the FTS databases, that ECW donors had significantly increased their EiEPC outlays. Interestingly, on the FTS database that includes incoming flows to education from INGOs and many other donors that do not report to the OECD DAC, the share of humanitarian funds that go to education from ECW donors is below the share to education from all other sources, and it grows more slowly. On the CRS database that mostly reports on flows from bilateral, multilateral and a few private donors, in contrast, the share to education of ECW donors' humanitarian commitments grew by 57 per cent, while for all other donors it grew by 18 per cent. In

²² The analysis of the CRS data involved tagging all projects that mention education as a target sector under all commitments to humanitarian expenditure of ECW donors versus all donors.

all cases the share is low, however. For example, on FTS the share to education-specific incoming flows in 2019, was still only 2.7 per cent. But this was up from 1.3 per cent in 2016 and represents a 43 per cent growth in available resources reported to FTS.

Relevance of FERs to local needs and emergency conditions

Finding 5. In practice, FER interventions are relevant because they occur in an under-funded sector and are aligned with country response plans and needs.

87. **The country cases found that the FERs were relevant because they provided funding to an otherwise underfunded sector.** In Niger the 2019 FERs were aligned with the HRP and as a consequence were seen to be supporting relevant areas. In Nepal too, the documentation points to alignment with HRP priority actions and the financing of these actions in the most affected districts. Similarly, in Nigeria and Colombia the FER projects responded to identified and immediate needs respectively that were underfunded.

88. **The COVID-19 FERs were also found to respond to assessed needs.** In the ten COVID-19 FER proposals that we analysed,²³ we found that the responses were generally aligned with the COVID-19 impacts in countries, and the assessed needs. The proposals recognized key impacts on education provision and outcome of the pandemic, including that (i) many children, especially girls, are not likely to return to school because of child protection risks, such as child household labour, early marriage and survival sex, and recruitment into armed groups while out of school; (ii) the risk of loss of learning; and (iii) the impacts on teachers and care-givers. The proposals recognized that many families would be unable to access basic needed hygienic equipment, and would face increased food insecurity. The FER responses generally detailed how they would address the impacts and risks identified, through distance education, child protection during school closures, and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH). The table below reflects these details.

Table 3 COVID-19 FER proposals’ relevance to assessed needs

COVID-19 Issue	Response examples
Distance education	<p>The distance education interventions are similar, in that most, if not all, include radio programs, and in some cases TV programmes (for example in the DRC, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Colombia, Venezuela, and Palestine). Investment in radio programmes is in itself a positive aspect and responds to the needs and technical limitations faced by most beneficiaries. However, conventional radio has limitations insofar as it does not allow interaction with the content broadcast. In eight of the nine countries, grantees offered complementary support.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the DRC and Bangladesh interactive radio instruction was offered, in the DRC backed by educational assistants accessible through hotlines. • In Colombia grantees proposed to provide printed materials to learners to complement radio content, in the DRC workbooks were proposed, and in Palestine worksheets. • Many countries had online materials made available, e.g. Mozambique, Ethiopia, Palestine and Niger. In Nigeria proposals included downloading courses onto flash-drives and distributing these to families. • In Colombia and the DRC, in-person education support to families/children was proposed. The Niger proposal was the only one that specifically mentioned tailoring measures to post-crises actions, focusing on accelerated and remedial learning. In Mozambique and the DRC future plans to offer such programmes were mentioned.

²³ Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Colombia, the DRC, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine and Venezuela.

COVID-19 Issue	Response examples
Child protection and psycho-social support	In the DRC a call centre was proposed for child protection and psycho-social support; together with support for home visits. In Bangladesh counselling was offered by phone, due to restricted internet access in refugee camps. In the DRC distance education programmes were adapted to include gender equality and psycho-social support material, as well as awareness on COVID-19. Generally, in most countries distance education measures were to include messaging on protection and psycho-social support issues.
Water, sanitation and hygiene	In Palestine and Mozambique, there is a strong focus on latrines, water points and hygiene kits. In Niger village chiefs were targeted as multipliers of messages on hygiene and protection, and hygiene materials were provided to regional educational offices. In Colombia schools were being assisted with hygiene routines. In most countries, distance education activities are targeted to include messages on hygiene.
Nutrition	In Colombia the COVID-19 FER distributed dry rations to negate food insecurity, and in Niger the COVID-19 FER supported the World Food Programme (WFP). Although other proposals mentioned food security, the FERs did not respond to this need.

Source: COVID-19 FER country proposals.

89. In some countries, however, proposals were overly generic (e.g. Afghanistan), or included activities that did not link clearly to the needs assessment (e.g. the full budget for UNICEF in Niger was invested in an end-of-school cycle exam preparation; while this could possibly be appropriate in principle, the needs assessment did not provide a background for the intervention). There were also some cases of needs that were not matched to activities, e.g. in Ethiopia emphasis on the 'imperative' need that teachers in high COVID-19 caseload areas, should be equipped with MHPSS training, is not reflected in the activities. Generally, the COVID-19 FER proposals suffered from an absence of data on needs, given how fast the modality was deployed in a context of high uncertainty. Furthermore, few proposals described needs outside the ones responded to, but this is a generic issue with proposal formats which is taken up further under the efficiency discussion below.


Finding 6. FER interventions are varied across countries, which suggests they are context sensitive. At the detailed level, however, responses may not be fully crisis sensitive.

90. **There is significant variation between FER interventions according to the type of emergency, especially in terms of what grantees opt for under specific EiEPC objectives.** We set out to test the common concern raised by global actors that FERs finance similar response packages by the same group of actors across countries and emergencies. This would mean that the modality would fall short on delivering strategic interventions that maximize relatively small resource flows against context-specific needs. If different emergencies and country contexts require different packages of responses, the responses that FERs fund would need to show differentiated patterns across the emergencies supported to some degree. In order to test this, we used ECW FER data that coded each intervention by grantee against an array of common intervention types. We tested two hypotheses: (i) that FERs finance similar interventions across types of emergencies; and (ii) that ECW FER partners tend to do the same. Annex 4 Table 20 provides the taxonomy of interventions, arranged by ECW beneficiary outcome objectives.²⁴ For this exercise we used the ECW's own categorization of intervention types and grantees. To code what emergencies the FERs were responding to, we coded each grant according to the context description of the proposal.

²⁴ These outcome objectives are: access, continuity of education, quality, safety and systems strengthening.

91. Figure 5 below shows the findings. The graphs present for each emergency context the share of grants that implemented each specific intervention. Graph A shows the share of times each ECW objective was covered. Graphs B to F zoom in on the share of grants that implemented each specific intervention out of all grants that included interventions towards the associated objective. Higher variation between types of crises is indicated by differences between 'footprints' for each objective set as sketched by the lines, and bigger gaps between the data points for each type of emergency by each intervention.

Figure 5 Incidence of intervention types in different types of emergencies



Source: ECW FER database, own calculations.

92. **For the most part the different patterns observed, appear emergency sensitive, but with some important exceptions.** Figure 5A shows that grantees vary their responses across ECW objectives according to the type of emergency. For example, a much higher share of total grants in refugee and conflict and displacement emergencies included continuity interventions, than grants in natural disasters.

93. Graphs B to F also show variation between types of emergencies. On access for example, building or rehabilitating recreational spaces is far more common in grants to refugee emergencies than in other emergencies; across continuity interventions natural disasters have a lower share of grants with relevant activities, than other emergencies; and the footprint for refugee emergencies differs significantly in the quality intervention graph (graph D), while graph E (safety interventions) and F (system strengthening) both show variation between all three emergency types.

94. In most areas the variation between footprints and shares by type of emergency is broadly appropriate. Graph F (systems strengthening) shows that grantees support community-driven monitoring in emergencies involving conflict and displacement more often than in other emergencies, and support national systems in natural disasters more often. Graph B (access) shows a higher incidence of cash transfers and awareness campaigns on education and related topics in refugee emergencies.

95. However, some patterns, but fewer, are more difficult to reconcile with possible needs. For example in graph E (safety), there is the low provision of teacher training on PSS in refugee contexts versus the strong showing of that in conflict and displacement contexts. And in graph F (system strengthening) there is low incidence of initiatives to mobilize the communities around education in refugee emergencies; and low incidence of training on conflict-sensitive education in emergencies caused by conflict and displacement.

96. **Furthermore, grantee responses also show appropriate degrees of variation across contexts and emergencies.** Table 4 below shows a heatmap of concentration ratios for each set of interventions, by type of grantee, as well as for the five grantees that implemented most grants globally. The concentration ratio is a measure of how often grantees undertake the same interventions. It measures what proportion of all interventions undertaken across countries are concentrated in the top one third of interventions that are most often undertaken. For example, under the quality outcome objective, it measures exactly how often grantees opt for the four interventions they most often perform, out of a possible 12 interventions. The assumption is that high concentrations would imply grantees disproportionately opting for the same measure in different circumstances. Such concentrations may, however, reflect their specialized expertise, as is the case for the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in the table below. Annex 4 Table 21 provides the footprints of interventions, by type of grantee, for further details.

Table 4 Concentration of interventions by EiEPC objective

	Access (Top 3 of 8) ²⁵	Continuity (Top 1 of 4)	Quality (Top 4 of 12)	Safety (Top 3 of 8)	Systems Strengthening (Top 2 of 5)	All possible interventions (Top 10 of 37)
All	67%	47%	60%	64%	62%	53%
Type of grantees						
INGO	68%	50%	58%	65%	58%	53%
Local NGO	72%	44%	75%	73%	90%	67%
UN agencies	68%	41%	70%	68%	67%	57%
Top 5 grantees						
UNICEF	67%	43%	74%	70%	64%	57%
Save the Children (STC)	73%	57%	64%	64%	59%	55%
Plan	65%	43%	61%	77%	65%	58%
UNESCO	100%	50%	60%	100%	83%	64%
World Vision	60%	100%	63%	71%	71%	60%

Source: ECW FER database, own calculations.

97. The table shows that for all grantees and across all possible interventions, the top ten interventions most often implemented are equal to 53 per cent of interventions implemented across countries. At closer inspection, however, these seem to be appropriate high-frequency interventions in EiEPC interventions. For example:

- Access interventions are the most concentrated, reflecting a high focus on building and rehabilitating schools, latrines and other infrastructure for all grantees, especially for local NGOs.
- Safety measures are also fairly concentrated. The measures most often implemented are training of teachers on psycho-social support and inclusive education, and implementing codes of conduct for schools, which are aligned with ECW emphases and have relevance in most contexts.
- In systems strengthening, monitoring systems, both national and community-driven, were most often supported, which is appropriate across contexts. The least supported interventions are the development of frameworks for non-formal education programmes; and trainings for education managers and planners on conflict-sensitive and risk-informed education. But, as shown in Figure 5F above, non-formal education programme frameworks were nonetheless prepared often in refugee emergencies where they would be most relevant; and training on risk-informed education often in natural disasters, where it would be relevant (but less often conflict and refugee contexts where it would also be critical).
- On quality, interventions were significantly concentrated in the top three responses, but namely the provision of materials for literacy and numeracy for (i) children/youths and (ii) teachers and classrooms, and provision of life skills materials for children and youths. Two of the next highest interventions are also material provision: for life skills and socio-emotional learning to teachers/classrooms. The pattern of high use of material provision does not differ significantly across type of grantees. In many cases, however, material provision was backed by efforts such

²⁵ There are eight types of intervention associated with ECW's access objective. We looked at one third (rounded to three) of these measures, and how concentrated grantees interventions are in these three. Similarly, for continuity, we looked at one third (rounded to 1) of four types of intervention.

as training for teachers on curriculum and pedagogy, and incentives and mentorship for teachers, which differs from high focuses on material provision of a decade ago.

98. **That interventions may vary between ECW EiEPC objectives and between intervention types, however, does not necessarily equate full context and emergency sensitivity within interventions.** There is some evidence from the country-based analysis of unevenness in the extent to which interventions are crisis-responsive. In Afghanistan for example, which we prioritized for a desk-based study, the use of 'healing classrooms' by a 2017 FER grantee, which includes MHPSS as a transversal element in teacher professional development, is clearly relevant to the context. At the same time, we found that the FER proposal treated 'conflict' generically, not explicitly discussing its specificities, except for the fact that women are particularly marginalized from education and that education facilities are frequent sites of attack.²⁶ The Nigeria case study had similar findings. More specific treatment of how the conflict might impact on older boys, was not specifically provided. In Niger too, case study respondents noted that FER responses provided fairly standard inputs and did not adjust sufficiently to the specific security situation. An example was still supplying inputs at fixed sites rather than more mobile schools, given that schools were targets for attacks. Another example was not having a sufficient focus on non-formal education. In Niger at least part of the reason for this was the strong alignment with the HRP, which placed emphasis on the restoration of formal education services.

Finding 7. The emphasis on the most vulnerable in FERs is appropriate, but individual FERs' targeting of the most vulnerable was not always sufficiently relevant in context.

99. Global and country level respondents agreed that it was appropriate for any first emergency response mechanism to pay attention to issues of gender, disability and other sources of heightened vulnerability. It was thought to be appropriate because (i) gender, disability, remoteness and other causes of heightened vulnerability need tailored interventions, in order to ensure that the most vulnerable are not excluded; and (ii) the importance of ensuring that a foundation exists for addressing these issues in any longer-term responses, even if in context it is difficult to do.

100. Almost 80 per cent of grantee survey respondents agreed that the emphasis on the differentiated needs of girls and others most likely to be left behind was good. The support of the ECW, however, was thought to be stronger on gender than on disability. Lower understanding of how to address disability in EiEPC was thought by many global respondents an overall sector issue, however.

101. The country case studies point to issues on how well FER proposals respond to sources of vulnerability, namely:

- The ECW's target of 60 per cent of beneficiaries being girls was thought not to be necessarily relevant in context: in some circumstances measures may also need to be tailored or targeted to boys, for example to prevent recruitment into armed groups in conflict (Nigeria and Afghanistan), or simply because in context boys' access and retention is a greater problem (Colombia).

²⁶ EiEPC good practice guidance on conflict-sensitive education such as the INEE Guidance Note on Conflict Sensitive Education, says that to be conflict-sensitive education policy and programming should both minimize negative impacts of a conflict on education and maximize positive impacts of the education programme on conflict and violence factors.

- While the FER proposals emphasized the inclusion of girls and children with disabilities in education activities, such inclusion was not well supported by a detailed analysis of needs, a coherent strategy across grantees or of responses (Nigeria and Mozambique). This occurred especially when needs assessments or strategies to respond to vulnerability are not well developed in the HRPs.
- In Niger, the proposal did not pay sufficient attention to non-formal education interventions to be more relevant to refugees, as noted above. It was, however, also found that the COVID-19 FERs have provided opportunities to look more at non-traditional options, such as home-based schooling and distance education.
- The country cases noted that there was insufficient coordination with interventions in the protection sector, to ensure a strong response for specifically vulnerable people. This is discussed further under coherence below (see section on coherence and connectedness on page 41).

Finding 8. The FER modality is more relevant in sudden onset emergency contexts and crisis contexts where needs are escalating significantly, rather than protracted crises without escalating needs, where ECW has often used it.

102. We stated in Finding 5 above that FER interventions are relevant because they occur in an under-funded sector and are aligned with country response plans and needs. That FERs provided additional financing for relevant needs, however, is separate from the question of whether the FER is the most relevant modality to finance interventions, or of whether the interventions financed were the most strategic. We deal with these questions in this and the next two findings. As emphasized by global stakeholders, it is important that the FERs are strategic in what they fund and how, because they are often small compared to needs, and are most relevant when they have effects beyond the funding of immediate needs.

103. ECW guidance texts have consistently indicated that the FER modality responds “at the onset or escalation of a crisis.”²⁷ Finding 3 above states that the FER modality is relevant to EiEPC objectives and needs in these cases. The Secretariat has indicated that in practice the modality has been used in four types of cases: sudden onset crises, such as Mozambique; protracted crises with escalating situations where no MYRP is planned, such as Ukraine; protracted crises with escalating emergencies where a MYRP is planned, such as Colombia; protracted crises with no discernible spike where an initial response was deemed necessary to help establish ECW, develop relationships and partnerships and understand the context, such as Nigeria. The first three types of cases correspond with the guidance text. The fourth uses the modality in a different context. Pressure on ECW to disburse also contributes to the modality being used in crises that are neither sudden onset nor escalating.

104. The modality was used to respond to sudden onset or more or less escalating protracted crises in the year the FER was triggered in at least 17 of the 30 countries in which non-COVID-19 FERs had been deployed by April 2020. Of these, 10 countries experienced sudden onset emergencies, and two experienced significantly escalating needs (see Box 1 for detail). In another two countries, needs escalated significantly the year prior to the FER. In eight countries the data show that the number of people in need in education was stable or decreased in the year before


²⁷ ECW 2017b, p. 4. See also ECW 2018a, pp. 11, 15, 23; ECW 2019g, p. 3; and ECW 2020, p. 3.

the FER was triggered. In the remaining five countries we did not have a consistent data series to make an assessment.

Box 1 FER deployment in sudden onset versus protracted crises

In ten of the 30 countries in which the FER modality was used to respond to emergencies other than COVID-19 by April 2020, the FERs responded to sudden onset emergencies. These were Bangladesh, Comoros, Indonesia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Peru and Zimbabwe.

For the remaining pre-COVID-19 FERs, we used data on people in need in the education sector from the HRPs published at the start of the year prior to the FER, the FER year, and the year after the FER, to assess whether these FERs were responding to situations of significantly escalating need.²⁸



Source: HRPs and other sources (please see Bibliography)

The graph shows the data for the 15 countries for which we could find a complete data series. It shows that in two cases, the FERs were deployed where needs were escalating significantly in the FER year itself (Cameroon and Columbia). Five more, Mali, Ukraine, Lebanon, Uganda and Yemen, also experienced escalating needs, but at a rate of increase of below 25 per cent. For eight countries, however, the number of people in need in the education sector, decreased during the FER year. In Burkina Faso and Somalia, the HRPs indicate that in the year prior to the FERs needs increased by well over 50 per cent even if they decreased in the FER year. In the DRC, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine and Syria, the HRPs suggest that needs were stable or decreasing even in the previous year.

105. The country case studies in Niger and Nigeria found that because the FERs were not implemented in clearly escalating country emergencies at the time, the value added was limited. In two of the four country case studies, the initial country FERs were implemented in a protracted crisis, without a recent and distinct escalation in need.

106. In Nigeria, the case study found that the FER was implemented as a pre-cursor to a MYRP, for ECW to establish a foothold in the country. The FER in Niger was implemented as one of three FERs, implemented at the same time against a joined-up FER proposal, with the other FERs being in Burkina Faso and Mali (with only Mali experiencing an increase in people in need in the education sector in the year of the FERs). In both Niger and Nigeria, the case studies found that while the FER interventions addressed large unmet needs, the short duration, fast implementation or relatively narrow scope of the FERs limited the relevance, coherence and sustainability of the interventions

²⁸ The change in need was calculated for the FER year by deducting the needs indicated at the start of the FER year, from the needs at the start of the next year. Similarly, for change in need in the year prior, we deducted needs as indicated at the start of the year before the FER, from the needs as reported at the start of the FER year. This was done on the logic that emergency situations change quickly, and that ECW would have looked at more current humanitarian need information in the year of awarding a FER, rather than information at the start of the year.

financed. The initial conflict FERs in both countries did not add value or were not needed specially to trigger coordination or get quick funding to the ground to start an emergency response. In both cases, while they funded unmet needs, the FERs did not help significantly to build the platforms for a response that is appropriate in a protracted emergency context.

107. Furthermore, some global respondents noted in their responses on the relevance of FER to EiEPC that while the FER itself is a unique and needed modality for the sector, it has not always been used in contexts where its unique characteristics (speed, flexibility, country-based decision-making processes) would be most relevant to the education sector response.

Finding 9. Fragmentation between FER rounds and grants, coupled with speed, means that in practice, the FERs may not be able to fund the most strategic interventions in context.

108. **The emphasis on speed means that in practice, FERs cannot always be fully strategic, tailored to local context and delivering through a diversified set of local grantees.** Because education is underfunded, FERs can finance almost anything and it would be relevant, reach boys and girls that are affected by the crisis, and produce results, if implemented well. Some ECW Secretariat respondents, donors and global civil society representatives, however, thought that the FERs should be more strategic, either to leverage better and bigger responses, or to reach those most in need. In practice, however, there are difficult trade-offs. It is not possible to deliver at speed, diversify grantees, be catalytic and mitigate risk at the same time, unless there is significant investment in preparedness, including on capacity building.

109. There are several obvious reasons. Emphasizing speed in some contexts, for example, means that thorough needs assessments cannot be done, especially when national education information systems are weak, when it is a sudden onset emergency and/or when refugee movements are volatile (as happened in Colombia, Mozambique and Niger, respectively). There is therefore no way of knowing whether the interventions selected, will be strategic or reach the most vulnerable. The emphasis on speed, combined with working through existing coordination mechanisms and requiring HACT assessments to manage fiduciary risk (as a consequence of being housed in UNICEF), means that grantees, especially national grantees, that could design and implement more context-specific responses, are not contracted, or not engaged at design phases when they are sub-contracted. Between 2017 and 2020 only 5 per cent of FER funding was contracted directly to LNGOs, with higher shares to LNGOs in 2017 and 2018 than in 2019 and 2020 to date. Lower use of LNGOs in later years followed an informal decision to work mostly with trusted international partners, given short FER granting processes and lessons learnt on risk of amongst other delays associated with LNGOs, and rely on these international partners to form consortia with or contract in local actors.

110. **In sudden onset and escalating crises, being rapid adds enough value to make trade-offs with quality more acceptable.** We have found above that when FERs respond to sudden onset and escalating emergencies, they are effective in catalysing early coordination, establishing education as an emergency sector, and triggering additional funding. The imperative to address new needs fast, is also strong. On balance, in such cases, an emphasis on speed can be justified despite trade-offs with quality and localization. If FERs are used in protracted crises with no discernible escalation of need, it is less clear that the drive to be rapid is as justifiable given trade-offs with strategic use of relatively small amounts of funding. We return to this issue below when we discuss the time efficiency and timeliness of the FERs (see from page 61 to page 63 below).

111. Multiple FER rounds, and dividing up already relatively small country FER allocations between multiple grantees, also limit the strategic quality of the FER interventions.

Country actors noted that although in principle relying on country EiEPC coordination mechanisms should lead to better context-sensitive choices, in practice it translates into non-strategic choices and poor implementation coordination.

112. Between 2017 and 2020, ECW FERs comprised 163 individual grants across 32 countries and one region. The average grant size is USD 703,865. More than half of the grants are below USD 500,00 and the smallest is less than USD 70,000. Figure 6 below arranges the FER countries by the total amount transferred as FER grants (the left-hand bar for each country) and the average grant size. It also shows for each country, how large the share of resources is that go to the cluster lead agencies, and how many additional grants there are and the volume of these grants. The average grant size is then plotted as a trendline across countries. It shows the larger FERs do not mean a higher average grant size.²⁹


113. A first consideration is that by the end of April 2020, most countries have had more than one FER round, and one as many as four. In many cases, multiple rounds are because of COVID-19. In 22 countries the first round of COVID-19 FERs followed one or more earlier FER. Altogether 32 of the 163 individual grants are to organizations receiving a separate grant in the COVID-19 FER. However, there were multiple FER rounds responding to the same emergency in six countries.³⁰ This in itself, even if all the FERs went to one organization, would limit how strategic any one FER is in its response to those emergencies.

114. Beyond multiple FER rounds, small grant sizes may be driven by many factors, some of which are strategic to consider, such as grantee capacity and grantees' access to different geographic regions. Furthermore, it shows that when few resources have gone to countries, often the country programmes/offices of either (or both) of the Global Education Cluster coordinators (UNICEF and STC) received all the resources (seven out of ten countries with total transfers of below USD 2 million). In most cases of countries that received a higher volume of resources, the global cluster coordinators received a large single share, and then the rest was divided into further often very small grants (where a grant is a single contract signed under a country FER). This, of course, may also be strategic, with well capacitated organizations taking on larger components of the response.

²⁹ For the eleven countries that have received more than USD 4 million in FER grants, the median number of grants is five, for the ten that received between USD 2 million and USD 4 million, the number is two, and for those who received up to USD 2 million, the number is 1.

³⁰ The cyclone Idai response countries, Malawi, Mozambique (which had a 3rd pre-COVID-19 round in 2019 due to another cyclone) and Zimbabwe, as well as Niger and Mali that received funding in a second Sahel-FER round. Greece also had two rounds.

Figure 6 Grant distribution and size by country



Source: Own calculations drawing on the ECW FER database.

115. The country cases, however, suggest that significant factors behind having more relatively small grants in the portfolio are: (i) the desire to give more organizations access to resources, rather than giving primary consideration to what would be an ideal distribution given priorities and capacities; and (ii) the country coordination process favouring those that lead it. In two of our four in-depth country case studies (Niger and Mozambique) where high grant volumes are associated with small average grants, grant allocation processes were not driven primarily by a strategic rationale, but by factors that had to do with diversifying grantees/giving organizations access to funding. While diversifying may be good if smaller grants are more often than not to local NGOs, in keeping with the localization agenda, most of the small grants were not to LNGOs. In Nigeria, which falls in the middle group of countries, the case found that the country coordinator, UNICEF, assigned projects and grants to organizations without much consultation, keeping the bulk of resources for UNICEF. While the activities undertaken with these resources, were indeed large (teacher training and purchasing of materials), there still was not a country process to test that rationale and discuss which organizations might be better placed.

116. In contrast, in Colombia, which also falls in the middle group of countries, the resources were all allocated to a single grantee, STC. However, this was as part of a well-coordinated and inclusive process, which established a single grantee managing a consortium of NGOs and a coordinated approach across grantees with different capacities.

117. We did an analysis of decision-making processes in countries that have had many FER grants (eight or more individual contracts) and a large share of resources to cluster coordinating partners (by volume of resources). It provided further support to a finding that grant sizes are driven not by strategy, but by incentives for sharing resources amongst organizations. When clusters make decisions through review committees or a select team of cluster members, the pattern is to distribute resources amongst many organizations (often cluster members). When the decision is made by the cluster coordinating organizations jointly or singly, a high share of resources (more than 61 per cent) goes to either one or both of the cluster coordinators. This does not seem to have changed significantly over time, as the FERs in all the countries with high fragmentation and a high share to cluster coordinating organizations occurred in 2019.

Table 5 FER decision-making processes and distribution between grants

	Countries with 8 or more FER individual grants (2017-April 2020)	
	Education Cluster review committee/select team 4 countries	Education Cluster Coordinators 6 countries
Low share to CCs 3 countries ³¹	Somalia (2017), DRC (2018), Uganda (2018)	
Medium share to CCs 2 countries	Mozambique (2019)	Zimbabwe (2019)
High share to CCs 5 countries		Burkina Faso (2019), Mali (2019), Malawi (2019), Niger (2019), Nigeria (2018)

118. However, it is notable that with the exception of Somalia, the DRC and Uganda, all of the countries with the most individual grants in the table above, have had more than one non-COVID-19 FER round responding to single emergencies. This occurred for the first time in 2019 but was repeated in 2020 with two rounds of COVID-19 FERs in a short period.

119. The evolution of grants in Niger and Mozambique demonstrates how multiple rounds – which contribute to higher volumes of resources – also contribute to more individual grants.

- In Niger the three rounds translated into 12 FER contracts and 13 organizations sharing USD 5.9 million against three concept notes within the space of about 18 months. In Niger, in the first round of funding UNICEF was the sole grantee working with three sub-contractors. In the second round, UNICEF was again a beneficiary, together with STC and The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), and three sub-contractors across the main grant holders. In the COVID-19 FER third round more grantees joined (World Vision International (WVI), the World Food Programme (WFP) and Plan).
- In Mozambique the four FER rounds between March 2019 and April 2020, translated into 11 contracts with eight organizations sharing USD 10.7 million over a period of 18 months against four plans. The first FER round in response to cyclone Idai provided resources to five grantees (STC, WVI, Food for the Hungry, the Association of Volunteers in International Service (AVSI) and Plan). A second round followed soon after with additional earmarked resources from DFID and Dubai Cares, with grants to UNICEF and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), allocated after the country coordination mechanism decided that organizations that already have funding cannot be funded again. When cyclone Kenneth occurred, a further FER round was triggered, with funding to an LNGO CESC. The COVID-19 FER was granted to three organizations, UNICEF, World Vision and Plan.

120. Altogether, the evidence points towards processes and the different incentives they trigger being strong factors in FER grant fragmentation.

³¹ A low share of FER resources to the country offices of Global Education Cluster coordinating organizations mean that within this group of countries with eight or more grants, the share percentage falls in the lowest third of countries. A medium share means it falls in the middle group, and a high share means it is within the group of countries that have the highest shares of FER resources granted to Global Education Cluster coordinators.

Finding 10. The ECW Secretariat’s approach to managing the FERs was seen as appropriate, but country actors emphasized the importance of in-person missions and progress on preparedness.

121. There is wide agreement at global and country level that the global-lean and country-heavy approach to managing FERs is appropriate. Global EiEPC actors were clear that it would not be appropriate to build a large Secretariat with a bigger role in making decisions on priorities for and grantees of a country FER allocation. The overall view was that this would duplicate existing structures, such as the cluster system. Where there are issues with how well these structures function at country level, such as the issues detailed in the previous finding, the problems should be solved within the structures, rather than by building another global institution.

122. At the same time, there is evidence that more should be done to support FER design and implementation at country level:

- The in-person missions that were undertaken in two countries to support country processes, were seen as critical (Colombia) or helpful (Mozambique). The Colombia case study found the 2019 country FER only really came together after members of the ECW Secretariat undertook an in-person mission, which helped to clarify the FER purpose, and roles and responsibilities in FER design and management, especially since FERs were new to the region.
- The positive evolution of clearer guidance for the FERs have also been helpful.
- Country and global actors emphasized the importance of the global humanitarian system investing in preparedness of countries, especially countries in frequent or chronic crisis. People were quick to acknowledge that this is not an ECW-specific issue, but of the global humanitarian system generally. However, ECW should be more aware of the level of preparedness in a country when it intervenes, and work more closely with other humanitarian actors to ensure an appropriate level of capacity to manage the FERs (this is discussed further under EQ 4).

COVERAGE AND REACH

EQ 2: Is the coverage/reach of the FER portfolio optimal? Why (not)?

123. This section looks at the extent to which the coverage and reach of the FER portfolio is optimal. It answers two questions: whether the FER portfolio focused on the most urgent education crises from 2017 to 2020, and secondly, whether in countries where FERs were implemented, the modality allowed the most marginalized and most vulnerable to be reached.

124. Based on the findings, we find that FER coverage of emergencies by 2019 was optimal, taking into account existing and planned ECW Initial Investment and MYRP investments, insofar as there were no emergencies that were clearly more urgent options for a FER response than the emergencies where FERs were deployed. The FERs, however, were not sensitive to relative need, and their reach in-country was limited when need was high. Grantees tailor their responses to the needs of the most vulnerable children. Effectively reaching these children across grantees, however, depends a lot on country capacity to target interventions well and tailor responses in context. While the ECW FER has responded to many refugee emergencies, the ability of the modality to target and reach refugees in complex emergencies with many vulnerable groups, has been more limited. Recently, ECW has been working with its education partners to address this issue.

Does the FER portfolio focus on the most urgent education crises?

Finding 11. Taking other ECW investments into account, the 2019 FER choices showed better coverage of global EiEPC needs than choices in 2017.

125. ECW guidance requires the ECW Secretariat to activate the FER modality balancing several factors (see Box 2), including need. In order to test whether the ECW FERs were deployed to the most urgent crises, we assessed the FERs against other emergencies in the same year, using two of the ECW criteria for crisis review and selection which are objectively measurable, the number of people in need in the education sector and unmet education response funding needs.³² The other potential emergency-affected countries were selected based on the number of people in need, the escalation in the number of total people in need across sectors from the previous year, and the severity of the emergency.³³ Countries in which FERs were still active from previous years or countries where the funding reported on UNOCHA FTS against the relevant HRP or appeal was more than the funding need, were not included in the analysis. The results of this analysis for the 24 country FERs for which data could be sourced are reflected in Figure 7 below. The higher a country is placed towards the upper right-hand corner of the graph, the more people were reported as in need in the education sector for that year, and the greater the EiEPC financing gap.

Box 2 ECW FER crisis review triggers and selection criteria

ECW guidance on the selection of emergencies for FER funding has been consistent: the FER window responds in order to provide “early funding support at the onset or escalation of a crisis, in order to reduce the impact of the crisis on education.”³⁴ A crisis review is triggered by the ECW Secretariat for all crises escalated to a Level 2 or Level 3 emergency (by the IASC, UNICEF or UNHCR). The Secretariat will also review a crisis when approached. Initially this was by ECW accredited organizations (in the 2017 and 2019 guidance), but since 2020 the approach must be by in-country coordination groups for EiEPC. The selection criteria for funding an emergency after review have remained consistent, namely educational need; a gap in support; the likely ECW value-add; and alignment with ECW’s strategic priorities.

Source: ECW, 2017, 2019 and 2020.

126. **The analysis shows that in all three years there were several countries that reported more people in need in the education sector than were reported for countries where FERs were implemented.** Some of these, e.g. Ethiopia (2017, 2018 and 2019) and Nigeria and the DRC (2017), also had consistently high unmet education emergency financing needs. Others had higher numbers of people in need than the FER countries for that year, but much lower unmet needs than at least half of the FERs, e.g. South Sudan (2017 and 2019), Yemen (2017 and 2018), and Sudan (2018 and 2019). Other comparator countries had levels of people in need and unmet financing needs that are closely within range of the countries in which FERs were deployed.

127. **However, countries that reported high education need and large financing gaps were experiencing protracted crises, and some were already covered through either an ECW initial investment or a MYRP in progress.** The graphs also show which of the comparator

³² The information sources utilized are associated HRPs or other plans. Annex 10 provides sources by country.


³³ Information from the UNOCHA Global Humanitarian Overviews for 2017, 2018 and 2019 were used to select comparator countries for 2017 and 2018. For 2020 the Development Initiatives Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2020 (see [here](#)), which provided emergency severity scores, was used together with the UNOCHA Global Humanitarian Overview 2020, which did not include severity indicators as it had in previous years.

³⁴ ECW, 2017, Grantee Operating Manual.

countries had ECW initial investments or MYRPs in place (the bright green dots), or MYRPs approved or planned for the next year (the light green dots) or the next year+1 (the light red dots). By 2019, all comparator countries towards the upper right and right of the graphs, were still implementing ECW initial investments and/or were set to start implementing MYRPs in 2020.

128. **It is only in 2017 that there are comparator countries that were strong candidates for FERs and where an alternative ECW instrument was not in play** (Nigeria, Iraq and the DRC). None of these, however, had experienced far more significant increases in people in need in 2017 than the countries selected for FERs. In both Nigeria and the DRC a FER was underway in the subsequent year.

Figure 7 FERs compared to other emergencies in same year




Finding 12. The FERs are not sensitive to relative need, and their reach in-country is limited when the need is high.

129. **On average FERs finance 27 per cent of the need indicated, but sometimes finance a much larger share of the need especially in sudden onset emergencies.** On average

(weighted), FERs finance 27 per cent of the need indicated, but this is influenced by a few cases where the FERs financed a high share of need. The median, which discards outliers, is 15 per cent. The spread is even starker when considering the degree to which FERs have funded the gap between funding needed and funding in place (minus the FERs). On average FERs have funded 34 per cent of the gap across countries, and a median of 17 per cent. The few cases where FERs fund a large share of need, are mostly sudden onset emergencies, such as Indonesia, Malawi, Nepal, Papua New Guinea and Mozambique. Five of the six cases where FERs funded more than 50 per cent of the identified need, were natural disaster emergencies. In some of these, the need was relatively modest.

130. The cap on the ECW Executive Director FER approval mandate at USD 3 million, results in too little money for big emergencies. The cap means that few FERs are ever larger than this, notwithstanding the need. Thus, when a natural disaster affects a relatively small share of the population or a small population, a standard FER reaches further. Between 2017 and the end of April 2020, only seven of the 63 FERs awarded were above this cap. Even with more than one round in a country within a year, very few countries received in excess of USD 4 million (see Figure 8 below) and these were not necessarily addressing the large crises with significant need and financing gaps. When a protracted crisis leads to millions of children displaced, out of school and in need of protection, the standard FER reaches fewer people and covers less of the funding gap. The size of FERs were very insignificantly associated with numbers of people in need, and even less so with the reported financing gap.

Figure 8 FER amounts disbursed and the size of the funding gap



Source: ECW FER financial database, HRPs, Flash Appeals, Action Plans and corresponding funding data on FTS. See bibliography in Annex 10.

Reaching the most marginalized and vulnerable affected children

Finding 13. Country capacities are important to target FERs well across grantees/projects, given the limited reach of relatively small FER budgets, even if at grantee level efforts are made to target vulnerability.

131. The ECW FER results data for grants from 2017 to 2019, show that FER grantees do target and reach two groups of highly vulnerable children, but only to a limited extent for children with disabilities. As shown in Table 6 below, ECW FER results data show that the

FER grantees in general reach more children with disabilities and girls than they target, but that (i) less than 1 per cent of total children targeted are children with disabilities; and (ii) even if grantees reach more girls than targeted, the 'over-reach' is even higher for boys. As there is scant data on the incidence of disabilities in affected populations overall, it is difficult to judge whether the low percentage of children with disabilities is material. It does appear to be low against the World Bank estimate that about 15 per cent of the world's population experience some form of disability.³⁵

Table 6 Results on targeting and reaching girls and children with disability

	Children with disability	Girls
Children of this group reached as a share of all children reached	0.86%	49%
Children of this group targeted as a share of total children targeted	0.68%	48%
Children of this group reached as a % of children of this group targeted	134%	108%
Girls reached as a share of girls targeted	130%	-
Boys reached as a share of boys targeted	137%	-

Source: ECW results data, July 2020.

132. **The case studies suggest that while the FERs reach vulnerable children, this is often to a limited extent.** In Colombia, Niger and Nigeria the FERs provided relatively modest amounts against overall needs (see table below).³⁶ Nigeria more so than Niger and Colombia, as it received a smaller budget and reported much larger funding needs. Mozambique received a relatively high amount, because of earmarked additional funding from the United Kingdom, which triggered a second round in response to the first 2019 cyclone (Idai). A third, small round then followed after cyclone Kenneth.

Table 7 FER amounts relative to need in three country cases

Country	FER amounts	Projected people in need	Funding needs
Colombia	2,642,900	696,000	33,400,000
Niger	3,269,398	344,000	12,400,000
Nigeria	2,499,999	2,800,000	60,900,000
Mozambique	10,359,747	900,000	18,000,000

Source: ECW Financial Database, HRPs for Niger (2019), Nigeria (2018) and Columbia (2019).

133. In Niger and Nigeria, the case studies found that country processes were not able to target the relatively small volume of resources to the most vulnerable. In Nigeria a contributing factor was the lack of detailed analysis of needs and responses.

134. In Colombia, the case study found that the needs of vulnerable and marginalized migrant and host community children, who otherwise would be unable to access education, were well targeted. Even in the absence of more aggregate data, the inclusive targeting process in Colombia was successful because it involved working with national and local education authorities to determine the regions and schools most in need and then partnering with those schools and communities to reach migrant children and out-of-school children.

³⁵ World Bank, 2020, Disability inclusion and accountability framework, [link](#).

³⁶ Mozambique, the fourth case study, received a relatively high amount, because of earmarked additional funding from the United Kingdom, which triggered a second round in response to the first 2019 cyclone (Idai). A third, small round then followed after cyclone Kenneth.

135. The case study, however, also found significant gaps in overall coverage, especially for hard to reach areas. It was noted that grantees tended to prioritize supporting schools where they had been working prior to the cyclones, and a bias towards working in more accessible areas. This emphasizes again the importance of building country EiEPC capacities through preparedness, to ensure better quality FERs that are better targeted.

136. **Our analysis of all FER proposals, including for the country case studies, found that grantees pay clear attention to specific sources of vulnerability.** On gender, the country case studies found that FER proposals included interventions that were tailored to girls and women, and that this was relevant in context, to address risks of early marriage and gender-based violence. In Nigeria the case study found that the conflict-FER proposal clearly identified challenges in girls' access to education and set clear targets for girls supported by community mobilization, awareness creation amongst teachers and the provision of gender-segregated latrines.

137. In Mozambique, the COVID-19 FERs were found to deepen the focus on gender and the inclusion of children with disabilities. In Nigeria, however, grantees reported limited scope to bring inclusive approaches into the COVID-19 FER, because of the limited budget and the distance-learning context.

138. **The grantee survey results also indicate that grantees thought their interventions were tailored to address sources of vulnerability.** The results indicate that FER interventions were predominantly tailored to girls and women (65 per cent of grantees ranked tailoring as very significant or significant), followed by the most remote communities (62 per cent) and persons with disabilities (41.5 per cent). Tailoring to minority ethnic or language groups (27 per cent) and orphans (24 per cent) is less common among the grantees who participated in the survey. However, interestingly, 62 per cent of respondents thought their tailoring was about the same or less pronounced in their FER-funded activities than other activities. This response was more common for civil society grantees than for UN grantees, where only 22 per cent of responding grantees thought their non-FER activities were equally or more tailored.

139. **The ECW FER results data for grants from 2017 to 2019, show that FER grantees reach the two highly vulnerable groups of children tracked, within overall FER responses.** ECW FER results data show that the FER grantees in general reach more children with disabilities (134 per cent) and girls (130 per cent) than they target. However, fewer than 1 per cent of total children targeted are children with disabilities. Furthermore, grantees reach more girls than targeted, but the 'over-reach' is even higher for boys (137 per cent of target).

Finding 14. While the ECW FER has responded to many refugee emergencies, the ability of the modality to target and reach refugees in complex emergencies with many vulnerable groups, is more limited.

140. **The ECW have targeted refugee children through the many FERs that were deployed to refugee emergencies.** Between 2017 and 2018, 545,349 refugee children were targeted through the FERs, according to ECW grantees' reports. This is equivalent to 28 per cent of total children targeted by FERs. Most of the refugee children targeted were in FERs that responded to refugee emergencies. These were in Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Palestine, Peru (2019) and Uganda. The second round of COVID-19 FERs were targeted at refugee education in the pandemic, but are not assessed in this evaluation.

141. **In complex emergencies, where refugees are one of many groups that FERs respond to, the modality is less successful in targeting refugees.** In complex emergencies, where refugees are only one of the groups the FERs respond to, available evidence suggests that FERs do not target refugees well. Some FERs in complex emergencies (for example in Afghanistan and Mali) did explicitly target refugee children. But others did not. Two of the country case studies, Nigeria and Niger, reported refugee children in need in education in the relevant HRPs, but neither reported reaching refugees nor specifically tailored their interventions to reach refugees. Overall, Nigeria had the 13th and Niger the 36th most persons of interest out of over 200 countries on the UNHCRs 2019 list.³⁷ However, both country cases found that the needs of refugees were under-represented in FERs. In the Nigeria study, the largely unmet needs of refugees in other parts of the country and independent coordination of the educational needs of refugees were raised; and in Niger the case study found that the needs of refugees were largely unmet, especially prior to the COVID-19 FERs, as the interventions did not pay enough attention to non-formal education. In Mali, refugee children appear to be under-represented. Refugees comprised 0.1 per cent of total children targeted in the FERs. Yet, according the 2019 HRP, 11 per cent of children in need are refugees.

142. **ECW results data suggest that grantees have difficulty actually reaching refugee children.** ECW's results data for FERs show that whereas FER grantees often reach more children than originally targeted, this is not the case for refugees. As shown in the table below, FERs reach 65 per cent of the refugee children they target and this percentage is about the same for boys and girls. The issue is more pronounced for FER grants than it is for the ECW MYRPs and initial investments. For MYRPs 96 percent of refugee children targeted were reached. This supports the views we heard from correspondents that MYRPs are more suited to targeting and reaching refugees.

Table 8 ECW grantee results on reaching refugees

Refugee children	ECW grantee results
Refugee children reached as a share of total children reached	17%
Refugee children targeted as a share of total children targeted	27%
Refugee children reached as a % of refugee children targeted	65%
<i>Refugee girls reached as a share of girls targeted</i>	<i>64%</i>
<i>Refugee boys reached as % of boys targeted</i>	<i>65%</i>
Total children reached as a % of total children targeted	106%

Source: ECW results data, July 2020.

143. However, the ECW's data on refugees targeted and refugees reached, rely on grantees correctly identifying refugee children. In practice, the definitions of refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons are blurred, and grantees may not use UNHCR definitions consistently to identify refugees. Nonetheless, on the assumption that grantees would have defined refugee children targeted and reached similarly, the results data do point to grantees being less successful in reaching refugees than in reaching children overall.

144. **There are institutional and context factors that contribute to difficulty in reaching refugee children.** Two institutional factors contribute. Firstly, that the response for refugee populations is coordinated through refugee-specific mechanisms, including the education of refugees, and these do not automatically connect into education cluster processes. Secondly, the UNHCR institutional country cap on UNHCR activities in any single country means that UNHCR to date has

³⁷ UNHCR Annual Report, 2018, 2019 and 2020, lists of Refugees, asylum-seekers, IDPs, returnees (refugees and IDPs), statelessness persons and others of concern to UNHCR by country/territory of asylum, at the end of the previous year.

not made many requests for FER funding. The dilemma is also that when it does, it cannot feed its expertise into assessing other proposals. Up to December 2019, UNHCR had received ECW FER support only in Uganda (2017) and Greece (2019). If UNHCR is not applying for FER grants and the EiEPC education and UNHCR-led (or the International Organization for Migration) refugee coordination structures are not connected, respondents noted that highly vulnerable refugee groups “are melted into a more national view approach.” Jointly, these factors hamper tailored efforts to reach hard-to-reach refugees.

145. In the three country cases where the FERs were responding to protracted crises and large-scale migrations, the FER process itself did not help better coordination regarding refugees. The three countries were Colombia,³⁸ Niger and Nigeria. Respondents in all three raised issues about how refugee coordination structures connect to education working group or cluster structures. In Niger, even though the second round of the COVID-19 FERs focused specifically on refugees, UNHCR, which as the agency for coordinating education was best placed to assess proposals, could not participate in the processes because in this case it was a bidder itself. In Colombia there was more of a deliberate effort to coordinate between EiEPC structures – which were in existence prior to the influx of refugees from Venezuela – and the coordination structures at regional and country level to coordinate the response to the refugee crisis. Coordination was not perfect but helped by having some agencies on multiple structures and back-to-back meetings between the refugee education working group and the education cluster. This helped to integrate providing support to refugee children with support to host community children. Nonetheless the case study found that coherence between funding flows remained an issue (see paragraph 157 below).

146. ECW is working with its global partners to address refugee coordination better. UNHCR has a secondee working at the ECW Secretariat to facilitate the inclusion of refugees in ECW’s operations. Furthermore, ECW has made a joint pledge with the World Bank and the GPE at the Global Refugee Forum in December 2019, following on the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees, to coordinate efforts and financing of refugee education. The new joint coordination initiative between the Global Education Cluster, UNHCR and the Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) emerging out of the ECW-supported Global Partner Project, is also a step in the right direction. The second round of COVID-19 FERs, allocated in July 2020, focused on refugees, and followed a different process insofar as they were coordinated by UNHCR together with host community countries. The UNHCR was also a grantee in the first COVID-19 FER round (Burkina Faso, Mali, Uganda and Chad), and the second COVID-19 FER round (Ethiopia, Kenya and Zambia).

Finding 15. The FERs disproportionately reach primary level girls and boys, with low reach of pre-primary aged children and children of secondary school age, reflecting underlying education systems and a long-standing focus of the education sector on primary education.

147. The Sustainable Development outcome targets for education, emphasize early childhood education and development and secondary education alongside primary education.³⁹ While the ECW

³⁸ Colombia was the country with most persons of interest to the UNHCR in 2017, 2018 and 2019.


³⁹ See [Sustainable Development Goal 4](#) outcome targets 4.1 and 4.2 that require free, equitable and quality secondary education for all girls and boys, and access to quality early childhood development, care and pre-primary education for all girls and boys.

Strategic Plan 2018–2021 is silent on whether it would target specific levels of education, the ECW Annual Reports for 2017, 2018 and 2019:

- Emphasize the importance of early childhood development interventions, and in each case stated ECW’s commitment to “expand its support to ECD” (2017, p. 93) “increase its investments to this age group” (2018, p. 118), and “allocate at least 10 per cent of available resources to early childhood education” (2019, p. 35). The argument is based on the ECW collective outcome goal of continuity, and on the life-long impact of neglect at this life stage.
- Also emphasize the importance of secondary education, stating that ECW will “increase its investments towards secondary education opportunities” (2018, p. 113) and discussing the gaps for children affected by emergencies in completing secondary education, relative to other children (2017, p. 10 and p. 82).

148. Between 2017 and 2019 nine out of 28 FER countries grantees did not target early childhood interventions, of which three nonetheless reached children in this phase through FERs. In seven countries grantees did not target secondary education, with one country not targeting but reaching secondary education children and youths, and two targeting but not reaching targets at this level. Only in Cameroon were only primary education children targeted.

Figure 9 Distribution in children targeted and reached by FERs 2017–2019



Source: ECW FER database.

149. The share of children other than primary children targeted was, however, low (Figure 9A), and it did not improve over time (Figure 9B). There is some evidence in the country cases that overly focusing on primary education in the FERs limited the coverage of the response. In Niger for example, some stakeholders suggested that a greater focus on secondary education could bring gains, especially if through non-formal education, and for the pre-COVID Colombia FER, it was noted that the focus of the FERs on children aged 8–18 left behind those in early childhood.

150. The difficulty in reaching pre-primary and secondary-age children is most likely a function of access to different education phases in the underlying education system. The countries with relatively higher secondary school children and youths reached, have higher completion rates at this level overall, compared to countries in which the FERs reached relatively few secondary school children. Some are exceptions, like Nepal and Uganda, which had high secondary school reach, and low completion rates in the underlying system, while Zimbabwe had the reverse. In each of these three cases the targeting relates to prioritization in connected plans. The FERs also reflect the focus on primary education in development and humanitarian practice linked to the millennium development

goals. In this regard, the FERs are often aligned with HRPs that often do not address early childhood educational needs.

Table 9 Targeting secondary school children and underlying education systems

Country	Secondary school completion rate (most recent year available)	Share of FER secondary school children/youths reached
Ukraine	99.4%	61%
Greece	99.24%	44%
Palestine	85.94%	40%
Indonesia	86.05	37%
Mozambique	14.47%	0.04%
Somalia	22.69%	0.02%
CAR	11.02%	0.02%
Malawi	21.81%	0.01%

Source: ECW FER database and UNESCO, 2020, SDG 4 indicator data ([here](#)).

COHERENCE AND CONNECTEDNESS

EQ 3: Are the FERs coherent with the humanitarian system and connected to development efforts? Why (not)?

151. This section addresses the external coherence of the FERs to the humanitarian system and its connectedness with development efforts, as well as internal coherence within a FER and with other ECW interventions. It also looks at the complementarity of the FERs to other sources of funding for EiEPC.

152. Based on the findings presented below, we find that the FERs are coherent with most of the humanitarian system by design. The FERs are complementary to other sources of funding in principle, and in practice in some cases. However, there is evidence that the transparency and capacity to facilitate complementarity is not always in place, and displacement of other funding for emergency education does occur. The connection from FERs to MYRPs to ensure that gains made in the FERs are sustained through the MYRPs is important, but not automatic and requires deliberate effort by stakeholders. Internal coherence between FERs is facilitated through joint design processes, but weaker during implementation where it depends on grantee and cluster efforts.

153. Relative to their size and scope, FERs can pave the way well for a stronger humanitarian/development nexus and provide a platform for longer-term solutions.

External coherence and connectedness

Finding 16. Because of the way that FER grants are designed, through the education cluster or working group, FERs have an 'in-built' likely coherence with most of the humanitarian system.

154. **FERs are coherent with other humanitarian education sector responses, because they are often coordinated by the same mechanism and draw on humanitarian sector plans, or vice versa when FER proposals precede sector plans.** This point was often made by non-ECW stakeholders at global level, as well as ECW Secretariat members themselves. The country case studies, and in-depth desk studies confirm that working through country EiEPC structures results in FER interventions that are coherent in the overall sector response.

- In Columbia, FER activities are derived from the Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan, align with the Humanitarian Response Plan and are coordinated with various structures, including the National Ministry of Education and Secretariats of Education at the district and municipality levels to ensure a coordinated and harmonized response. Likewise, the activities under the COVID-19 FER were aligned with the national response plan for COVID-19 and the priorities of the sector under the Education Cluster (which coordinates the FERs) and the education working group in migrant coordination structures.
- In Mozambique the initial FERs responding to the two cyclones were designed at a point when a comprehensive HRP was not yet available. The case study found, however, that the work done for the FERs provided the base for the subsequent education emergency response strategy. For the COVID-19 FERs, the proposal drew on the Government’s response strategy.
- In Niger too, alignment with the relevant year’s HRP was noted to support coherence.
- In Nigeria the FERs were closely aligned with humanitarian and government strategies for supporting education in the north-east of Nigeria, particularly with the access objective. The list of indicative activities included in the HRP also corresponded closely to those included by FER grantees. The COVID-19 FERs were aligned with the cluster’s overall education response strategy for north-east Nigeria.

Finding 17. *For the most part, the FERs are complementary to other sources of humanitarian EiEPC funding, although duplication and displacement can occur, and transparency and coordination are often imperfect.*

155. **Most global respondents thought that the FER as a modality complemented existing sources of financing for EiEPC.** The FER modality shares characteristics with Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) Rapid Response Window grants, Country-Based Pooled Funds (CBPFs), and the Global Partnership for Education Accelerated Facility, which all provide funding to EiEPC interventions when a new emergency occurs, or an existing emergency deteriorates. However, the FERs are education specific (different to the CERF RRW and the CBPFs), deliver rapidly in new emergencies (while the CBPFs take longer), and work through humanitarian networks and disburses directly to implementing agents (different to the GPE which is financed through a grant agent). The key point of coordination to ensure complementarity in practice is the country education cluster or education in emergencies working group.

Table 10 FERs and complementary funds

Funds	FER complementarity
CERF RRW	<p>The FERs complement CERF RRW grants, insofar as they are education specific and can contract non-UN partners directly. CERF RRW grants are also coordinated through country-based structures: in principle they should be complementary to ECW FERs.</p> <p>The CERF shares many of FER design characteristics, including a short implementation time frame, similar triggers, and field-level design and coordination through the cluster system. Two key differences, however, are that (i) the CERF RRWs are not education specific; and (ii) that the CERF can finance only UN agencies, which can in turn contract non-UN and local partners. CERF RRWs are supported through UNOCHA offices in the field.</p>
CBPFs	<p>FERs complement CBPFs as they can respond very quickly in new emergencies while CBPFs are being set up. Not all emergencies merit CBPFs. CBPFs have more flexible risk management procedures that allow direct grants to LNGOs more easily. CBPF education allocations are</p>

Funds	FER complementarity
	<p>linked to country clusters through the strategic review process for proposals done by selected country cluster members: in principle they should be complementary to the ECW FERs.</p> <p>The CBPFs are also aimed at responding when emergencies occur or escalate, are closely coordinated with clusters and finance education interventions, but differ from FERs also in key respects. As country-based funds with advisory boards, strategic and technical review committees, local operational manuals and a local humanitarian financing unit they take longer to be set up once the process is triggered. Once set up, they can respond rapidly through the reserve fund mechanism. CBPFs fund all sectors. CBPFs are also flexible in terms of the type of organizations funded, and have more country-specific risk mitigation strategies.</p>
GPE	<p>The key difference between the FERs and the GPE Accelerated Funding window is the way in which they are managed at country level, and size. The GPE Accelerated Fundings can be much larger (e.g. the USD 11.8 million AF grant to Sudan, and a USD 15 million COVID-19 grant to Mozambique). They are triggered through local education groups and managed by grant agents that manage the funds against the operational plan and budget.</p> <p>Complementarity between FERs and GPE Accelerated Funding funds depends on the degree to which the local education group, grant agent or government engages with the education cluster. AF Funds can be delivered fast, with a target period from initiation to disbursement of about six weeks. Disbursement to the grant agent, however, does not equal implementation as implementing organizations are only then contracted.</p> <p>FERs complement GPE Accelerated Funding funding insofar as they are channelled more through humanitarian networks, whereas GPE Accelerated Funding funds in practice deal more with government's response to crisis and emergency. GPE Accelerated Funding grants are managed by a single grant agent, whereas FERs are disbursed directly to implementing agents in most cases. In the pre-COVID-19 AFs, the GPE funds focused more on systemic impacts, but the COVID-19 window targeted the most vulnerable.</p>


Source: Global Interviews, UNOCHA CERF and CBPF Guidelines and Manuals, GPE Accelerated Funding and COVID-19 AF Guidelines.

156. The country cases presented mixed evidence of alignment in practice between FER funds and other sources of funding: key factors in differences were between FER grantees coordinating their own funding well, and the ability of country structures to coordinate. In Nigeria for example, the FERs were found to complement other sources of funding. The CERF and the Nigeria Humanitarian Fund (a CBPF) each had made only a small allocation to education interventions. Other EiEPC sources were mostly bilateral and respondents reported that the FER built on and complemented activities financed from these sources. In some cases, the FER grants allowed some grantees to continue to deliver to communities where previous funding sources had ended, and others to complement activities in other sectors in communities with education interventions. In addition, the cluster played a strong role by allocating geographical areas to different agencies and avoiding duplication.

157. In Colombia, however, the case study found weak coherence and coordination between the FER funds and other (limited) sector humanitarian and development funds. Funding sources were not tracked well nor was information shared in a coherent manner. While some donors share what they are doing in meetings of the education cluster and the education working group for the migrant response, government does not present its needs or coordinate initiatives. Weak donor alignment and limited information shared with donors on the FER, have resulted in potential for duplication, with other donors not being well informed about ECW and the FERs. A donor noted that FER grantees/sub-grantees did not mention their FER funding. At the same time the FER proposals did not discuss other funding for EiEPC in detail.

158. **The grantee survey results support the role of grantees in ensuring the complementarity of FERs.** FER funding accounted for less than 20 per cent of the grantees’ EiE activities in about 50 per cent of the cases. In a further 25 per cent of the cases, FER funds accounted for 20 per cent to 39 per cent of the EiE funding. In general, the dependency on FER funding is higher among NGOs. The main sources of alternative funding are funding from bilateral donors and internal funds, with funding from UN agencies in third place (see Figure 10). The graph also illustrates some differences in relation to complementary sources of funding for EiE across the two main grantee groups. Compared to NGOs, multilateral organizations and agencies rely to a larger extent on internal funds, CERF and GPE accelerated facility. At the same time, NGOs seem to have better access than multilateral organizations and agencies to funding from INGOs and government.

Figure 10 Grantees sources and use of complementary financing for EiEPC



Source: Grantee survey results.

159. Just over two thirds of grantees used different sources of financing for interventions in different geographic areas. Almost half noted differentiating by programme areas or population groups, or by using the FERs for earlier interventions in their responses. The number of grantees indicating that their emergency education responses using FER funds was not distinct from their responses using other EiE funding is particularly high in the case of multilateral organizations and agencies (43 per cent). This poses some questions in relation to potential duplication with funding from other sources. It is possible this could be explained to some extent by the larger reliance of multilateral organizations and agencies on internal funding (see above).

160. **The survey results suggest, however, that ECW FERs do displace EiEPC funding from elsewhere at the grantee level in some cases.** We wanted to know whether grantees shift funding from EiEPC activities that they would have done in any case, when they receive a FER grant. In about 40 per cent of the cases, grantees indicated that the FER grant indeed helped the organization respond in sectors other than education by freeing up funding.

Finding 18. Relative to their size and scope, the FERs can pave the way well for a stronger humanitarian/development nexus and provide a platform for longer-term solutions.

161. The ECW Strategy 2018–2021 pictured the FERs together with MYRPs bridging the divide between humanitarian and development actors (see diagram on page 11). “*Working through the established humanitarian coordination structure, ECW brings together host governments and all relevant partners amidst a crisis... By bringing together these actors from the outset, ECW facilitated joint programming responds to immediate and urgent needs, addresses systemic needs and medium-term interventions, while also paving the way for long-term and sustainable solutions.*” (p. 10).

162. **Where governments were or became active members of education clusters, FERs helped paved the way for government or development funding to build on humanitarian interventions.** There are many examples of FERs that are implemented within a context of stronger government and strong government engagement, including in Mozambique, Colombia, Afghanistan, Nepal and Uganda, thus paving the way for connecting humanitarian, government and development funding. In Mozambique the FER triggered early organization from the education sector humanitarian actors, drawing in government and contributing to bringing in funding from development partners to provide finance, especially for the construction and rehabilitation of education facilities post-cyclones and more systemic responses to COVID-19. In Colombia the FERs also brought government strongly into humanitarian response: it triggered government to conceptualize the situation as an emergency and begin to prioritize coordinated preparedness and develop national policies that address migration and work across the humanitarian-development nexus. The Colombia FER was oriented to addressing systemic, long-term needs, including building local education authority capacity and working on comprehensive teacher professional development.

163. **However, FERs do not always connect well to government processes and strategies or to development actors.** Some global actors thought that the way in which FERs are designed means that the modality is significantly a humanitarian instrument and does not contribute to spanning the humanitarian/development nexus. Respondents thought that FERs, even if small, should do more to work with and through governments, especially when doing so would not violate humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality, as it would ‘set out a landing path’ for other humanitarian and development action to follow. This was especially important in education, because of the need for children to progress in a structured education system.

164. Our analysis of FER documents across all FERs supports the indication that not all FER processes connect well to the national authorities. While information is routinely shared with governments as members of the education cluster or other EiEPC group, governments in only eleven countries actively participated in grant selection and in 18 countries in processes to assess needs and define FER priorities. The database also provides evidence that FER projects are generally but not always implemented in coordination with national, regional or local authorities (in 19 countries), but as shown in the Nigeria FER this does not mean a strong connection to government overall.

165. The Nigeria and Niger cases provide evidence of how FERs can be implemented in contexts that do not make these connections well, and in turn do not influence actors to connect better. In Niger the FERs were seen as a short and relatively small emergency response that took little account of longer-term, inter-connected institutional problems. In Nigeria the conflict-FER focused on addressing the immediate needs of learnings, but other development actors did not build on FER activities to provide long-term solutions. The case study found that it was too small and its duration too short to

draw attention or influence the context. While the FER was coordinated with sub-national education authorities, this was too far removed from the federal level where development partners were active. Most development funding was directed elsewhere and most of the main sector donors had limited awareness of ECW and the FER. The potential for the FER to trigger additional resources, was therefore limited.

Internal coherence and connectedness

Finding 19. MYRPs and FERs are coherent when stakeholders ensure that gains made in FERs are sustained through the MYRPs.

166. The evaluation looked at whether there is appropriate continuation from the FERs into the MYRPs, where these follow, so that gains made under the FERs are made more sustainable. In practice at country level, such a connection was irrelevant in 16 countries, as the FERs were not followed by an MYRP at all (16 FER countries). In a further three countries, there is more than a one-year gap between the pre-COVID-19 FER and the MYRP. These countries are Somalia (FER in 2017, MYRP in 2019), Nigeria (FER in 2018, MYRP indicated for 2020), and Lebanon (FER in 2018 and MYRP indicated for 2021). In both Nigeria and Lebanon, however, COVID-19 FERs are being implemented in 2020, and a further FER in Lebanon responding to the Beirut explosion.

167. **Even when a MYRP follows, it may not build directly on the FERs.** At the time that the Nigeria conflict-FER was launched, beyond providing a quick response to an urgent need, the FER was intended to pave the ground for a subsequent MYRP. However, the utility of the FERs in helping to prepare for a MYRP appears limited for a number of reasons: (i) the focus of the FER in the north-east has meant ECW has not achieved any visibility at the federal level important in progressing a MYRP; (ii) there has been little learning through the FER around the more complex educational challenges that ECW would address in building a MYRP strategy; and (iii) it is far from clear the extent to which the MYRP would build directly on the FER activities or the FER partnerships.

168. **Colombia offers evidence of the potential value of coherence between FERs and MYRPs.** In Colombia the MYRP was recently developed. At the time of the field-work, there was evidence that stakeholders are explicitly working to build on lessons learnt from the FER into the MYRP and coherence between the FER into MYRP. The MYRP will expand targeting to the most vulnerable and include learning assessments as a separate activity. Processes for the MYRP also benefitted from FER lessons.

169. **In Afghanistan the MYRP also builds on the FER activities, connecting activities to focus more on systemic issues and connections.** The MYRP is being implemented for the years 2018 to 2021, with a planned investment of USD 36 million by ECW. While the main MYRP document makes no explicit mention of the preceding FER, the MYRP's overall targets and objectives are mirroring the FER, including a focus on girls, returnees, IDPs, complementary basic education, and safe and protective learning environments. The MYRP, however, is able to link to systemic issues more strongly. The MYRP covers almost all target provinces that were covered by the FER projects. Furthermore, the MYRP design process involved the LNGOs that carried out the FER, even though the grant was awarded to UNICEF.

Finding 20. Grantee or cluster efforts rather than ECW FER processes, facilitate coherence and learning within and between FER grants in implementation.

170. **While ECW FER design processes enable a coherent, coordinated FER proposal, implementation processes are grantee specific.** Whereas country coordination mechanisms directly approve the original grants, they play a limited role in grant management. FER grants are managed by the ECW Secretariat, with financial management support from the UNICEF Fund Support Office, through the grantee-specific reporting process. This limits coherence between grants, especially when grantees adjust their activities, and limits learning between grants.

171. **Grantees are interested in learning across grants. In Colombia such effort has borne fruit.** In Mozambique, Niger, Colombia and Nigeria the case studies noted that grantees are interested in learning from one another on FER supported activities. In Colombia a deliberate focus on information sharing and learning within the FER grantee – Save the Children – and three sub-grantees, has deepened coherence, learning and coordination between members (see box). Respondents in Colombia also noted that it would have been useful to have lessons learned from other FER grants in similar contexts.

Box 3 Information sharing and learning in FER grant in Colombia

The FER NGO consortium in Colombia has established active feedback loops enabled through monthly meetings. Several working groups are in place on key issues such as Gender; Coordination; Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning (MEAL); and Finances, with a focal point from each consortium member to strengthen the coordination within partners and ensure a standardized approach to project activities. NGO Consortium members also organized a lessons-learned exercise amongst themselves at the beginning of 2020 that captured key challenges and lessons learnt. The consortium has offered training to the education ministry and education cluster and migrant education working group members, improving coordination across the sector.

Source: Colombia case study.

EFFICIENCY

EQ 4: Are the FERs managed in an efficient, timely and transparent manner?

172. This section reports findings on how country actors become aware of FERs, on the transparency, inclusiveness and efficiency of FER processes, and on the cost-efficiency of FERs.

173. Based on the findings below, we conclude that the FERs, especially but not only the early FERs, have been marked by a lack of transparency and consistent information sharing with and between country stakeholders across countries. This is because earlier guidance on FERs was too loosely specified, resulting in opaque and closed processes for some FERs. How total FER amounts were decided by country was also opaque to stakeholders. We noted that the guidance issued in 2020 for implementing FERs and selecting grantees addresses these issues.

174. We concluded that FER design and reporting processes strike a balance between quality of responses, grant size and the focus on speed, but will need more focus on preparedness to ensure localization. Also, the short period allowed for grant proposals is offset by delays later in the process.

175. Drivers of cost-effectiveness in FERs were the low management cost and the cost efficiencies achieved when FER grants build on the existing activities and capacities of grantees. However, high

fragmentation between grantees and sub-contractors reduced the efficiency of the FERs because of rising fixed overhead ratios and/or indirect programme cost ratios to FER budgets.

Transparency of the FERs

Finding 21. FERs have been marked by a lack of transparency and consistent information sharing with country stakeholders across countries.

176. **ECW FER procedures have evolved rapidly and are slowly formalizing.** ECW is a fairly new fund with only three years of operating history. Its first grants were disbursed before it had a functional Secretariat. The first FERs were designed shortly after the establishment of the Secretariat, and the Fund has continuously been updating its guidance. In 2020 the Secretariat issued new guidance for FERs, including on grantee selection processes that emphasize the importance of open FER processes. The grants assessed for this evaluation were implemented before the updated guidance became available.

177. **In the period under review, countries have learned about FERs in various ways.** How potential FERs are announced to country EiEPC coordination mechanisms, and to potential grantees, has therefore varied significantly. The 2019 Guide for applying for first emergency response grants stated in most cases that the Secretariat will inform the country coordinators of a potential FER, and the coordinators should then communicate this to partners. This process seems to have been followed for the first FERs in Nigeria, Niger and the Mozambique cyclone rounds. In the case of Colombia, information about potential FER funding became available informally when a country coordinator approached ECW, but ECW had been engaging at the regional level already. More recently, a decision was made to fund existing grantees in the COVID-19 FER rounds. Subsequently, the Secretariat communicated directly with many existing grantees, thereby bypassing country coordinators.

178. **The real communication breakdown, however, has been at country level between the coordinator and partners.** Processes for this level of communication varied greatly, and in some cases were opaque. The table below summarizes the processes and challenges of FER announcements in the case study countries, illustrating that often information about the FERs was not disseminated widely enough, so that a range of partners who may be well placed to respond, could submit proposals. Double-hatting by UNICEF, and in some cases STC country coordinators, increased perceptions that it was these organizations communicating directly with the ECW, rather than coordinators on behalf of the EiEPC coordination mechanism.

Table 11 FER announcements at country level

Country	Country process steps
Colombia	<p>ECW to working group: Yes, but with some partners having information beforehand and complexity due to interface with regional coordination structures.</p> <p>Cluster coordinator to partners: Yes, but central role of UNICEF as coordinator and in cluster and migrant education working group caused challenges and misperceptions.</p> <p>Wider dissemination: No wider communication to all INGOs, LNGOs operating in the region.</p>
Mozambique	<p>ECW to cluster: Yes, but cluster was newly established and early communication between ECW and UNICEF as coordinating partner caused perceptions of exclusion. COVID-19 FER round announcement bypassed the cluster.</p> <p>Cluster coordinator to partners: Yes, FER information disseminated to cluster partners, but cluster is new so initial round excluded potential grantees.</p>

Country	Country process steps
	Wider dissemination: No, information was not widely available to LNGOs. Speed and language also excluded some LNGOs.
Niger	ECW to cluster: Yes Cluster coordinator to partners: Not clear that first FER round was shared widely if at all. Second round still poorly shared, but COVID-19 FER rounds were improved. Wider dissemination: No
Nigeria	ECW to cluster: Yes Cluster coordinator to partners: Yes, presented to cluster partners, but COVID-19 FER had lower visibility because existing grantees were already selected by ECW. Wider dissemination: No, awareness of modality closely tied to core Education in Emergencies Working Group (EiEWG) members in the north-east. Very little knowledge at federal level. No open call for proposals: in practice proposals were by invitation.

Source: Country case studies.

179. These case study experiences are reflected in comments by global respondents on a lack of transparency and uneven knowledge about FERs. The survey results are similar: 66 per cent of grantees first heard about FER grants from the EiEPC coordination mechanism. There are differences, however, between responses from NGOs and multilateral organizations and agencies. Compared to NGOs, multilateral organizations or agencies were less dependent on country coordination mechanisms and relied to a significant extent on direct information from the ECW Secretariat or informal contacts. Observed differences between multilateral organizations and NGOs could be explained by the role of UNICEF as cluster coordinator in many countries.

Finding 22. Earlier ECW’s guidance on grantee selection processes was too loosely specified, resulting in opaque and closed processes for some FERs.

180. **In each of the case study countries, stakeholders communicated some or other issue with grantee selection processes.** To some degree this can be expected, as there are inevitably winners and losers in an application process. It is remarkable though, that issues can be traced back to lack of openness regarding FER availability and decisions, especially by lead coordinators.

- In Nigeria, officially the EiEWG strategic advisory group agreed on how the participating agencies would be identified and selected, and how the criteria would be set. However, various grantees recollected that for the conflict-FER, in practice, the UNICEF EiEWG cluster coordinator decided which agencies would be invited to apply for what amount, and that the proportionately high allocation subsequently apportioned to UNICEF caused resentment. While this could be explained by UNICEF undertaking high cost activities, this choice was not widely agreed beforehand and perceptions of conflict of interest persisted. This was exacerbated by the strategic advisory group comprising UNICEF and the other grantees of this FER round.
- In Mozambique, where processes were in fact robust (see Finding 31 and Box 4 below), issues were about perceived conflict of interest of STC as a grantee and initial coordinator of the first round FER proposals (through surge capacity allocated to Mozambique from the global cluster), dissatisfaction with a late decision in the second round (led by government) to not award further money to first round recipients, and poor communication on grant amounts in the COVID-19 FER round.

- In Niger country stakeholders are of the view that the first conflict-FER round decision-making processes were not transparent, even if later rounds were improved. Information about the initial FER was not widely shared by the UNICEF cluster coordinator on time, and there was not a process of joint decision-making. Doubt about procedural fairness was exacerbated by the cluster coordinator; UNICEF was indeed the sole recipient of the first round FER.
- In Colombia country stakeholders were more satisfied that the FER selection process eventually undertaken was transparent, despite misunderstandings and miscommunication about the roles of the cluster coordinator from UNICEF and the co-lead from STC that were only resolved after an in-person country mission by ECW.

181. Generally, dissatisfaction is because ECW and the FERs were unknown in countries. Guidelines were available, but countries also had a lot of discretion to deviate from the guidelines. Coordinators did not set up robust processes, communication was weak, and decisions were not always well documented within the cluster coordination mechanisms, leaving room for discontent.

182. When the EiEPC coordinators 'double-hat', ie the same person managing programmatic responsibilities in their parent organization while also acting as the EiEPC coordinator, perceptions of conflict of interest arise more easily. Even when steps were taken to mitigate, such as coordinators recusing themselves when proposals are assessed, stakeholders can still question the decisions.

183. In June 2020 ECW issued a Guidance Note on the Selection of Grantees as well as a revised Operations Manual, with improved guidance on transparency and communication, as well as roles and responsibilities in FER processes. The new guidance will help overcome country capacity constraints on inclusive FER processes if implemented.

184. The survey results suggest that on average, the 83 FER grantees that responded to the survey are generally satisfied with different aspects of the design and approval processes. However, this would be the case as the survey was of successful grantees. It is therefore interesting, that on average respondents were less satisfied with the inclusion of local NGOs as potential grantees, the coordination of grantees during proposal design, and the fairness of decision-making on grantees. However, over half of respondents still scored these issues 4 or 5 on a 5-point scale where 5 indicated 'Very good.' Respondents from NGOs had somewhat lower levels of satisfaction on the transparency and fairness of decision-making, but still over half indicated 4 or 5. Perhaps not surprisingly, on average they were significantly less satisfied with the inclusion of LNGOs.

Finding 23. How total FER amounts were decided was opaque to stakeholders.

185. **ECW is not transparent on what drove decisions about the volume of FERs for specific cases.** Many global respondents felt that ECW should be more transparent about what factors influenced decisions on the FER amounts allocated to countries, especially when the FERs are allocated as part of a regional response. They did not necessarily argue for a more rule-driven arduous approach that would drive up transaction costs relative to the amounts, but thought that transparency would be assisted by the ECW Secretariat making available the rationale for decisions, at least to country stakeholders. Country respondents in regional FERs, three of the four country case studies, also perceived the decisions as opaque. The data show that there was some disparity between the allocations relative to need for countries in regional responses.

186. The ECW's own thinking on how to determine FER budgets has shifted. The ECW Strategy 2018–2021 targeted an average of 25 per cent of needs. The data for all FERs where we could find independent information on financing need (such as in HRPs), show that on average FERs have

financed 31 per cent of need, but this includes a few outlier responses to natural disasters. The median is 16 per cent. The recent operational manual notes that “ECW does not set the level of funding as a percentage of the overall education requirements of the emergency” for the FERs, but uses the extent of the needs, the size of the response, available financial resources and capacity of partners to implement. It aims to “enter a dialogue with the emergency coordination mechanisms” to recommend a realistic level of funding. This would assist country stakeholders to have confidence that the country was allocated a fair amount.

Table 12 Regional allocation relative to country EiEPC funding needs

	Grant	Funding needed	Share of funding needed
Cyclone Idai FERs			
Malawi	2,250,421	2,400,000	94%
Mozambique	10,359,757	18,000,000	58%
Zimbabwe	2,250,000	14,300,000	16%
Sahel round 1 and 2			
Burkina Faso	2,200,000	11,755,860	19%
Mali	4,300,000	32,500,000	13%
Niger	3,269,398	12,400,000	26%
Venezuela Regional Response			
Brazil	749,000	5,000,000	15%
Colombia	2,642,900	33,400,000	8%
Ecuador	1,936,700	32,000,000	6%
Peru	1,294,700	Not known	-

Source: Associated HRPs, FER proposals and FER database.

Efficiency of FER processes

Finding 24. FER design and reporting processes and templates strike a balance between quality of responses, grant size and the focus on speed, but will need more focus on preparedness to ensure localization.

187. FERs aim to be nimble and respond rapidly to immediate need. They rely on country coordination structures to make fast decisions based on the best information to use the best available capacity to address the immediate education needs of the most vulnerable. A key question for the evaluation therefore is whether the processes and templates used by ECW are fit for this task, and whether they are clear enough, and deliver what ECW needs.

188. **FER processes strike a balance between drawing on existing country processes and documentation, value-addition and accountability to its donors.** Processes to design FER proposals and select grantees are the most resource- and time-intensive in the FER project timeline. They place high demands on country coordinators, grantees and the ECW Secretariat. An issue raised by a few global and country stakeholders was that ECW FERs duplicate broader EiEPC planning processes in an emergency. The argument is that FER processes should select from projects already included in the HRPs, rather than require additional proposal and project design effort. Counter-arguments are that the process of drafting a concept note and proposal for the FERs facilitate coherent FERs, that there are often timing issues between HRP completion and FER proposal timing, HRP processes do not always sufficiently raise the profile of EiEPC nor do they always integrate gender, inclusion, protection or MHPSS as thoroughly as ECW FER processes require. Requiring a separate process that draws on the existing needs assessments, structures and plans strikes a balance

between enabling ECW's mandate to enable better education responses and efficiency. Furthermore, as a global pooled fund, ECW is accountable to its donors to deliver effective use of funding: it was not clear to the team that this would be possible without separate processes, even if a separate process would not necessarily need extensive new documentation.

189. Country stakeholders, including grantees, on balance see ECW's arrangements for the design of FERs as about right. Country case study respondents for the most part thought design processes were efficient. Grantees who responded to the survey, also thought the time allocated overall was about right.

190. The preparation of project proposals and the assessment of education needs are the two areas with a higher number of respondents who thought the time allocated for these processes was too short. The review of the open-ended answers indicates that grantees rating the time available for some of the stages as too short usually linked that opinion to their views on overall quality and/or the need for more consultative, inclusive or transparent processes. However, open-ended answers from many grantees argue that, in humanitarian situations, there is a trade-off between the speed of the process and the quality of some of the stages. A better process would require more time and would delay the response. Instances where the process is considered to be too long are generally linked to a few experiences where the proposals suffered substantial delays and/or the revision process was long.

191. Short proposal timelines can mean delays later in the process, given the ECW focus on aspects such as the most vulnerable. There are trade-offs between stages in the FER project timeline. In effect, the ECW FERs are about getting fast proposals on the table against which funding can be disbursed quickly, but with flexibility so that adjustments can be made in the field as needed. In practice, however, delays occur before proposal approval, as the ECW Secretariat puts effort into reviewing proposals and negotiating adjustments before approval of the proposal. In Mozambique, for example, grantees noted that the COVID-19 FER two-day turnaround time meant that they drafted proposals under great pressure. The initial time pressure resulted in subsequent protracted exchanges of several weeks with the ECW Secretariat on the hastily prepared proposals. Longer time to draft may have resulted in an overall higher quality proposal.

192. Our review of project proposals raised the same issue: it is not clear that the combination of templates and short time for reply always produce documents with good, coherent information for making grant decisions. This results in significant effort from ECW to improve/enrich proposals. Besides issues such as noticing exact text reproduced across countries for the same grantee in the COVID-19 FER proposals, it was not clear that the context and needs assessment section, for example, delivered really useful information. The review of the COVID-19 proposals showed that these parts of the proposal neither provided thorough overview of all needs nor enough on the needs that the project is responding to; consequently, ECW could not judge either whether the most urgent needs were being responded to or the appropriateness of the response. The issue is perhaps more that this is always difficult to do from a document, especially a short one, unless the reviewer is in context. Once again this emphasizes that the country-level review processes are key to the quality of FER interventions and the need for preparedness so that these processes are capacitated when an emergency strikes or escalates.

193. Short proposal timelines also mean that potential grantees, who could be better placed to respond, are excluded from processes. The argument for fast proposal turnaround in the interest of a rapid response is clear. However, in all the country case studies it was also clear that

it comes at a cost of more grantee diversity and localization. Furthermore, the country case studies found the COVID-19 FER proposal time to be too rapid even for existing grantees. An unreasonably short two days were given for the receipt of applications, which was justified on the basis of using existing grantees. In Nigeria, Mozambique and Colombia this meant that some agencies decided not to apply.

194. While UN agencies and large INGOs have the capacity to put in convincing bids within hours or a few days, national NGOs do not that capacity and may not be fluent enough in English to do so even if they would otherwise be able to complete the process in a short period of time. Country stakeholders also reported that whereas consortia may be an option and even desirable, the timeline is too short for such consortia to form and agree common proposals, unless they are already in place. An additional constraint in many cases is that national NGOs in most cases are not HACT-assessed and therefore not able to respond in any event. Getting organizations HACT-assessed will take much longer than getting organizations into consortia. The ECW arrangements allow for grants to be approved for non-HACT-assessed organizations, but grants will not be disbursed until the assessment is in place and this option has not been used often, as the risk of very long delays are high. Should ECW therefore want to fulfil its commitments to localization more directly, while still ensuring rapid deployment of FERs, it will have to work with its global partners to invest more in preparedness.

195. **FER contracting and reporting processes were seen as light, manageable and more flexible and efficient than for many other funders.** Grantees did not raise issues about the ECW FER reporting requirements. They often expressed the view that compared to other funders, the templates were straightforward and the frequency of reporting appropriate. Most grantee survey respondents rated contracting checks and procedures, financial procedures, financial and narrative reporting requirements as 'very good/easy' or 'good/easy.' ECW feedback on the annual report was rated lower more frequently, but still 70 per cent of respondents thought it 'very good' or 'good.'

196. Country case study respondents also thought ECW procedures for making programme and budget changes straightforward in a way that allowed them to adjust to situations that can change rapidly. In Colombia, the consortium was able to respond easily to a previously unidentified need for female hygiene products, for example. Most survey respondents agreed, although they did not rate programme and budget change procedures as high as other implementation procedures.

197. **Stakeholders found FER guidelines and templates manageable.** The FER proposal template is a living document: over the period of the evaluation it has had several iterations as the Secretariat added elements, and then slimmed it down again. Overall, global and country stakeholders thought that ECW got the balance about right between templates that are sufficiently information rich to assess FER proposals and templates that are light and easy to complete. Generally, stakeholders thought templates were light compared to other funding sources. Grantees who responded to the survey most often rated the proposal narrative template as 'very good/easy' or 'good/easy', followed by budget templates, and guidance on FER processes. Interestingly, most grantee survey respondents who participated in several FER rounds either thought guidance, templates and feedback to be clearer in later rounds (e.g. about 40 per cent thought proposal templates and guidance was better later), or the same.

198. **The results framework was seen as problematic by some, but the 2020 version could address coordination issues if ECW succeeds in establishing this framework as a used global core framework for EiEPC.** Some global stakeholders expressed the opinion that it is problematic that ECW has its own results framework and does not draw more on existing global,

country or grantee indicators and frameworks to minimize the cost of monitoring and evaluation, especially in small grants like the FERs. This was reflected at country level, where the difficulty of collecting data or recasting data for ECW purposes was raised. Grantee survey respondents also gave templates for result measures and targets lower ratings more often than other templates, even if more than 60 per cent of respondents still rated the template as 'good' or 'very good.' In Colombia, one stakeholder noted that the consequence of ECW-specific results framework is that ECW grantees and sub-grantees work narrowly along ECW lines rather than integrating their ECW-funded work into sector-wide discussions in the coordination group. Starting with existing sector indicators, results measures and targets would help bring the work/discussions into the sector (and ultimately benefit its strengthening). Global stakeholders also noted that if ECW starts with what is already used at country level, it can add its own specialist indicators.

199. There is, however, currently no commonly accepted, overarching global EiE data/results framework. The ECW Secretariat indicated that in order to report to its donors, it requires some degree of standardization across countries. The ECW indicators are common indicators, such as boys and girls reached, and teachers trained. Furthermore the community of EiEPC partners saw the ECW as providing such a global results framework, with the idea that it would become a lead framework for others to build on. In developing the revised ECW framework which was released in 2020, the ECW Secretariat involved a large group of stakeholders so that the indicators chosen are owned more broadly, with a wide applicability to the many diverse country contexts and in line with the frameworks used in different agencies. This is a sensible approach if backed by ECW efforts -- through the joint coordination initiative with the Global Education Cluster, UNHCR and INEE -- to market the framework to establish its common use.

Cost-effectiveness of FERs

200. It is difficult to judge the degree to which FER-financed interventions are cost-effective, because of significant differences between countries, and even within countries, between different grantees. Given that project-specific outcome information is not available, cost-effectiveness at this level is also not possible to assess. However, in the country case studies and at the global level, we were able to look at economy and efficiency. This also differed between contexts, but there were shared drivers of inefficiency across contexts.

Finding 25. The FERs are more efficient than funding modalities that require capacity at country level, such as agents, financing units or country offices.

201. Since 2016, the ECW Secretariat, UNICEF FSO and trust fund fees combined are equivalent to 10 per cent of ECW grants disbursed. This is low. Other global fund management arrangements we looked at had costs ranging from 11.6 per cent of grants issued. Of those costs, the Secretariat cost comprises 8 per cent. A key factor is that the country-level costs of FERs are only in some cases expensed to ECW.

Finding 26. Fragmentation of FER grants between grantees and across multiple rounds, and high use of sub-contracting, drive up costs.

202. In Nigeria and Mozambique, the case studies found that the overhead costs associated with the award of a number of small grants, drove up costs. Two factors contribute: firstly, each additional organization contracted has overheads related to grant management, administration and monitoring and evaluation, that reduce funding available for interventions; secondly, many small

grants in a FER require investment in coordination to avoid inefficiencies and overlap. In Nigeria the evidence demonstrated a sharing of available resources amongst eligible agencies, rather than a competitive process that could have led to larger and more efficient grants. In Mozambique, similarly, the approach was not to award the FERs to the best proposals, but to rather scale back all proposals to fit the envelope. This meant that, taking overheads into account, the efficiency of each proposal was diminished. Multiple rounds in quick succession lowered the likelihood of cost-effective grants. In the COVID-19 FER round a misunderstanding about the total amount available meant that grantees planned for a larger amount than was eventually offered.

203. The Colombia case study noted that similar effects occur when a larger grant to a single grantee is sub-contracted to many providers. In the case of sub-contracting, in addition to the staff and overhead costs associated with grant management, administration, monitoring and evaluation at the level of sub-grantees, a next layer of indirect programme costs may be charged. For grantees, ECW limits this charge to 7 per cent of direct project costs for main grantees. If this guideline amount was followed, and 80 per cent of a USD 1 million grant is sub-contracted to the next layer of service providers, it means that if contractors also charge the same amount, 12.6 per cent of the USD 1 million will be paid in indirect project costs, before any interventions are started.⁴⁰ There are cases where sub-contractors sub-contract a next layer of sub-contractors.

Finding 27. There is evidence that FERs achieve cost efficiencies when they build on existing capacities and activities of grantees.

204. In Nigeria the conflict and COVID-19 FER activities leveraged existing EiEPC investments by grantees. In the conflict-FER the temporary learning centres that were utilized had already been constructed. The COVID-19 FER was able to complement and scale up projects that grantees were implementing already. Furthermore, in many FERs, UNICEF's global procurement capacities that are deployed to obtain educational materials and other supplies at lower unit costs, are also noted to be a driver of cost-efficiencies.

EFFECTIVENESS: SYSTEMIC OUTCOMES

EQ 5: Do ECW's fund mobilization efforts support FERs, and have the FERs contributed to education in humanitarian situations at country, regional and global levels?

205. This section assesses how global capacities connect to the FERs and vice versa. It investigates how ECW'S global and in-country advocacy and resource mobilization efforts have contributed to better FER design and implementation, and how FERs may have contributed to strengthening the global environment for EiEPC.

206. We have already argued above in Finding 2 that the FERs have raised the profile of education in emergencies and in Finding 4 that there is evidence that it contributes to some degree to additional resources for the sector because it enables rapid responses, demonstrating the need for and possibility of a rapid education sector response, alongside protection, food security, water, sanitation and health. The discussion in these two findings, which demonstrated how the FER adds value, is

⁴⁰ The FER project budgets do not show the detailed budgets of sub-contractors. It was therefore not possible for the country case studies or other countries to determine the exact share of FER grants that are spent on indirect programme costs and non-variable overheads.

relevant to EQ5 as well, as it sets out a link between the FERs and the raised profile of EiEPC, as well as more resources for the sector globally.

207. Based on the findings below we conclude that FERs were supported by ECW fundraising efforts and the pooled fund mechanism, but that some elements of the management of FER funds, such as the 'no objection' requirement for when UNICEF is a grantee, should be improved. The ECW Secretariat's support is relevant to quality FERs, but the lack of understanding about the FER modality globally, affects how it is perceived and implemented at country level. The current level of global or regional support for countries that are allocated a FER is also insufficient. Ongoing global efforts to improve coordination for support between global actors is a step in the right direction.

Finding 28. Fund raising efforts by ECW and the arrangements for financing FERs, support rapid deployment of ECW funds to emergencies, but arrangements for ExCom engagement on the FERs are out of date.

208. **The replenishable reserve fund arrangement for financing rapid responses without cumbersome approval processes works well.** We have not become aware of any occasion where ECW was not able to respond to a rapid onset or escalating emergency because it did not have resources on hand. The reserve is set at about USD 25 million but can be replenished. ECW has had to do that in both 2019 and 2020. This may signal a need, or at least an opportunity, to increase the reserve, which would be needed more if the scale of FER funding were to be increased. However, in both cases ECW was able to replenish the reserve through additional funds raised, partly because of the profile of FERs. The reserve fund mechanism works well to allow the Secretariat freedom to take rapid decisions.

209. **However, the 'no objection' arrangement for when UNICEF is the grantee is ineffective and causes delays.** It is understandable that putting the arrangement in place was necessary at the time when ECW was new as a pre-emptive measure and backstop to protect donors, ECW and UNICEF from reputational risk from appearance of conflict of interest. It has not, however, yet resulted in the reversal of a decision to award a FER grant to UNICEF. It may have contributed to discourage some UNICEF country coordinators from allocating undue shares of FER grants to UNICEF country offices, but this is not evident.

210. The multiple roles of UNICEF in FER management at global and country level, in the absence of the modality being well understood by stakeholders, have led to country processes that are insufficiently robust, resulting in concerns that UNICEF monopolizes funding. The Executive Committee no-objection procedure has not visibly contributed to protecting ECW and UNICEF from conflict of interest allegations, but has delayed grant approvals and disbursements. Options to strengthen the process are to streamline it, so that a sub-committee looks into cases at some threshold in more depth, or to opt for more regular ex post systematic reporting on the FERs to the Executive Committee. As it is, the no-objection procedure delays approvals and disbursements and adds transaction costs.

211. **More systematic reporting on the FERs could also raise donor support for the mechanism.** Our donor interview data suggest that some development donors are more interested in the MYRPs, which is closer in practice to development rather than humanitarian approaches. While ExCom members received routine communication on the award of the FERs when they happen, some noted that it would help them communicate to their home offices on ECW if they had a more

systematic overview of current FERs and why they are important, more frequently than the annual report.

Finding 29. A lack of awareness of and understanding of the FER modality globally, affects how it is perceived and implemented at country level.

212. More ECW global efforts to create awareness and understanding of the FERs would have supported country processes better. The FERs are relatively new in the EiEPC landscape compared to instruments such as the CERF, CBPFs and their predecessors, and the GPE. Global interviews and our country case studies show that country actors were not familiar with the FER, including the country staff of international bodies. Because of the multiple roles UNICEF plays in FERs, it is particularly at risk that its staff and country stakeholders would see FERs as de facto UNICEF funds and not develop or demand inclusive processes to allocate FERs. These roles are: ECW is housed in UNICEF; UNICEF is the co-coordinator of the Global Education Cluster; it provides surge capacity; and it was the implementer of the ECW initial investments. That ECW corporate mail sometimes also comes from UNICEF addresses, strengthens impressions that the boundary between ECW and UNICEF is not solid. Thus, when UNICEF is then also the country EiEPC coordinator, and individual staff members double-hat, it creates both opportunities for UNICEF to monopolize FER resources and a platform for discontent when conflict of interest issues are not well managed.

Finding 30. While support for FERs deepened as ECW capacity grew, the global or regional support is still not sufficient to assist countries to put together and implement quality FERs, in alignment with global humanitarian principles and standards.

213. As ECW Secretariat capacity grew, support for the FERs deepened. Over time ECW capacity to quality support (QS) FER proposals grew, especially with the addition of more technical EiEPC sector, grant management and monitoring and evaluation management capacity. The addition of capacity on gender, MHPSS and safeguarding and protection was particularly noted. Overall, country case study respondents noted that ECW Secretariat review processes were helpful, and we did not perceive issues about responsiveness to the field from the Secretariat. The majority of grantee survey respondents also rated Secretariat support as 'good' or 'very good.' However, it is apparent that the burden of primary review to ensure that grantee and project selection is optimal, should be placed at field level, in the hands of the EiEPC coordination mechanism. It would not be possible for the Secretariat to scale up and down Secretariat support as emergencies unfold; better knowledge of the context and field conditions is at country level; and the Secretariat needs to retain an oversight role, limiting how deeply it can be involved.

214. In-country missions helped in three of the case studies to raise ECW's profile and clarify the FERs, even if some were linked to upcoming MYRPs rather than FERs. In Colombia and Nigeria missions helped to respectively clarify the FER modality roles and responsibilities and raise the profile of the FER at the federal level. Subsequent missions in Colombia helped to raise EiEPC issues with government and donors. In Mozambique the Secretariat provided this support, and support on grantee selection processes for the FERs.

215. Support from ECW's global partners, such as surge support from the Global Education Cluster, also have a critical role in many FERs. Our clearest example is Mozambique, where the surge support provided by UNICEF and Save the Children made rapid FER proposal and approval possible, even preceding the support provided by the ECW Secretariat.

216. Global Education Cluster support is clearly available when there is a sudden onset emergency, or a clear, recognized escalation in a protracted emergency. In practice, however, ECW has deployed the FER in circumstances where surge support has not been triggered. Niger, for example may have benefitted from similar support, to help broaden the proposal base and bolster country capacity to coordinate and review proposals.

217. Global coordination to assess country capacities in all cases of new FERs and provide support when needed, is still weak, but the recent initiative on coordination is a step in the right direction. While the Global Education Cluster is informed or consulted when ECW decides to deploy a FER, or can even trigger a FER to be deployed, it is not clear that there is a routine process to make a rapid assessment of country capacity, and what support would be needed to avoid weak country processes and sub-optimal grant decisions. Similarly, in refugee situations, global processes to do a rapid check with UNHCR on country capacity and need for coordination triggers is not in place.

218. The recent Acceleration Facility-financed UNHCR, Global Education Cluster and INEE Initiative for Strengthening Education in Emergencies coordination will assist in this regard, as it includes commitments to allocate time and resources for joined-up coordination at preparedness stage and from the very start of a response; and to invest in communication, exchange and capacity building between global, national and sub-national EiEPC coordination systems.

219. Country FERs have not benefitted yet from being connected through a joined-up regional effort or from global cross-country learning support via ECW. Regional level coordinated FERs appear to be a good principle in regional crises to ensure targeted support, cross-border advocacy, coordination (for example on certification), learning and better data. However, the Niger case study noted no further regional coordination between FERs. In the case of Colombia, a complementary regional FER, a first, was put in place to support regional coordination between countries affected by the Venezuela refugee crisis. Colombia country partners thought that there was limited knowledge exchange, learning or targeted technical support facilitated by the regional component. The lack of consistent communication between the regional and national level in the FER was an issue. In Colombia, stakeholders had hoped for a stronger focus from the regional component on strategic issues where regional actors can add value, such as applied learning, advocacy and resource mobilization. Overall, there seems to be not enough thinking or planning from ECW around the strategic focus of a regional role vis-à-vis the national FER in the first place, so that the regional component has not yet reached its potential.

220. Relatedly, there appears to be limited connection between ECW's Acceleration Facility and FERs. The Acceleration Facility's financing of improved global sector capacity – such as of the recent Initiative for Strengthening Education in Emergencies – provides indirect support to the FERs. However, more directly applicable work, such as on learning what interventions work and when, can support a FER learning agenda. We did not find evidence that learning, for example on how to provide safe spaces when schools are under attack or how to mitigate conflict tensions, is enabled directly for the FERs through the Acceleration Facility.

EQ 6: Did the FER modality and the FERs promote a rapid, timely, joint, coordinated and inclusive approach to EiE in countries?

221. This section examines whether the FERs were designed, implemented and monitored in a joint, coordinated and inclusive manner between country partners. It asks to what extent the required

actors were consulted, and whether affected populations were consulted. Finally, it asks whether the FERs were sufficiently rapid and timely.

222. Based on the findings below we conclude that the FERs did promote a joint, coordinated and inclusive approach to EiE in countries when there is strong leadership and capacity at country level. In protracted crises, FER processes tend to at first reinforce poor cluster leadership dynamics, but can also leave coordination better off. The improved coordination can be inclusive of government, but this requires government capacity and interest. That the FERs can operate without government engagement is a plus. However, the FER timelines do not allow for consulting with affected communities. The short proposal drafting time also effectively excludes LNGOs, which are often not HACT-assessed and do not have the same means as INGOs to turn around proposals fast and in English.

223. The FERs were not designed and disbursed as fast as the FER timeline demands. Delays sometimes meant that the FERs were not timely, and affected project results. In protracted crises design delays mattered less than in sudden onset emergencies.

Promoting inclusive country processes

Finding 31. FERs can promote joint and inclusive EiEPC work at country level by bringing actors together for FER processes when there is strong leadership and capacity at country level.

224. **FERs trigger coordination because they are dedicated funding that country EiEPC actors must allocate.** By design the FERs aim to trigger more coordination at country level. They require the country EiEPC coordinating body to allocate the FER as a pooled, dedicated resource for the sector, creating incentives for actors to cooperate in ways that other EiEPC funding sources do not. Two of our country case studies are good examples of this principle working well, namely Mozambique and Colombia, where country processes were robust (see Box 4 below).

Box 4 FER allocation processes in Mozambique

The Mozambique Education Cluster provided coordination and management of the successive FERs in Mozambique. Coordination arrangements were put in place at the national level in Maputo, in Beira (Sofala), Chimoio (Manica) and Quelimane (Zambézia). ECW FER first round grants were awarded on a competitive basis through the cluster. An application review committee was formed with representatives from government, civil society and the cluster coordinators (represented by UNICEF and STC). Clear criteria were defined to judge the applications and the outcomes of the review committee were then documented and made publicly available. Criteria included geographical coverage, age group coverage, cost per child, the completeness of the offered package and consideration of issues such as MHPSS, differentiated needs of girls and boys, needs of children with disabilities, child safeguarding and consideration of government priorities and link to long-term interventions. This process was generally accepted to be fair and evidence-based. Five of the six applications were accepted, in some cases with budget adjustments to bring them in line with the total available envelope. Even the COVID-19 FER, which had short turnaround requirements, were subjected to competitive review of proposals from existing grantees and selected awards within the ECW envelope.

Source: Mozambique case study data.

225. All stakeholders agreed that the education cluster has performed exceptionally well in Mozambique. It was activated quickly and with strong leadership has proved to be an effective coordinator of the overall educational response, although there were reported differences in the effectiveness of coordination at the provincial level with different levels of local interest and engagement. In Mozambique, because of good government capacity and advocacy, coordination has continued beyond the FER processes, around subsequent funding streams.

226. This is, however, not always the case. As noted above (see paragraph 170), because the FERs do not require country-based implementation reporting or coordination, the coordination effects triggered by the FER design process, are less than they could be. Colombia is a good example of where joint implementation under a single proposal has generated additional pay-offs in implementation (see Box 5 below).

Box 5 The Colombia FER triggered better coordination across the project cycle

The NGO Consortium approach in Colombia has proven to be efficient and transparent amongst the partners and has resulted in cost savings through standardization of activities and tools, sharing of expertise and training and better coordination not only between partners but also with the Ministry of Education and existing coordination mechanisms, which also enabled partners to start implementation rapidly. This consortium approach has, in effect, put into action the New Way of Working based on complementarity, comparative advantage and division of labour around not only expertise but also around geographic locations. These efforts have contributed to the achievement of collective results, and have promoted efficiencies, such as better joint planning and leveraging of collective resources of partners. For example, each consortium member agreed to lead on a thematic area for teacher training: STC leads on literacy and numeracy boost, inclusive education and social-emotional learning; the NRC leads on peer-learning package and Plan and World Vision are collectively working on a teacher training package on gender.

Source: Colombia case study data.

Finding 32. In protracted crises FER processes tend to at first reinforce poor cluster leadership dynamics, but may leave coordination better off.

227. **As much as FERs can build clusters in new crises, when they land in protracted crises with established clusters, they at first reinforce existing leadership shortcoming or functionalities.** Country respondents thought that the first FER exacerbated pre-existing difficulties of coordination, rather than help solve them. The Niger case study offered an interesting case where the conflict-FER first round was not inclusive and was perceived as UNICEF allocating funds to UNICEF. Implementation was also delayed. Before the next round the cluster leadership shifted, however, to joint cluster coordination by UNICEF and STC. Significant efforts were made in this round to coordinate inputs during the FER application process. As a consequence, the second conflict-FER and COVID-19 FERs were found to promote a timely and coordinated EiE response to a growing crisis and the global pandemic. One respondent commented that FERs “could not happen” without the cluster coordinating responses.

228. **It is, however, notable that in Niger and Nigeria, where the first FER rounds were more dysfunctional than in Colombia and Mozambique, efforts were made to strengthen cluster coordination afterwards.** Our evidence suggests that this may be a result of the FERs. In Niger several interviewees attested to the importance of ECW’s insistence on putting the cluster – and especially the coordinators – at the heart of the FER process, which is very different from other

sources of funding. In Nigeria, by the time the COVID-19 FER occurred, the cluster leadership was also strengthened, partly with FER funding.

229. Overall, our database analysis shows a general trend of improved processes, even if some countries still appear to have processes that are not sufficiently inclusive. We analysed the information on grantee selection from all proposals made available to the evaluation in the FER document base. The table below shows the results of our analysis. Just under 60 per cent of 2019 and 2020 proposals that we could categorize were done through processes 1 and 2, compared to only 40 per cent of 2017 and 2018 proposals, suggesting improvement over time.

Table 13 Features of FER selection processes across countries and FER rounds

Proposal process descriptions	Number of proposals
Process 1. A separate review committee or advisory group, within the cluster, came together to reach a decision on the FER grantees	15 (3 from 2017)
Process 2. Decision reached by education cluster partners, but a review committee was not specified	14 (1 from 2018)
Process 3. Core group, often cluster coordinators, as decision-makers	7 (2 from 2018)
Process 4. Decision by specific agencies, often one of cluster co-coordinators	6 (2 from 2018)
Process 5. Government decisions	3 (1 from 2017, 1 from 2018)
Process 6. No selection process as such, as existing grantees were selected for COVID-19 FERs or only one grantee could submit a proposal in time (also COVID-19 FER)	7
Unclear	4 (1 from 2018)

Source: ECW FER proposals, own analysis. See details in Annex 4 Table 22.

Finding 33. This improved coordination can be inclusive of government, although it requires government capacity and interest. At the same time, that the FERs can operate without government engagement can be a plus.

230. Governments are systematically engaged in many, but not all FERs. Some global interview respondents thought that the FERs were not inclusive enough of government actors to ensure sustainability of interventions. In order to get a better view on government engagement in the FERs, we coded the FER proposals for 32 countries in the document base, on levels of government engagement.

231. Across the FER portfolio there are many examples of FERs being implemented in close coordination with government, usually through government general participation in EiEPC structures. The engagement, however, goes beyond just information sharing through these structures in many cases.

- In ten countries – Afghanistan, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Comoros, the DRC, Malawi, Mali, Nepal, Uganda and Ukraine – government actively participated in selection processes. In Mozambique and Colombia government was also involved in FER design processes. Our country-level research moreover showed that in both cases it can be argued that FER processes have contributed to government becoming more involved in EiEPC. This is especially true in Colombia, where the FERs triggered government conceptualizing the migrant crisis as an education issue too.
- In 19 countries, the FER document base or our country case studies indicate that government has participated in needs assessments and/or processes defining the priorities that should be

tackled through FER interventions. This list includes Afghanistan, Colombia, Comoros, the DRC, Ecuador, Greece, Indonesia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Peru, Somalia, Syria, Uganda, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

- The analysis of the FER database shows that FER projects are generally implemented in coordination with national, regional and/or local authorities. The database provides evidence that this is the case in 19 out of the 33 countries: Afghanistan, Brazil, Cameroon, Colombia, Comoros, the DRC, Ecuador, Indonesia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Nepal, Nigeria, Peru, Somalia, Syria, Uganda, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Most of the collaboration on implementation is with regional authorities, especially with pre-COVID-19 FERs. In Nigeria, Cameroon and the DRC the COVID-19 FERs have led to working with central levels of government, as they involved national radio broadcasts and other tools.
- Evidence of government participation in FER projects monitoring and evaluation systems, including data collection, is limited to 11 countries: Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, the CAR, the DRC, Mozambique, Nepal, Nigeria, Somalia, Uganda, Yemen and Zimbabwe. The involvement of government in FER project monitoring and evaluation is generally related to the oversight role of government over the education systems. The analysis of FER documents reveals two different types of activities which can apply concurrently. Firstly, the government can participate or lead data collection processes at central government level (e.g. Uganda) and/or through local educators or education authorities (e.g. Yemen). Secondly, government can also participate in joint field visits to monitor project implementation (e.g. the CAR, Uganda and Nepal).

232. Many respondents, however, noted that a strength of the FER is to finance EiEPC responses even when government engagement may not be possible or desirable, such as in sub-regions of countries where government may not be able to reach in humanitarian emergencies caused by internal conflict, or where government policy to re-settle internally displaced populations, including through providing schooling and fixed sites, may be politically motivated. Such circumstances call for a FER of some form that allow humanitarian actors to provide education to affected populations, while remaining neutral.

Finding 34. The speed of FER design processes, and requirements for a minimum, assessed level of financial management and other capacities, exclude most national NGOs from participating.

233. We argue above, in paragraphs 193 and 194 under Finding 24 on the efficiency of FER design processes, that national NGOs face high barriers to participating in FERs. The speed of FER proposal processes, together with the requirement that grantees are HACT-assessed, means that most national NGOs are excluded.

234. While this may be overcome by the use of consortia, the FER timeline generally does not allow for establishing new consortia. To date, FERs have only been awarded to consortia in 11 FER grants in six countries (see Annex 4 Table 23 for more detail).⁴¹ In five of the cases the consortium partners are exclusively INGOs, or predominantly so. Established consortia would often include only those national NGOs that would be able to participate on their own accord in any case. Sub-contracting is the other option, but that is costly, as indirect programme charges would be levied twice. It will also

⁴¹ As revealed by analysis of the FER document base and the country case studies. There may be more consortia that are not clearly specified as such.

not necessarily bring the benefit of local knowledge to the FER design stage, when the insights of local sub-contracting NGOs are not incorporated at this stage already, unless there are existing relationships between main grantees and potential sub-contractors.

Engagement with affected populations

Finding 35. FER timelines do not allow for consulting affected communities, but grantees generally do include feedback mechanisms into project designs.

235. The country case studies present mixed evidence of the extent to which the views of affected populations are sought in FER project design and implementation. Communities are consulted in project implementation and some grants have activities that are aimed at strengthening citizen voice, for example by setting up school committees. In Nigeria and Mozambique grantees did not seek community input into proposal preparation. Instead they drew on their previous engagements with communities, as the timeline did not allow for consultation on the FER projects themselves.

236. In Colombia, however, where FER timelines were longer, FER grantees described their efforts to get input into project design. Regular meetings were held with affected populations to receive their feedback on project activities. Children, parents and teachers are also involved in monitoring through a wide range of feedback mechanisms, such as hotlines and complaint/suggestion boxes, focus group discussions and education committees.

237. Respondents to the grantee survey also shared their views on how they considered the voice of beneficiaries during planning and implementation of FER grants. Grantees were balanced between those who used available information, those who collected information and/or those who made additional efforts to collect the views of vulnerable groups. When the data is broken down per type of grantee, multilateral organizations/agencies relied to larger extent on available data, while grantee replies suggests a larger share of NGOs collected data and made additional efforts to consider the views of vulnerable beneficiary groups.

Timeliness of the FERs

238. This section should be read together with the efficiency findings on whether the FER processes as designed are time-efficient. In this section we look at whether processes were delivered on time, and whether they were timely to restore access to education.

Finding 36. FER proposals mostly did not comply with the prescribed ECW timeline, and delays did affect project results, in some but not all cases.

239. **FERs take much longer from concept note to disbursement than targeted.** The FER expected timeline indicates that first draft proposals should be submitted within 16 days of the concept note, final approval eight days later, with the grant confirmation letter (GCL) following 15 days later, or 45 days after an emergency is declared. This timeline has generally not been kept. Figure 11 below show that while on average grants progressed faster after the first proposal in 2019 than in 2018, the time between the concept note and first proposal lengthened so that the whole process to disbursement on average took about 16 weeks in 2019 rather than the 15 weeks of 2018, if the concept note is taken as the starting point. In both years however, it takes significantly longer to disburse a FER than the eight weeks targeted, if two weeks are allowed between the GCL and disbursement.


240. **The main delays more recently are up to final proposal stage.** Against ideal timeline, comparing the two years:

- In 2019, processes after the final proposal (to the GCL and disbursement) was about as long as targeted, registering significantly faster processes than the year before.
- Up to final proposal, however, still took much longer than targeted. In 2018, on average the first proposal was just about in on time, but then from first to final proposal took almost five weeks rather than 8 days. In 2019, country EiEPC coordination bodies took much longer to submit the first proposal on average, but the revisions took only about 7 weeks.

241. Grantees also did not perceive much delay in contracting and disbursement processes: only 16% of grantees reported a delay at this point, and generally held a positive perception of Secretariat and UNICEF Fund Support Office assistance to resolve issues.

242. The country case studies show a similar picture, with the Nigeria FER taking almost 12 weeks to the GCL from the first proposal, compared to almost 8 weeks for the Colombia FER. In Mozambique, which was a sudden onset natural disaster, disbursement across the FERs and grantees was on average nine weeks after submission of the first proposal. A key question for the evaluation is why these delays occur, whether they are merited, and how delays impacted grant implementation.

Figure 11 Timeliness analysis: on average and for country cases



Source: FER database.

243. **The protracted crisis case studies did not report a significant cost of delays.** In Nigeria, Niger and Colombia the FERs were implemented in protracted crises, so there was not the same urgency. The Colombia case study produced the clearest reason for delays, especially the long delay from concept note to final proposal, namely the regional nature of the FER and the multitude of country and regional coordination mechanisms. A two week delay for example occurred because the proposal was waiting for regional signoffs.

244. **In Mozambique the main delay was between the first and final proposal,** with the country actors incorporating ECW comments into the document. Delays also occurred subsequently because of fiduciary processes, including a HACT assessment for one of grantees. This impacted the start date for some projects, but larger grantees were able to start projects with their funding before disbursement.

245. **Delays in implementation were also common, with many grantees requesting no cost extensions.** The table below analyses the reasons given for delays. It shows that the most common reason for delays was instability and insecurity. However, delays that could have been foreseen in project planning comprised almost three quarters of delays.

Table 14 Implementation delays

Challenge	No	Country (number of grantees)
More in control of grantees/ECW (40 cases)		
Activity took longer than expected	2	Uganda, Cameroon
Challenges finding local labourers	1	Nepal
Change in/delay in receiving technical specifications from Government	2	Mozambique (2)
Competing demands of scheduled activities	1	Mozambique
Coordination challenges	3	Syria, Indonesia, Ecuador
Delays getting approvals from authorities/Government	3	Ukraine, Uganda (2)
Delays in getting supplies, because of:		
Access restrictions by authorities/Government	1	Palestine
Competing education priorities in country	1	Nepal
Economic context	1	Zimbabwe
Hard to reach areas	4	Madagascar, Papua New Guinea, Mozambique (2)
Instability/insecurity (less foreseeable)	2	Nigeria, Cameroon
Low capacity of vendors/contractors to supply in time frame	5	Nepal, Madagascar, Mozambique (3)
No reason	2	Nigeria (2)
Delays in implementation by other grantee(s)	1	Nigeria
Delays in staff recruitment/lack of availability of suitably trained staff	3	Uganda, Afghanistan, Greece
Start/end of funding at wrong time of year (e.g. starting before school holidays/ending before terms ends.)	6	Uganda, Afghanistan, Nigeria (2), Colombia, Mozambique
Time to set up operational structure/new offices	1	Cameroon
Increased community mobilization and advocacy needed to get children enrolled into schools	1	Nigeria, Somalia
More outside of control of grantees (15 cases)		
Disease outbreak	3	Madagascar, Burkina Faso, Mali
Impact of elections	5	Nigeria, Cameroon, Nigeria
Instability/insecurity	12	Somalia, Nigeria (2), Madagascar, Cameroon (2), Madagascar, Nigeria (2), Burkina Faso (2), Niger
Accessibility challenges: extreme weather	2	Mozambique (2)
National strike	2	Ecuador, Mali

Source: FER document base.

246. We also came across evidence from different sources that sub-contracting and procurement processes of grantees can delay project implementation. Global interview respondents pointed out that while global procurement of materials and kits via UNICEF may help bring down unit costs, the arrival of materials in country can be delayed. In Nigeria UNICEF-procured materials were delayed. In Niger the first conflict FER implementation, which was managed entirely by UNICEF as the main grantee, but largely subcontracted, was delayed. In Colombia, where the FER grant is implemented by a consortium of NGOs with STC as the main grantee, however, the case study specifically noted that sub-contracting was swift and transparent (two weeks after the FER grant agreement) and that

various implementation processes were well coordinated between sub-grantees, drawing on their respective strengths.

247. In some cases, delays in FER processes affected project results. In Mozambique the cost of delays meant that the construction of temporary learning structures became less relevant, as seasonal winds and rain meant that they were not durable, and government shifted to setting resilient construction standards for classroom rehabilitation. This meant that fewer children could be reached with FER funds, as the FERs moved more into financing recovery rather than immediate needs. Our document base analysis of challenges reported by grantees, similarly, pointed to other cases where project delays meant that projects were no longer well timed. For example, in Uganda one grantee noted that the project was originally scheduled to end before the Ugandan school calendar in December. Its delay prevented learners from completing exams to support transition into formal schools at the appropriate level. In Afghanistan the start of the project just before the summer vacations affected the grantee ability to enrol children, and the end of the project in the middle of the school year was also seen as a challenge

EQ 7: Has ECW strengthened country capacities for effective immediate and rapid response to the educational needs of affected populations? Why (not)?

248. This section examines whether the FERs have built the capacity of the EiEPC coordination bodies and grantees to assess, plan, implement, monitor/report, and/or evaluate EiEPC interventions. It also asks whether the FERs have contributed to better government EiEPC capacities.

249. FERs are relatively small grants, focused on addressing the immediate needs to restore access to education for crisis-affected boys and girls. In contrast to MYRPs, FERs have much lower ambitions for strengthening national and local systems. The early articulation of the FER modality in ECW documentation and guidelines were largely silent on capacity building and systems strengthening effects of the FERs. It is only in 2019 that this ambition was more clearly articulated in the Guide for Applying for First Emergency Response Grants. The findings below take this limited scope, especially of earlier FERs, into account.

250. Based on these findings, we conclude that FERs, relative to their size and scope, contributed to improved systemic outcomes, including improved capacities of EiEPC coordination groups, and strengthened grantee capacities. FERs also include efforts to strengthen state capacities and there is evidence in our country case studies that these efforts can result in stronger capacities.

Finding 37. FERs were found to contribute to the capacities of EiEPC coordination groups.

251. FER design processes have the effect of improved EiEPC group coordination capacities. It follows that if the FERs promoted coordinated country processes (see Finding 31 and Finding 32 above), they would have contributed to strengthened capacities and systems for more joint responses, even if this capacity was not necessarily in place when the FERs were designed. While the FERs were not intended to strengthen systems, they often have the effect of leaving stronger systems in their wake. The Niger case illustrates well how ECW's arrangements for the FERs demand capacity in a way that no other source of funding for EiEPC does, and can put groups on a new footing.

252. Grantee survey respondents also had very strong positive perceptions about the impact of FER grants on the capacity of in-country coordination mechanisms. A very significant share of grantees

reports a positive impact across planning and implementing EiEPC interventions, and on coordinating EiEPC interventions, and a lower share for monitoring and evaluation.

253. **The FERs also sometimes pay, or help to pay, for dedicated coordination capacity** in the cluster, but only when the grants are relatively large and the coordinator’s parent organization wins the bid. In Nigeria the conflict-FER grant to UNICEF contributed to the position of the EiEWG coordinator. The STC co-coordinator was not supported by FER funds, as the STC grant was too small. In Mozambique too the FER grants contributed to the cost of a dedicated national cluster coordinator (employed via UNICEF) and regional coordinator in the areas affected by the cyclones (employed via STC). The financial contribution is obviously only for the duration of the FERs.

254. Prompted by the case studies, we examined the budgets of FER grants where we had these available in excel. We found a further twelve grantees in nine countries that had a specified budget line for a cluster coordinator. This is probably an undercount. Most budgets include contributions to the cost of senior grantee staff and in many cases, these may be double-hatting coordinators. Annex 4 Table 24 provides detail on the countries.

Finding 38. FERs strengthen the capacities of grantees for EiEPC, especially in new emergencies.

255. **Strengthening capacities occur on the job, through formal training and deliberate Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning (MEAL) processes.** Colombia is an interesting case where the coordination capacity was not so much strengthened at cluster level, but at the level of the FER grantee consortium. Furthermore, the case study shows clearly how the capacity of partners within the NGO consortium significantly improved in terms of emergency expertise and technical EiEPC expertise (see Box 6 below). The partners recognized that the FER grant has helped to build internal capacity and to position the four NGOs as important EiEPC actors in the country. The NGO Consortium approach to identifying comparative strengths and building the capacity of others based on those strengths was effective. In addition, STC’s MEAL Officer supported sub-grantee capacity on MEAL, including to meet common minimums that were jointly developed.

Box 6 Shifting from development to emergency work in new emergencies

Capacity-strengthening effects among NGO Consortium partners in Colombia include:

Staff that used to work for development programs have gained knowledge and experience in emergency context work, both from training with the Consortium and on the job;

Staff think differently about project design, which has been evident from the COVID-19 response in which the FER partners have responded rapidly to needs and proposal development.

Teams are more innovative and flexible in terms of ideas, such as developing social and emotional learning guides, self-learning materials, podcasts and parent guides for working with different age groups in the context of COVID-19.

Source: Colombia case data.

256. In most other protracted emergencies these effects are less clear – as noted in the Nigeria case study – with FER grantees being selected for their existing capacities and track record. Even in Mozambique this was found to be the case, given that the 2019 cyclones were not the first emergency faced. The experience of implementation, however, still provided some opportunity for agencies to improve their operational capacities and skills. In Mozambique, for example, one grantee noted that PSS materials developed under the FER would be mainstreamed in future development projects. The

piloting of remote learning approaches through the COVID-19 FER was another important opportunity.

257. Grantee survey respondents consider that the FER grant has had a positive impact on their capacity to plan and implement EiEPC activities. Monitoring and evaluation is the area where the impact is considered the lowest with 70 per cent of grantees reporting a positive impact, compared to over 80 per cent for planning, implementing and coordinating EiEPC activities. In the open answers, it is interesting that some noted that the FER grant allowed an EiEPC response for grantees that were new to emergencies or helped to scale-up activities.

Finding 39. It is likely that many FERs contribute to government capacities through more than just engagement in FER roll-out and the EiEPC coordination group.

258. **There is agreement that building government capacities to respond (better) should form part of humanitarian actors' interventions.** The global interviews suggested that especially in protracted crises, it is important to be connected to government systems and build capacity for governments, unless working with government means not being neutral and impartial, or government does not reach a geographic area the humanitarian response is targeting.

259. Three of the country case studies gave us some data on how FERs may or may not contribute to strengthening government systems and responses to protracted crisis: Niger and Nigeria were examples of existing protracted crises when the FERs were implemented, and Colombia a case of an escalating emergency within a protracted crisis. The Mozambique study also provided information on government engagements. In addition, we looked at the final project reports for a number of additional countries. For the analysis, we have selected a number of countries dealing with protracted crisis beyond those already explored in the case studies: Bangladesh, Brazil, Ecuador and Peru (in relation to the Venezuelan migrant crisis), Palestine and Uganda. This section presents the results of this analysis.

260. The table below sets out the results of the analysis for each country. It visually illustrates how effectively capacity was built by locating the activities and results on a series of intermediate results, to what would be full government capacity (i.e. the capacity to deliver demonstrated by delivery). We have worked with a continuum of interventions and reported results, where information sharing and participation in coordination groups are seen as the least impactful forms of capacity building and systems strengthening (on the left of the table), followed by workshops and trainings, followed by the development of texts that set out guidelines or policies to manage the crisis, followed by actual implementation of actions and delivery of services to affected populations (far right, the most significant signals of systems strengthening). Within each of these we distinguished between more supply-driven grantee instigation of the intervention (coloured pink), versus state-instigated interventions or results (coloured blue). We simply counted actions as a way of indicating higher effort, with an X denoting an identifiable action or single set actions. We have also graded the tones in the table with the darker tones representing greater effort. It should be noted that we depended on details in grantee reports to make judgement calls to calibrate responses across countries – for example some reports may set out each step of a sub-project, while others mention disaggregated details of steps. Furthermore, as the reports are likely to have a positive bias, the table should be read as an indicator of effort being made, rather than a precise measure of capacities built.

261. **Most FERs contribute to government systems.** A first finding is that of the 10 countries we looked at, only one (Brazil) had no discernible activities to develop country systems. Here the FER

project was led by UNICEF and it does not include significant capacity building activities. The focus is on the construction of temporary facilities, and directly supporting migrant families. It may be that in implementation the project involved government officials or had actions that were not reported.

Table 15 Interventions and results to support government systems for EiEPC

Country	Brief description	Shared information, awareness raising & participation in clusters		Workshops, trainings, materials for government and technical assistance		Guiding texts for government responses		Delivery of assessments, interventions and results	
		EiE	Gov	EiE	Gov	EiE	Gov	EiE	Gov
Bangladesh	Joint coordination structures; Joint Education Needs Assessment; sharing M&E information; teacher development trainings; standardization of EiEPC responses; establishment of an education sector task force	XX		X		X		X	X
Colombia	Raising awareness, inclusion in coordination, development of integration policy, establish internal committee, training local authorities, joint monitoring, and accreditation frame-works developed for non-formal education	XX		XX		x	X	X	XX
Ecuador	Workshops & development of guidelines to integrate migrant children; raising sub-national awareness on existing government integration resolution & guidelines; develop awareness materials & PSS materials for government distribution; training teachers	X		XXX				x	
Niger	Meetings with education ministry; regional official roles in roll-out	X						X	
Nigeria	Work with state education board & local authorities to provide teachers; build capacity of inspectors; master local trainers for teacher training			XXX				X	
Mozambique	Education ministry role in cluster; ministry coordination of response	X							X
Peru	Sub-national coordination; TA to education ministry on gender, inclusion & quality; revision of regulations, guidelines; TA to strengthen information systems and improved systems; TA to strengthen communication; host/refugee families provided with information; capacity building of local institutions	X		XXXX		X		XX	
Palestine	Empower teachers on violence against children; school support on non-violence			XX					
Uganda	Accelerated education: assess guidelines, policies & resources; curriculum review & update; workshop; develop guidelines and training package; assess needs; Double shifting: Assess double-shifting practices & workshop with ministry; guidelines on double-shifting; testing guidelines with ministry Certification: establish an advisory group; assess key factors on recruitment of South Sudanese teachers; assess number and capacities of teachers; develop models of certification and cost models; raise awareness on certification	X		XXXX		XXXX XXX	XX	XXX	XX

Country	Brief description	Shared information, awareness raising & participation in clusters		Workshops, trainings, materials for government and technical assistance		Guiding texts for government responses		Delivery of assessments, interventions and results	
		EIE	Gov	EIE	Gov	EIE	Gov	EIE	Gov
	Coordination & M&E of government on ministry response plan: assist to establish system; complete results framework with baseline data; develop M&E framework; propose integration of refugee data in national system; integrate data								

Source: FER Grantee Final and Annual Reports; evaluation case study data.

262. Raising awareness, strengthening frameworks for joint needs assessment and monitoring and training of officials and teachers are key pathways for the effort to build capacities. Besides awareness raising, information sharing and drawing government into EiEPC coordination groups, the most frequently reported activity was training and the development of various texts, frameworks and guidelines. Some joint assessments – overall or of a specific area – were also undertaken. Joined-up monitoring and evaluation is also present, and in one case, Uganda, the FER included activities that contributed to developing government systems for data collection and monitoring and evaluation, to the point of helping to integrate the refugee systems into the core government system. Generally, Uganda was the country that had the most government system building activities specified.

263. Interventions seem to be significantly supply-driven, but report data may not always provide enough in-depth information to judge this well. Certainly, in Colombia, our case study research has shown that the impact of the FER to instigate government’s engagement on the education aspects of the migrant crisis, has been significant. This is shown to some degree by being the one other line that had significant blue shading.

EFFECTIVENESS: BENEFICIARY OUTCOMES

EQ 8: How effective are the FERs in restoring safe, equitable access to quality education in sudden onset and escalating emergencies? Why (not)?

264. This section examines whether the FERs have contributed to restoring safe and equitable access to education for crisis-affected boys and girls, and whether there were any unintended side-effects on beneficiaries. It also asks whether the FERs promoted a holistic approach to quality education and learning and looks at the degree to which gender was mainstreamed and targeted.

265. Based on the findings we conclude that the FERs have assisted a large number of boys and girls to access education opportunities and materials, even if with different levels of support. The FERs in almost all countries implement holistic learning. Most FERs also emphasize gender issues and reach girls, but grantees tailoring interventions to girls’ differentiated needs is less common.

Finding 40. By ECW’s own result measurements, the FERs assisted a large number of boys and girls affected by emergencies, to access education opportunities and materials.


266. The FERs are short programmes of support that are often one-off and with small budgets relative to need. As such, they do not lend themselves to measuring access at the outcome level. We

therefore rely on the number of children reached as a proxy measure for access.⁴² It should be noted, however, that this is only at the output level of the country TOC. We cannot therefore clearly assess the degree to which the FERs have delivered on reducing out-of-school rates, for example, of children affected by emergencies.

267. By the end of July, the FER database shows that the pre-COVID-19 FERs had reached over 2.1 million boys and girls in 28 countries. The FERs had also trained 27,000 teachers and education administrators in these 28 countries and supported 4,047 financially. FERs had paid for the rehabilitation of 4,619 classrooms, constructed 1,817 latrines and delivered materials to 12,688 classrooms. The COVID-19 FERs are likely to increase numbers of children and teachers reached significantly, because of emphasis on distance learning and awareness raising.

268. As small grants, the FERs reached about 8 per cent of estimated needs, distributed as per the map below. FERs also account for 29 per cent of children reached by ECW funds between 2017 and 2019, and over performed grantees' own targets by 6 per cent. It is also apparent from the map, that FERs tended to reach larger shares of the population in need in natural disasters (Madagascar, Malawi and Zimbabwe, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Nepal, Peru (2017)).

Figure 12 Share of needs met mapped to countries (2017–2019 FERs)



⁴² The revised ECW results framework includes enrolment as the outcome measure of access, but no data are available. When outcome data are not available through country systems, such as on enrolment, out-of-school children, survival, dropout or completion rates of children affected by the emergency, FER grantees do not collect this data.

Finding 41. The total number of children reached, however, covers very different levels of support.

269. The overall number of children reached should be treated with caution, however, as not every child was reached in the same way. Some children were reached with one-off kits and learning materials, and others were supported through the provision of non-formal education, or accelerated learning programmes. The country case studies provide more qualitative information on the quality of reaching children and providing access to schooling.

Country	Key aspects of restoring education access
Colombia	<p>The 2019 FER has contributed to restoring safe, equitable access to education and holistic learning opportunities (literacy, numeracy and social-emotional learning) for vulnerable crisis-affected boys and girls in Colombia. The FER is still in implementation. However, the 6-month monitoring data indicate that targets have been exceeded. For instance, NGO partners provided safe, quality education activities to 1,372 students (73% migrants) with almost equal reach for boys and girls (51% girls), which more than tripled the target for this activity. Of the 1,303 children who accessed informal education, 471 were able to enter formal schools. The FER intervention addressed equity by focusing on vulnerable migrants through catch up and bridging programs so migrant children who are behind their peers can receive the additional support they need to be on the same learning level as their Colombian peers. The programme has built and/or rehabilitated classrooms, offered accelerated learning programmes, and put in place awareness campaigns on education. Teachers have been trained, including on inclusive education for children with disabilities, and remedial classes were offered. PSS training was provided to teachers. Activities were disrupted by COVID-19 and the COVID-19 FER is being used to mitigate this. The COVID-19 FER has contributed to the continuation of children’s learning opportunities, emphasizing cross-sectoral needs. 2,339 children were reached through dry rations, radios, hygiene kits and learning materials. The consortium members undertook a child-safeguarding risk-assessment and developed mitigation actions.</p>
Niger	<p>In Niger the FERs helped to restore access to education systems, especially at the primary level, including through non-formal education programmes. Underlying pre-crisis problems in education access, including issues of lack of infrastructure, teachers, very low levels of literacy and numeracy and language of instruction amongst significant language diversity, remain. In Niger, grantees reported that for the first conflict FER, 36,662 girls and boys were reached. These numbers were reached through teacher training sessions in 256 schools in two regions, school enrolment awareness and mobilization campaigns to support the enrolment of out-of-school children in alternative education centres, and training of facilitators for the centres. Out-of-school children were also reached with radio-campaigns, even before COVID-19. Capacity building of teachers on psycho-social support and gender-based violence was also done in two regions. The COVID-19 FERs helped develop exercises and support for teachers and students in primary and secondary education, and distributed the materials, reaching 101,583 students. Hygiene support was provided, estimated by grantees to reach 12,480 children in primary and secondary school. Pedagogical support was provided through reading sessions to 4,606 children.</p>
Mozambique	<p>In Mozambique the FERs contributed to restoring post-cyclone access for 99,273 learners. This was through activities including the provision of Temporary Learning Spaces (TLS), the rehabilitation of classrooms and the provision of materials and resources to replace those lost to the cyclones. Teacher training was also undertaken. Country respondents mentioned especially the FERs’ support to displaced learners, who depended on the rapid establishment of new educational facilities. Material provision was seen to be especially effective, with individual school kits being a big incentive for learning. There were</p>

Country	Key aspects of restoring education access
	<p>significant delays in implementation, but this was largely out of the control of grantees, with factors such as insecurity and national elections. The delays affected the construction components significantly, including standards set by government for resilient construction. The COVID-19 FER supported the continuation of remote learning using a variety of methods, including radio, TV and printed materials. Data on the effectiveness of these interventions was limited as the final reports for the COVID-19 FERs had not been submitted for the use of the evaluation, but our interviews indicated implementation of the programmes.</p>
Nigeria	<p>The FERs were effective in bringing a number of learners into education, providing school materials to a larger number of learners already in school and maintaining access to education during the COVID-19 crisis. In the conflict-FER, several partners constructed Temporary Learning Centres (TLCs) to accommodate out-of-school learners, with the objective of bringing them into the formal school system. In other settings the FER supported established schools and TLCs through the rehabilitation of classrooms and the provision of learning materials – including the School in a Box. The numbers of learners benefiting from the different categories of support need some careful unpicking, however. A large share of the 290,951 children reached in Nigeria, was through a one-off distribution of materials, reaching 205,486 children.</p> <p>However, activities focused on providing education to children who needed to catch-up to enter the formal system. The case study also noted that the EiE work was successful in increasing school enrolment and demand for basic education, but that the absorption capacity of the state system was very low compared to the demand. The case study noted that there was limited attention to ensure school safety within FER projects; that there was not engagement with why parents opt not to send their children to school; and that engagement with the health, WASH and protection sectors occurred through the grantees rather than at sector level through the EiEWG.</p>

Source: Country case study data

Finding 42. In many countries FER grants implement holistic learning.


270. ECW uses the term holistic education to refer to ‘whole-of-child’ approaches, and has increasingly emphasized holistic education as a means to support children’s healthy growth and development in the learning environment and in their everyday lives.⁴³ Holistic learning addresses the multifaceted learning, safety/protection, organization, and teaching challenges when delivering quality education. In this finding we use the intervention package categories used by ECW to track the holistic learning content of its interventions, to assess learning approaches in FERs.⁴⁴

271. **Most FERs support holistic learning, and many FERs finance activities that are associated with numeracy and literacy education quality improvements as well as socio-emotional learning, in a single grant.** Figure 13 below provides a picture of the share of pre-COVID-19 FER grants per country that undertake learning activities. The blue bars show the share of FER grants that combine numeracy and literacy learning with socio-emotional learning. Green and red show the share of grants in all country grants that undertake either. And the outlined bar represents grants that have no learning activities.

⁴³ See ECW, 2020k. 2019 Annual Results Report, p. 83.

⁴⁴ It is notable that the EiEPC sector is still developing common measures of learning and defining what aspects are important to measure in an emergency context. This is work that can benefit FERs where the AF can contribute.

Figure 13 Numeracy and literacy, socio-emotional, and holistic learning by FER country (pre-COVID, share of grants).



Source: FER database, own calculations

272. Only three countries reported activities that support the ECW quality objective in the country's pre-COVID 19 FERs. In one, Niger, the country case study showed, however, that the COVID-19 FER included activities to support learning, including the development of exercise books and teacher materials to cover the curriculum components missed, and reading support. It also showed activities in the main FER grant that could have been reported as learning activities, such as provision of materials and teacher training for out-of-school centres, even if the FER database reflect no quality activities in Niger.

273. In Colombia, Nigeria and Mozambique the country case studies detailed how these activities are constituted:

- In Colombia partners are taking actions to address quality, such as through literacy and numeracy activities to improve basic skills, the distribution of learning materials to reduce the economic burden of education on families, and work with parents to more effectively support children with social emotional learning activities. Partners have also worked closely with communities and education officials on campaigns against xenophobia and to improve the quality of education through comprehensive professional teacher development, including teacher training materials that were vetted and approved by the Ministry of Education. In the COVID-19 FER schools have been supported to deliver printed materials to families without digital access and are supporting teachers through trainings on virtual learning. After the training provided to the teachers, and in this context of school closures, teachers are reporting that they are establishing better relationships with parents through their engagement.
- In Nigeria a major component of the conflict-FER programme was a coordinated investment in teacher training. Over 800 teachers received harmonized and integrated training delivered by tertiary education institutions. Two hundred and twenty-two master trainers were also trained to provide training to volunteer teachers. This responded to the Joint Education Needs Assessment⁴⁵ (JENA) finding that teachers lack adequate capacity for effective lesson delivery. The state education board and local authorities deployed government teachers who

⁴⁵ EIE WG Nigeria, 2017

were trained along with volunteer teachers for the FER project. In-service mentorship was provided for teachers and volunteer teachers were paid a stipend from the FER budget. Street Child conducted an end-of-line assessment, of children enrolled in temporary learning centres to measure improvements in outcomes.

Box 7 Significant learning increases for learners in Nigeria

After six months, Street Child conducted an endline assessment of children enrolled in the TLCs to measure improvements in learning outcomes compared to their learning levels at baseline. The assessment was based on the Teaching at the Right Level assessment tools, and assessed learners on reading, number recognition and their ability to complete mathematical operations. It is interesting in itself that it was possible to conduct an assessment of educational outcomes within the context of an emergency intervention.

Analysis of the results of this assessment showed that there were significant learning increases across all groups that took the tests. Comparison of baseline and endline reading results highlights the progress made – the percentage of learners at beginner level (unable to recognize letters) fell from 50 per cent to 1 per cent by the end of the project. The percentage of learners able to read words increased from 9 per cent to 43 per cent, and the percentage of students able to read a paragraph increased from 1 per cent to 13 per cent.

Source: Nigeria case study data.

- In Mozambique the cyclone FERs adopted a holistic approach to learning, including aspects of teacher training in all proposals. All of the FERs included some aspect of teacher training in the proposals, including on pedagogy, subject knowledge and curriculum; inclusive education; emergency preparedness, Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and risk management; health and hygiene awareness; psycho-social support; and support to distance learning. The evidence on the effectiveness of these trainings is largely subjective as the monitoring framework did not include specific indicators, but stakeholders highlighted the importance of the PSS interventions, which were credited with positively changing teacher attitudes to learners. Furthermore, the subjective opinion of interviewees – Government, grantees and beneficiaries – was that there was no noticeable deterioration in educational outcomes following the cyclone within beneficiary schools.

Finding 43. Attention to gender issues is a common thread across FERs. Generally, grantees have succeeded in reaching girls, but there is less evidence of tailoring efforts to specifically reach girls' differentiated needs.

274. We have discussed the gender reach of the FERs under Finding 13 above, including that grantee survey respondents reported tailoring their activities most often to take gender into account. The case studies in country desk studies provide specific examples of how grantees have tailored their activities to ensure that the differentiated needs of girls are met. The table below summarizes the data on whether countries implemented gender-sensitive project planning and implementation, and specific project activities that were tailored for girls. It also shows the share of girls in children reached, and as a comparator, the share of females in the population (last year measured).

275. **Girls often comprise more than half the children reached, but may be a larger share of the target population.** The table shows that whereas in three countries more than 50 per cent of children reached were girls, it is likely that girls are an even higher share of the population. For Colombia and Niger, the population affected includes refugees in the specific emergency, and this may shift the total population share somewhat.

276. **The most effective FER in reaching girls, also has the most tailored interventions.** The only country where the share of children reached through the FERs is significantly larger than the guide population, is in Afghanistan. The opposite does not hold, as Nigeria has the biggest gap between FER girls reached, and women as a share of the population.

Table 16 Gender in project planning and project activities: selected countries

Gender-sensitive project planning, implementation and monitoring		Afghanistan	Colombia	Niger	Nigeria	Mozambique	Nepal
<i>Girls reached as a share of total children reached</i>		59%	51%	49%	46%	50%	52%
<i>Girls as share of population in need or of overall population (marked with a *)</i>		48.7%*	51%	51%	55%	51.4%*	54.4%*
Tailoring for gender in project activities	Specific support for/recruitment of female teachers	x					
	Hygiene Kits		x			x	
	Gender training for teachers	x	x		x		
	Gender-sensitive latrines/WASH	x	x		x	x	x
	Public awareness campaigns & promoting girl enrolment	x		x	x	x	
Gender in project planning, monitoring and reporting	Additional efforts to ensure gender is integrated in project planning		x				
	Collecting gender segregated data for use in project design and implementation		x		x		
	Targeting and reporting gender-disaggregated reach	x	x	x	x	x	x

Source: FER database World Development Indicators, Relevant HRPs.

277. The Colombia case study was the only one where the grantee consortium made additional efforts to integrate a gender lens in their project planning. The STC MEAL officer designed a tool kit for use by the consortium partners in project management. This tool showed significant issues that prevented girls from attending school, and the project made adjustments to address these challenges, including providing menstruation hygiene kits, constructing gender-sensitive WASH facilities and incorporating gender issues into teacher training.

5. Conclusions

Overall conclusion

278. Overall, we conclude that the FERs are relevant to EiEPC needs, and can be relevant, coherent, connected and effective instruments in rapid onset and escalating emergencies when they are used well and supported by country coordination capacity, or by assistance from the ECW Secretariat and ECW's global partners such as the Global Education Cluster, when country coordination capacity is low or emerging.

279. Overall, there is enough evidence that the FER theory of change is valid. We were able to observe key elements of the FER theory of change results chain working in practice within and across cases to conclude that broadly the FERs are broadly well designed for their stated purpose.

280. Where breakdowns in the results chain of FERs against the FER TOC have been observed, it is driven by three separate sets of factors. Firstly, they occur when the FER is used in protracted emergencies without clear escalating needs when the ECW was not (yet) in a position to use a MYRP. The current design of the FER is not suited for these contexts. The low ability of the conflict-FERs in Niger and Nigeria to catalyse better coordination and to have significant effects that go beyond the implementation of the projects are cases in point.

281. Secondly, while the overall theory of change is valid, there are some aspects of the FER's design that need to be adjusted even for sudden onset emergencies. For example, while speed is important, the guideline time for proposal preparation needs to be extended; ECW by design should be more open about the reasons for the amounts allocated to countries; there should be more limitations, even if procedural, on large shares of FERs granted to the parent organizations of cluster coordinators and on fragmentation of FERs; by design coordination in complex crises that involve refugees should enable appropriate attention to their needs; and implementation processes should adjust to anchor more cross-grantee coordination and learning. Over and above these specific issues pertaining to aspects of how the FER is designed to operate, is the degree to which flexibility is explicitly formalised in the FER design. We have noted at several points key trade-offs between different objectives of ECW in a FER, many with speed. For example, there is a strategic choice between how fast a FER is implemented from announcement to disbursement, and the degree to which the country cluster can make sure that the selection of grantees and projects will reach those who are most vulnerable or most marginalised; the extent to which interventions will be tailored to their needs; the extent to which local grantees can participate; the extent to which needs assessments can be done and so forth. There are also trade-offs between having strategic, coherent FER projects, and a diversity of grantees, and between the size of FERs and how rapidly they can be deployed, and the proportion of needs met. To date the modality has been used with high flexibility by ECW, and as a result these trade-offs occur in practice, but without clear and transparent processes to govern how flexibility is decided and applied, and often without being strategic about them in context. There is cause for regularising key flexibilities, so that it is a norm for these key strategic trade-offs -- such as between speed and better targeting and tailoring; and between fragmentation, localization, coherence and grantee diversity. But also so that how it works is clear and understood, the trade-offs are considered and better decisions made.

282. Thirdly, across cases some breakdowns in the result chain occurred because assumptions in the theory of change were not met about the FERs being well understood and applied as directed by country structures that have the necessary capacity or are supported to develop capacities. This resulted for example, in country mechanisms that were insufficiently transparent and inclusive, as well as in potentially sub-optimal FERs in the absence of competition and thorough country-level review. This highlights the importance of improving country EiEPC coordination capacity for FERs. In contexts where country capacities for coordinating a strategic response are low, global level support for FERs is critical, but is often not in place early enough. Relatedly, investment in preparedness can help improve FER implementation.

283. Our recommendations below pick up on key aspects of each of these drivers. It is also important to note that our observations are based on evidence across the evaluation scope (FERs approved

from 2017 to end-April 2020), often reflecting shortfalls that were more prevalent in earlier FERs. We indicated in the findings when this was the case. Some observations however remain valid for recent FER practices. For many of these we have noted that important steps are already taken to address the issues, such as on clearer guidance on more open and transparent country processes and steps to strengthen inter-agency coordination. Our recommendations therefore focus on key outstanding issues.

Conclusions by evaluation criterion

The relevance/appropriateness of the FER modality and FERs

284. **The FER modality is relevant to EiEPC and the mandate of the ECW.** The FER modality is relevant to EiEPC priorities, because it has contributed to the repositioning of education on the humanitarian agenda. In sudden onset and escalating emergencies it is designed to add value because it is fast, requires country actors to work together early, assist in early needs assessments, can deliver context appropriate responses with accountability, and use organizations that are best placed on the ground to respond quickly. The emphasis on high vulnerability in the FERs is appropriate to target FERs well. There is some evidence that the FER modality has also been important to catalyse additional resources at the global level, but less so at country level.

285. **The FER modality in its current form is most relevant in sudden onset emergency contexts, where it is more likely to trigger the systemic change that ECW aims for.** The design of the FER modality generally translates to relevant FER-financed interventions at country level, mostly because the sector as a whole is underfunded and most interventions are relevant to address need.

286. **The FERs are less relevant in protracted emergencies without escalating needs, because they are less likely to add value.** Amongst our cases, the modality's most effective use has been in Colombia and Mozambique, where it was catalytic, triggering coordination and in the case of Mozambique, contributing to additional resource flows. In Niger and Nigeria, where the conflict-FERs were deployed in the absence of clearly escalating needs, there was not the same pressure to be fast, and the FERs tended to reinforce existing poor coordination and leadership capacity in the country clusters in the short term. The more significant value-add was in the COVID-19 FERs, where the FERs were important to trigger the sector's fast response to additional, sudden crisis.

287. **FERs are largely context and emergency appropriate**, as demonstrated by the degree of variation in intervention packages across contexts. Multiple FER rounds and the division of a FER between multiple grants, result in FERs that are overly fragmented and run the risk of being less than strategic. The emphasis on speed means that in practice the FERs may fall short on tailoring to local context, effectively targeting the most vulnerable and delivering through a diverse and localized set of grantees. This results in many small grants that raise transaction cost, overhead cost and limit how strategic and coordinated interventions can be.

Reach and coverage of the FER modality

288. **Over the three years of implementing FERs, ECW has become better at targeting the most urgent crises at the global level**, taking into account existing or planned ECW investments through the initial investment window or MYRPs.

289. **The FER design means that FERs are not sensitive to relative need and their reach is very limited in high-need crises.** The FER modality has a de facto cap of USD 3 million, regardless of need or likely impact. Only in very few cases has the Secretariat opted to provide a larger budget, triggering Executive Committee approval processes, and these cases were not the highest need crises. This means that crises with more people in need, do not receive more funding.

290. While there is evidence of targeting vulnerability through FERs, evidence on the degree to which the most marginalized and vulnerable are reached with tailored interventions is mixed. On the one hand evidence shows that FER grantees target the most marginalized children – including girls and at least to some degree children with disabilities – and perform well in reaching the targets. Most grantees applied such criteria for prioritization of the most vulnerable children across their work, also outside of the FERs. On the other hand, at country level, it was not clear that the most vulnerable populations were reached with well-tailored interventions, unless the FERs were supported by strong in-country capacity and field presence to strategically direct FER funding.

291. **While FERs have and are responding to many refugee emergencies, the ability of FERs to target and reach refugees in complex emergencies with many vulnerable groups is more limited.** Our country case studies in Niger and Nigeria showed that FER interventions were not targeting refugees, despite the HRPs reporting high refugee need. Cross-country grantee-reported results data show that grantees were less able to reach refugees targeted than other population groups. While grantees may be under-counting refugees, because of how they are applying definitions, they under-reach the refugees they targeted by their definitions.

292. The country cases show that a key reason for difficulties in reaching refugees is because education of refugees is coordinated outside the EiEPC coordination groups and in refugee coordination groups. The connection between these is not always tightly forged. Refugees are also very hard to reach. Since the end of 2019 ECW and its global partners – including UNHCR, GPE, the Global Education Cluster and INEE – have taken significant steps to strengthen cross-agency coordination on refugees, which is likely to strengthen future responses. Already, the second set of COVID-19 FERs has been focused on refugees and coordinated by UNHCR.

Coherence and connectedness

293. **FERs are well aligned with the humanitarian system, complementary to other funds and can pave the way for a stronger humanitarian/development nexus.** By design, FERs are well aligned with HRPs and other humanitarian response plans and are designed through country EiEPC coordination mechanisms. FERs are generally complementary to other EiEPC funding, because needs are vastly under-funded, but also because of active management of funds by grantees and at the cluster level. Duplication and displacement effects do occur, however, and transparency and coordination are often imperfect.

294. The FERs are often implemented with high coordination with government and linked to development plans in the design and/or implementation phases. FERs can trigger more government involvement in sudden-onset or escalating emergencies. In protracted crises, FERs are too small and too rapid to connect to development efforts. This makes connection to MYRPs that are better placed for such work important, but in many cases FERs are not followed by MYRPs or do not connect well to them. When a FER/MYRP connection is explicitly established, FER activities can be built upon and FER lessons taken up.

295. FER processes ensure that FERs are internally coherent up to proposal approval, but then do not facilitate in-country coherence or learning. FER grantees are interested in learning from each other, and Colombia offers a good example of the value added through better coordination and learning between grantees in implementation.

Transparency and efficiency of the FERs

296. **Because of the architecture of ECW and the EIEPC cluster coordination system, FERs are vulnerable to conflict of interest issues. These issues have not been addressed sufficiently in substance or transparency in the FERs, although this has improved over time.** The reasoning behind the amounts allocated to countries was not clear enough to stakeholders, and country FER processes were not consistently sufficiently transparent, especially in early FERs. While the announcement of the availability of a FER has generally been communicated via the cluster, communication within the cluster and to all potential grantees has been less robust, and processes have not always been open. This is because ECW's guidance on grantee selection processes was not tightly specified initially, and the FERs were not well known or understood. Furthermore, the multiple roles of UNICEF in FER management at global and country level, in the absence of the modality being well understood by stakeholders, have led to country processes that are not robust enough, resulting in concerns that UNICEF monopolizes funding. The Executive Committee no-objection procedure has not visibly contributed to protecting ECW and UNICEF from conflict of interest allegations, but has delayed grant approvals and disbursements. There is a positive evolution toward greater transparency on the part of the ECW Secretariat, which has made efforts to address these challenges through new guidance issued in 2020.

297. **FER processes are efficient, and guidelines clear, but the short timelines have consequences for ECW's localization commitments.** The guidelines, however, are generally thought clear and templates are thought light enough and easy to apply. Overall, ECW's project design timeline strikes the right balance between being fast and having good quality of design for rapid onset and escalating emergencies. The tight specification of timelines has consequences though for the scope of grantees that can apply, with especially national NGOs being excluded because of capacity and language issues and little time for forming consortia. It also affects strategic impact, sustainability, and the quality of project design. We noted that tight timelines in the proposal phase, which contributes significantly to these trade-offs, cause delays in the review and approval phases. Longer provisions for proposal writing may ease the trade-offs, and not result in later disbursement overall.

298. **There are drivers of cost-efficiencies and inefficiencies in FERs.** Cost efficiencies are because of low global and in-country costs, and because FERs build on grantees' existing activities. A key driver of inefficiency is fragmentation of the grants between grantees/sub-grantees and further between sub-contractors. This drives up the share of overhead and fixed programme cost for each dollar spent.

Systemic outcomes of the FERs

299. **The FERs have contributed to a raised profile for education in emergencies, and to the ability of ECW to raise funding.** The replenishment financing model for FERs works well. In this model ECW draws on a reserve that is replenished annually, or more often when needed, to make rapid grants to cover immediate needs. More systematic reporting to the Executive Committee on the FERs could raise development donor support for the mechanism.

300. The FERs would benefit from more systematic global support, especially when they are first implemented in a region. FERs would benefit from better coordination between ECW and its global partners when FERs are announced, to assess and support country capacities. Such surge capacity has complemented Secretariat support to date, where it was available. The recent joint initiative on coordination in emergencies is a step in the right direction to support country FERs. FERs in regional emergency contexts would also benefit from more strategic thinking and planning from ECW around the strategic value-add and focus of a regional role vis-à-vis the national FER, and more clear guidance on communication between the levels. Generally, all FERs would benefit from more global learning effort on better early education sector responses.

301. FERs can promote inclusive EiEPC processes by bringing actors together around FERs when there is strong leadership and capacity at country level, especially in new emergencies. In protracted emergencies, however, FER processes tend to reinforce poor cluster leadership dynamics rather than transform them.

302. FER processes are often inclusive of government actors, in many countries in substantive ways that can contribute to the continuation of their results. FERs, however, have not been inclusive of national NGOs. If the FERs are to be both fast and inclusive of national NGOs, efforts to ensure that these organizations are HACT-assessed, included in consortia and/or are fully engaged in cluster processes should form part of ECW's work on preparedness and country capacities.

303. FERs fall short of their expected timelines (in 2019 FERs on average took almost twice as long as the norm of eight weeks). Sometimes these delays, as well as implementation delays, have consequences for timely project implementation, such as when FER interventions become misaligned with the school calendar.

304. FERs contribute to developing the coordination capacities of EiEPC groups, grantees and local state actors. FERs strengthen EiEPC coordination groups. Especially in new emergencies, FERs strengthen the capacities of grantees to plan, implement and monitor EiEPC responses. It is likely that many FERs have also contributed to strengthened government capacities.

Beneficiary outcomes of the FERs

305. The FERs have assisted many girls and boys to access education in emergencies, and they mostly include interventions to support learning. Increasingly, FERs match the provision of learning materials with complementary actions such as teacher training or teacher incentives. All but three pre-COVID19 country FERs include learning interventions, and mostly combine interventions to promote literacy and numeracy learning with interventions that support psycho-social learning. While the effectiveness of these measures is difficult to measure in short programmes like FERs, the Nigeria FER included a robust effort to do so.

306. Attention to gender issues is a common thread across FERs, but it more often takes the form of targeting girls, rather than targeting girls and tailoring interventions to their needs. Generally, grantees have succeeded in reaching girls, but there was less evidence of tailoring efforts to specifically reach girls' differentiated needs.

6. Recommendations

307. **Recommendation 1: ECW should continue to use FER to respond rapidly to sudden onset emergencies and clearly escalating crises.** In line with the overarching conclusion of the evaluation, the FERs should continue to be available to the global humanitarian sector to respond fast in humanitarian emergencies.

308. **Recommendation 2: ECW should not default to using the FER in its current form, to respond where it is unlikely to catalyse systemic outcomes. It should adjust either the FER or the MYRP design for responses in protracted crises without escalating needs where it cannot use a MYRP or design a third instrument.**

309. The FER works well as a rapid funding instrument of short duration and small size to respond in sudden onset emergencies, where it triggers a fast EiEPC response. Its design is not suited to protracted emergencies without escalating needs, where ECW clearly needs to engage but where MYRPs are not suited. ECW appears to need an instrument with more flexibility and lower transaction cost than the MYRPs, and engaging less with state actors in given contexts, to address urgent needs, but with longer planning timelines and longer forward time frames than the FERs in their current design. This may be a version of the FER (perhaps a repeated FER with a longer initial design period and forward indicative budgets), to keep ECWs overall range of instruments limited, or a version of MYRPs, or a third, intermediate, instrument. However, there would need to be an in-depth look at the costs and benefits of establishing such a third instrument rather than being explicit about having two categories of FERs.

310. **Recommendation 3: Some design features of the FERs contribute to their relevance, efficiency, coherence, effectiveness and impact in sudden onset and escalating emergencies, and should remain in place, such as the reliance on country-level structures and processes, an overall rapid timeline, high flexibility and light reporting requirements.** Some of the issues we have observed, are more related to how the modality is implemented in contexts that it was not designed for, rather than to the design itself. For its use in sudden onset and escalating crises, the rapid timeline, high flexibility and light reporting requirements work well. The use of country-level structures is essential to triggering systemic outcomes, and should remain. Below, we note further ways in which implementation of this aspect, and the structure of the rapid timeline, can be improved.

311. **Recommendation 4: Some design features of the FERs should be reconsidered, including how the timeline for its design is structured, transparency on allocations between and within countries, rules on fund distribution, coordination around refugees in complex emergencies, and arrangements for when country coordinators are grantees.**

312. **Work on better timelines:** The rapidity of the FERs is critical for their relevance and effectiveness in sudden onset emergencies. Nevertheless, having unrealistic timelines has a cost in terms of who responds and the quality and implementability of proposals. The experience to date points to the need to:

- ensure a concept note happens early. The timing of the concept note is fine – coming within days of the announcement of a grant as a first trigger to bring country actors together. However, it is important to assure that there is in fact a concept note, which has not always been the case;

- provide more time for potential grantees to organize themselves, draft better proposals, and for thorough country-level review of how well the FERs will meet needs. This will save ECW time during proposal revision and approval. More time for grantees to organize themselves, will also allow consortiums to form more often in ways that keep a single indirect programme charge and its transaction cost efficient.
- consider having more flexible timelines in principle, so that some emergencies that can tolerate longer timelines and need more work up front, can be treated differently from emergencies that need a response within weeks. Guidance on timelines should be updated to discuss key trade-offs between speed and other potential FER objectives, and to indicate when a country-specific timeline would be determined. For example, the announcement of a FER can include setting a timeline together with the FER envelopes, both of which have been discussed with country coordinators.

313. Be transparent about country allocations and why they were made and be consistent and clear in communication about FERs: The intent in the 2020 Operational Manual to engage country partners on what the size of a FER should be, will help address concerns about opaque processes to determine when a FER is used and how large it will be. That the FERs are flexible and that ECW has flexibility about their use and size is conducive to the Fund (and FERs) being nimble. However, systematically engaging country partners and explaining after the fact why decisions were made, will aid the confidence of ECW's global and country partners and potential donors in the instrument. In addition, the ECW Secretariat should further systematize how FERs are announced, and ensure that ECW procedures are consistently followed in this regard.

314. The clear guidance in the new manual on country processes is well considered, and if implemented, will help to ease some of the issues observed about opaque country processes. The requirement to be open and transparent about decisions and document decisions, is important.

315. Set better rules for grant allocations by grantee and insist on transparency: ECW should (re-)consider procedural regulations for FER grants when UNICEF, STC or any other organization is both EiEPC coordinator and a FER grantee. Ex ante controls could be an additional process that is triggered before country selection of grantees are made when the share to a co-coordinator is beyond a specified threshold. These processes should include a review by the Secretariat of the quality of the process and the reasons for the proposal. They should also include some form of engagement by the Executive Committee. This may be simply through ex post reporting of the final allocation decision and its justification, and assurance that the original proposal was reached through an open country process. If the Executive Committee mechanism remains an ex ante check, it is important to ensure that the check is robust, so that it is more meaningful, but fast. The use of a sub-committee of the Executive Committee is an option.

316. ECW should consider setting a guideline floor for minimum individual grants, which can also trigger a Secretariat review when a country proposes grants below the threshold before the country proposal is submitted. It should issue guidance on what trade-offs are between fragmentation and coherence, localisation, grantee diversity and coherence, to support implementation of a floor. It should also require better transparency on sub-contracting and the combined overhead costs of the full implementation chain.

317. Develop guidelines on coordinating on refugee needs in FERs, drawing on learning from the 2nd round of COVID-FERs: ECW should work with UNHCR to apply learning from the COVID-19 2nd round of FERs, when UNHCR coordinated country processes including in complex

emergencies, to develop guidelines on managing FERs addressing emergencies that involve refugees. The steps taken since December 2019 at the global level to commit to better coordination on refugees is a starting point, but it would be important for the ECW to translate the commitment to concrete steps at the country level as soon as possible to enable better targeting and more tailored and unified FER responses to the needs of refugees, especially in complex crises.

318. Recommendation 5: ECW should be more open to awarding larger FERs when needed, even if it would trigger an ExCom process, but consider ways to make this process efficient. Because the USD 3 million cap results in most FERs being this size and smaller, the modality does not respond relative to need, thereby limiting its reach and catalytic effects. In emergencies that affect very large populations, larger FERs would be appropriate. It is recognized that larger FERs have been approved, but that this is not consistently the case for large emergencies. If the current approval process beyond the cap on the approval mandate of the Executive Director is a significant barrier to larger FERs happening more frequently in response to large emergencies, ECW should consider options that are lighter, more rapid, but which are more likely to be applied, such as having a sub-committee of the ExCom mandated to approve such grants in a short turn-around time.

319. Recommendation 6: Global support for FERs should be strengthened between the ECW Secretariat and ECW's global partners like the Global Education Cluster and UNHCR. The FERs are a new instrument, and highly dependent on country EiEPC coordination capacity which varies considerably across countries. When the instrument is misunderstood by EiEPC coordinators, or when they are unable for one reason or another to lead a robust country process, FER impacts are more likely to be limited and ECW faces reputational risks. ECW should be more systematic in engaging its global partners on what country capacities are when a grant is triggered, and agreeing who will support and how. This may be with the Global Education Cluster in some cases, with UNHCR in others, or with both, when complex crises involve refugees. This will go far in improving the quality of country FER processes and projects.

320. Recommendation 7: ECW, and its global partners, should invest more rapidly in preparedness, especially so that FERs can contribute better to the localization agenda. ECW should accelerate its efforts to invest in preparedness, particularly in countries where capacities are low and where emergencies are likely to occur or escalate. This would speed and increase the impact of support when emergencies escalate and allow for more diversification and localization of grantees across countries. The two aspects we would emphasize are outlined in the two following paragraphs.

321. Promoting the localization agenda: Recognizing that localization is a long-term process, ECW should consider what support may be given through its other instruments to build the capacity of local actors to respond in crisis situations. This may include encouraging potential partners with experience in EiEPC to seek HACT approval and the formation of partnerships with INGOs. Better guidelines to country coordination groups on how ECW seeks to implement the localization agenda through its grants are also needed. The point here is not fragmentation but advance identification of strong local partners.

322. Invest in better information for emergencies overall: Data gaps are a consistent issue across FERs. Some of the data gaps are inevitable, as they are about needs that change rapidly in emergencies. However, in contexts where preparedness is crucial, ECW should consider financing the efforts to address the information gap and information management coordination gap across countries. Some of this may occur in MYRPs, but where MYRPs are not in place, investment in better

EiEPC data would contribute to FERs being able to better target the most vulnerable, identify priority needs, and support clusters to fundraise more effectively to address needs.

323. Recommendation 8: ECW should consider ways in which more country-level coordination of implementation can occur, without procedural overload on country structures. If grants are to be coherent between grantees, and if grantees are to be given high flexibility to adjust projects, there needs to be more connectedness among grantees and with the country coordinators during implementation. ECW should consider recommending that for year-long FERs, grantees and coordinators should meet once or twice during implementation to exchange information on progress, challenges and adjustments: this should be framed as a learning event and incentivized by providing a small budget for it to the largest grantee. It should be systematic to ensure that all project adjustments and reports are shared with the country coordinators.

324. Recommendation 9: Overall, more review and learning is needed in the FERs, and through FERs on key EiEPC issues. The ECW should consider ways of ensuring that this learning happens, e.g. by using Acceleration Facility funds, or more targeted evaluations. The recommended learning event proposed above could be part of such a FER-linked programme. FERs are rapid, first response instruments. ECW faces many issues detailed in this report to ensure that FERs are more relevant, efficient and more effective. This evaluation should be considered only one step in ongoing review, evaluation and learning on FERs and on rapid responses in emergencies. An immediate learning focus could be on coordination between ECW and UNHCR, and refugee and education cluster coordination groups, especially in the COVID-19 2nd round FERs. Other areas include how to:

- strengthen inclusive education for children with disabilities in first responses;
- tailor responses better to the differentiated needs of girls and boys, and target gender better;
- develop better, more efficient approaches to access for out-of-school children;
- include early childhood learning and development, as well as secondary education, better in first emergency responses in education;
- develop better, faster and more efficient supply chains to improve the efficiency of FER grants;
- implement better assessments of cost-efficiency when country coordination groups make awards;
- improve holistic learning;
- mitigate conflict and conflict sensitivity more effectively; and
- measure access and learning better in short-duration grants.

325. Once learning has occurred, ECW can strengthen guidelines for country coordination groups and grantees.

326. Recommendation 10: ECW should think more strategically on how it would use FERs in regional emergencies, when coherence and learning across countries are important. This would include being clear about what the value-add is of regional components, what minimum arrangements are for them, how regional and country FERs fit together, and what the guidelines are on communication when two FERs are in place.

Annex 1 Terms of reference



Terms of Reference: Evaluation of ECW's First Emergency response funding modality

December 2019

1. Background / Context

The Education Cannot Wait (ECW) fund was established during the [World Humanitarian Summit in 2016](#) to help reposition education as a priority on the humanitarian agenda, usher in a more collaborative approach among actors on the ground, and foster additional funding to ensure that every crisis-affected child and young person is in education and learning. ECW is committed to supporting the delivery of inclusive and quality education to 8.9 million girls, boys and youth most affected by emergencies and protracted crises by 2021. Working along the Humanitarian – Development Nexus ECW seeks not just to meet education needs, but to reduce risk and vulnerability to realize the common vision of a future in which no one is left behind.

ECW developed its current and first strategic plan for the period April 2018-2021. It however started operations during its start-up phase mid-2017 based on initial discussions and insights. ECW's strategic plan designed three different modalities that together aim to achieve a set of collective education outcomes¹: (I) the First Emergency Response (FER) investment window/modality supports education programs immediately in sudden-onset or escalating crises; (II) the Multi-Year Resilience Program (MYRP) investment window addresses longer-term needs through a multi-year joint program in protracted crises, enabling humanitarian and development actors to work together. By providing seed /start-up funds ECW kick-starts the implementation of a MYRP. From there onwards it starts the financial resource mobilization process together with its partners on national and global levels. (III) The third modality is an Acceleration Facility (AF) focused on innovation, capacity development and the creation of public global goods for the education in emergency sector. The operational manual steers the implementation of ECW and the funding windows and is currently in its finalization process. Other strategic documents inform the functioning of these modalities. These include the Gender Policy, Strategy and Accountability Framework, Advocacy Strategy, Resource Mobilization Strategy and Evaluation Policy.

ECW is a multi-stakeholder fund that funds education in emergencies and protracted crises. ECW's day-to-day operations are carried out by the Secretariat. The [High-Level Steering Group \(HLSG\)](#) provides strategic guidance to the Fund's operations. Convened at the Ministerial level, it is chaired by the UN Special Envoy for Global Education, Rt Hon Gordon Brown, and is comprised of partner organizations, including heads of UN agencies and multilateral aid agencies, CEOs of civil society organizations and foundations, and private sector representatives. These constituencies are represented in the Fund's Executive Committee which oversees operations. ECW is hosted by UNICEF in New York, with supporting

¹ (1) access; (2) continuity; (3) equity, gender equality, and inclusion; (4) quality education and learning, and (5) safe, healthy and protective learning environments.



offices in Geneva and Amman. The Fund is administered under UNICEF’s financial, human resources and administrative rules and regulations, while operations are run by the Fund’s own independent governance structure.

With this ToR, ECW seeks to contract a firm to undertake its first comprehensive evaluation as part of its recently adopted Evaluation policy and plan. The evaluation policy describes the norms and standards, types, process, roles and responsibilities of the different evaluations commissioned. Three main evaluations are scheduled for the current strategic plan period: an evaluation of the FER modality in 2020, an evaluation of the MYRP modality in 2020, and a summative organizational evaluation of ECW in 2021.

ECWs Theory of change

ECW’s Theory of Change (ToC) can be split in two parts that together determine ECW’s success in delivering results for children and youth.




Figure 1: ECW Theory of Change

In the upper layer, the core functions of ECW are depicted whereby ECW:



1. Inspires political commitment based on its vision;
2. Mobilizes funds;
3. Catalyzes rapid and collaborative response, bringing together humanitarian and education development actors;
4. Strengthens capacities for implementation, and;
5. Strengthens Education in Emergency (EiE) data systems and evaluates and shares knowledge on what works and what does not in EiE settings.

The core functions of ECW are translated into systemic outcomes². These are based on an analysis of global and national obstacles in the sector conducted by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI)³ in 2016, which led to the creation of ECW. The approaches to achieve each of the systemic outcomes are captured by separate strategic and/or guidance documents of ECW⁴ as well as existing education and humanitarian/development frameworks such as Education 2030 Framework for Action, Grand Bargain Agreements, the minimum standards of the Inter-Agency Network for Education and Emergencies (INEE)⁵, as well as overall emphasis on local actors and accountability to affected populations etc.

The systemic outcomes of ECW are a basic “package” that ECW provides and can be summarized towards: (I) the creation of a better enabling environment (domestic leadership; global community push; systems and policies), and (II) the development of capacities (finance, organizations/people, and mechanisms for programming, accountability and learning). The systemic outcomes and core functions (or top part of the ToC) work on global, regional and national levels. ECW as a fund has more direct control over implementing this part of the TOC and uses its three funding modalities, including the FER, to do so.

The systemic outcomes or “package” should ultimately lead to results at the second layer (bottom half) of the ToC consisting of five beneficiary/collective outcomes:

- Access: Ensure that crisis-affected children are provided with continuous quality learning
- Equity and gender equality: Leave no one behind and ensure access is provided to the most vulnerable children, including girls and children with disabilities
- Continuity: Ensure children stay in school until they complete their education
- Protection: Make sure that schools and learning centers offer a safe, protective and healing environment to crisis-affected children

² (i) Strengthened commitment by governments, donors and humanitarian and development actors increases proportion of affected children and youth receiving quality education; (ii) Substantial increase in generating and disbursing additional, predictable funds for education in crises; (iii) New acute crises result in joint multi-year, costed education plans, underpinned by improved coordination and national financing mechanisms with focus on long-term sustainability; (iv) National and global capacity to respond to and coordinate education crises is improved; (v) Real-time, quality data and analysis support education crisis advocacy, response planning, implementation and accountability as standard.

³ <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10497.pdf>

⁴ For example: the communication and advocacy strategy, gender strategy and policy as well as accountability framework for gender equality, the resource mobilization strategy, the nexus paper, capacity development framework (in draft), and consolidated approaches towards a variety of thematic areas that are designed as a global public good based on ECW experiences regarding for example: learning outcome measurement, quality education, gender equality, MHPSS, safe learning environments.

⁵ <https://inee.org/standards>



- Quality: Improve learning outcomes by combining the above and provide focus on teachers' capacities, learning materials, school management and leadership, and curricula. ECW aims for holistic learning outcomes focusing on academic and non-academic skills including social-emotional wellbeing.

To summarize, ECW's Theory of Change is that IF we change our ways of working AND deliver well-funded quality programs in emergencies and protracted crises, THEN Government, cluster and working group/local education groups have capacities ('quality' people, funds and mechanisms/tools) to manage education responses and be prepared for disasters (coordination; participation; ownership; empowerment; right-based; preparedness/risk-informed); and THEN school communities (principals, teachers, parents) can provide equitable, inclusive, safe and secure access to quality education (school facilities; trained teachers; learning materials) AND children can use the education services sustainably and achieve learning outcomes relevant to their lives.

Since implementation of ECW-funded programs take place through grantees, the Fund has indirect control over achievement of the collective outcome results, while remaining jointly accountable on such results by retaining influence on program design, capacity development and monitoring. As an effort to define roles and responsibilities more clearly, ECW designed an accountability matrix to further clarify the management, organization and quality assurance of its operations.

Next to the collective outcomes ECW aims to work on the nexus of emergency, recovery, and development bringing education actors together to strengthen the resilience of the education system. Special attention hereby is given to interventions that promote system strengthening. It links up to institutional capacity development whereby ECW grantees, via context specific collaborations, work towards aspects such as data systems like EMIS, non-formal education (NFE), recognition of prior learning (RPL), disaster preparedness and risk reduction, adaptable learning assessment, and institutional capacity development. The nexus receives more attention in the MYRP compared to the FER.

The ToC of ECW is supported by a results and indicator framework for both its systemic and collective outcome and related output level results. As well, a specific accountability framework on gender equality and empowerment of women and girls is used to inform these results. Achieved results are captured in a database.

The FER in more detail

The FER window, as one of ECW modalities, aims to respond to the most immediate and urgent education needs as a crisis suddenly occurs or escalates. It aims to provide rapid funding against an inter-agency coordinated proposal and seeks alignment with inter-agency planning and resource mobilization strategies, such as Flash Appeals and Humanitarian Response Plans. ECW's target is to deliver funds within eight weeks of the declaration of the emergency, or when entering a dialogue with field emergency coordination bodies (typically the Education Cluster, UNHCR or the Education in Emergencies Working Group (EiEWG)).

FER investments primarily focus on re-storing the education function. Results focus on access, inclusion and are equity based on differentiated needs of girls, women, boys and men. Thus, activities relate to



this function such as restoration of facilities, school grants, provision of teaching & learning material, community engagement, teacher training/motivation, and so forth. This focus is reflected in ECW's decision mid-2019 requiring FER grantees to report on access at the outcome level, while MYRPs do also require reporting on learning outcomes.

To promote system strengthening aspects of cluster coordination, psychosocial support, disaster risk reduction, emergency preparedness, as well as development and adherence to contextualised education minimum standards should be included in the response. As a rule, ECW is not prescriptive in defining the results or activities the FER grantees undertake. It instead intends to leave the FER project design largely to the in-country partners. At the same time ECW aims to ensure quality control on results and cross-cutting themes such as gender, inclusion, protection and MHPSS.

At the same time while system strengthening is encouraged, in principle, the focus of the FER is to provide a rapid response. This is reflected in the relevant indicators as part of systemic outcome 3 stated as a joint, locally owned planning and timely response, inclusive of humanitarian and development partners. Therefore, FERs aim to work via existing in-country planning structures and plan to provide funding against HRP and RRP. At the same time ECW aims to facilitate and strengthen an EiE response via joint advocacy efforts, funding and support to coordination structures including the deployment of cluster personnel when needed.⁶

FER projects have a duration of 6 months to 1 year. Some receive a no-cost extension. Currently 29 countries, particularly in Africa, Middle East, Latin America and South-Asia, have received a total of USD 79 millions of FER related funds. For an up-to-date overview of the project portfolio click [here](#).

ECW does not target a maximum or a minimum level of funding as a percentage of the overall education requirements of the emergency via this window. Rather, the Secretariat enters a dialogue with field emergency coordination bodies and recommends a realistic level of funding. The coordinating bodies and their partners can refer to the proposed level of funds as they plan and draft proposals.

The initial designs of the FER were tested in 2017. Over the years envisioned improvements have been made resulting into its current form as described in the Guide for Applying for First Emergency Response Grants (accessible [here](#)) which is part of the organization's operational manual. The guide explains the processes, requirements, and selection criteria for the application and execution of FER grants and is supported by a variety of planning and reporting formats. Implementing partners or grantees are pre-accredited and ECW uses the Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers (HACT) of the UN to do so.

2. Purpose / Objectives

The main purpose of this formative evaluation and ToR is to assess the overall relevance/appropriateness, reach/ coverage, efficiency, effectiveness, and connectedness of the FER modality, and to measure its progress towards systemic and collective results since its operations in 2017. It is the first evaluation under its current evaluation plan and strategic plan.

⁶ In addition, AF funds of ECW are used to strengthen global exchange and capacity development of the education cluster.



The evaluation looks at both ECW's organizational systemic outcomes as well as the beneficiary collective outcomes on global/regional and national levels. More specifically, the overarching objectives of the evaluation are as follows:

- a. To determine the extent to which the FER modality is meeting its envisioned purpose, and to better understand what aspects of its design and approach are working or that require improvements in the future. The evaluation intends to provide an objective assessment of the FER modality, and how ECW applied its core functions i.e. "package" to achieve its strategic outcomes. The connection between its global design and in-country application requires specific attention as ECW aims to evaluate how well it adapts programming to country context and dynamics. This objective includes a comparison with other funding mechanisms in the education in emergency sector, either more humanitarian and/or development/recovery oriented.
- b. The second aim of the evaluation is to assess the FER project portfolio's collective outcomes at global and country level, with specific attention to the implementation approach and whether ECW and its grantees are fulfilling their expected roles and responsibilities efficiently and effectively. It follows all steps of the project cycle from identification, formulation, contracting, implementation/monitoring, evaluation, and the integration of cross-cutting themes such as gender, inclusion, protection and MHPSS all in relation to the EiE context. It also includes whether investments through the Acceleration Facility, that aim at the creation of global public knowledge and goods, are visibly benefiting FER action at country level.
- c. Provide important lessons learned and recommendations to specific actors so to improve the FER modality as part of ECW's strategic direction and engagement in the broader global EiE sector.
- d. Recommendations on how ECW should organize an evaluation of its FERs modality in the future.

Objective a and b obviously overlap and interact. It is therefore expected that the evaluation analyses the change processes, "contribution claims," or "pathways of change" as envisioned in ECWs ToC. It is expected that the evaluation analyses how well ECW exercised its five core-functions to achieve systemic organizational as well as collective beneficiary outcomes in the countries, all within the scope of the FER modality. To do so properly, the national and global context of education in emergency and protracted crises, and the interaction between them, are to be well understood. It is the quality of the systemic outcomes that (in theory) affects the design, implementation approaches, and results for the beneficiaries of the FER. If the ToC holds "true" is to be evaluated.

The commonality of the FERs currently lies more in its strategic principles than in its in-country application. It is expected that the evaluation assesses the balance between standardization and contextual alignment of the FER approach. In its design the FER aims to be flexible, country-led, and aligned with inter-agency planning strategies and existing appeals and education/humanitarian plans. The implementation approaches therefore aim to differ and mirror in-country reality and needs. If this current set-up is most relevant, effective and efficient is to be analysed and therefore expected to be evaluated.



Regarding the comparison with other funding mechanisms in the education in emergency sector as part of objective A, it is expected that the evaluation compares the overall design, processes and approaches towards the identification, formulation, contracting/granting, and implementation of grants. It focuses on comparing the ECWs roles and responsibilities within the FER modality with comparable other funding mechanisms or streams. The comparison should point out: i) to what extent is the FER focussing on and operating in ways that others are not (e.g. reaching less high profile crises, building political support); (ii) where the FER is doing what others are, is it doing them more effectively (e.g. contract/granting, grant implementation); and (iii) to what extent is FER complementary to other mechanisms and improves their effectiveness? The comparison does not include a comparison on the effectiveness or efficiency towards beneficiaries of the FER with other modalities.

The primary users of the evaluation are ECW Secretariat incl. its ExCom. Secondary users of the evaluation are ECWs FER grantees incl. host-country Governments. Recommendations, and the subsequent by ECW to be developed management response, are to be written to specific users.

3. Scope of Work

The evaluation incorporates all projects and activities as part of the FER modality (29 countries) since its inception in 2017 to date. The geographical scope of the evaluation is global, with in-depth evaluation and country visits to 4 proposed beneficiary countries⁷. Each FER has about 2-5 grantees in each country.

Other ECW funding modalities (the multi-year resilience window and the acceleration facility) are not part of this evaluation and are planned to be evaluated separately at a later stage in 2020. However, the MYRP and AF modalities interact and connect with the FER modality. Certain FERs are transitioning into MYRPs, other FERs are extended into a new phase, all depending on in-country context. AF funds target the development of public global goods or tools that are to be used during FERs. If and how (well) these interactions or overlaps take place are to be evaluated.

4. Proposed evaluation questions

The evaluation should include findings and recommendations based on the evaluation criteria listed below. These evaluation criteria are a combination of development and humanitarian action programs set by OECD-DAC and ALNAP⁸, that are relevant to the FER modality.⁹

The evaluation questions will be validated and further refined during the inception phase of the evaluation.

Relevance and appropriateness: How relevant is the support provided by ECW and its Secretariat towards the design and implementation of FER grants so to achieve the collective outcomes? What is

⁷ For the FER modality evaluation Colombia, Niger, Nigeria, Mozambique are pre-selected. This batch represents major crises over the last couple of years. Both acute natural disaster and protracted crises as well as refugees & IDPs. These crises also represent a broader regional crisis with strong needs i.e. Venezuela, the cyclone in Southern Africa, the Lake Chad region. Particularly the Lake Chad region is important from a girl's education perspective.

⁸ <https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/alnap-evaluation-humanitarian-action-2016.pdf>

⁹ Purposefully, due to the nature of the FER modality, criteria such as impact, sustainability and coherence are not included in this ToR.



the added value of the FER modality compared to other existing and potentially new modalities on a global level and in the countries¹⁰, and to what extent can we speak of a FER model, opposed to a fully context-specific approach? To what extent did the FER modality adapt and respond to the immediate learning/education needs of boys/men and girls/women, including persons with disabilities? To what extent are the required actors (Government, UN, CSOs, humanitarian/development) consulted in the design and planning M&E of interventions? To what extent is the FER investment linked to and aligned with in-country education sector needs analysis, humanitarian response plans (HRP) and other relevant policy frameworks? Were the choices of grantees in-country the correct ones and why (not)? To what extent do the FER funds align and collaborate with other sources of funding (government, other donors or NGOs) or in addressing urgent needs of those targeted?

Coverage/reach: Does the FER portfolio focus on the most urgent education crises and are the selection of countries transparent? To what extent has the FER modality reached those most marginalized and vulnerable unable to access education and learning otherwise? What were the main reasons that the intervention provided or failed to provide the selected population groups, proportionate to their need?

Efficiency: How do countries/grantees become aware of potential ECW funding and is this process and communication clear and transparent? How efficient is the design process of the FER¹¹ carried out and what can be improved (i.e. timeliness, cooperation/communication between actors, alignment with existing humanitarian coordination architecture and processes, funding allocations, Q&A of ECW, decision-making and approval process)? Is the process of grantee(s) selection clear and transparent, and what can be improved? What contracting modality would be most efficient?¹² How efficient is the implementation of the FER grants? Is the process of monitoring and reporting leading to better insights and is evidence used for learning and improvement? Are the costing and budgeting (lines) of FERs justified by its results?

Effectiveness, connectedness & timeliness:

The effectiveness questions on systemic outcome level of ECW and collective outcome level for beneficiaries in the countries are separated for easy reference. The timeliness and connectedness¹³ criteria are integrated into systemic outcome (SO) level.

Systemic outcome results:

1. To what extent has ECWs global and national advocacy and resource mobilization efforts facilitated the (i) design, (ii) implementation, and (iii) potential co-financing of the FER in the

¹⁰ It is expected that the evaluation compares the overall design, processes and approaches towards the identification, formulation, contracting/granting, and implementation of grants. It focuses on comparing the ECWs roles and responsibilities within the FER modality with comparable other funding mechanisms or streams incl. direct funding support from donors to grantees, the central emergency response fund, and accelerated funding of GPE. It does not include a comparison on the effectiveness or efficiency towards beneficiaries of the FER with other modalities.

¹¹ See the work flow for FER grant applications in annex 1

¹² One contract for each grantee as done now, or one contract for each FER program that is guiding all grantees in a country.

¹³ The extent to which activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context that takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account (resilience)



- countries? What effect or additionality has ECW FER funds had on the flow of resources to EiE on a global and/or country level? (SO 1 and 2).
2. If so, and to what extent has the FER improved a joint, coordinated and inclusive approach to EiE so to support the achievement of the set educational outcomes at country level? How timely was the start of the FER interventions and were funds disbursed to grantees within 8 weeks, if not why and what were the consequences? To what extent did the FERs short-term emergency nature take longer-term and interconnected institutional/systemic problems into account (i.e. resilience) during its design and execution? How effectively were voices of affected populations including girls and women and persons with disabilities considered in the planning, implementation *and* monitoring of the FER projects? (SO 3)
 3. Has the in-country institutional (coordination groups/clusters) and organizational capacity of grantees and local partners to assess, plan, implement, monitor/report, and evaluate EiE interventions improved due to ECW support? How effective was the support to strengthening national EiE standards? How much was there an emphasis on localization and how effective were FERs used to strengthen the technical *and* institutional capacities of local partners? Do grantees finish the project on-time and what is the effect of the no-cost extension, what can be improved? (SO4)
 4. How much were the lessons learned from the FER used to support global knowledge development, exchange and learning and vice versa?¹⁴ (SO5)

Collective beneficiary results:

5. What is the overall effect of the FER intervention “package”¹⁵ on the beneficiaries and what lessons can be learned to improve the implementation approaches? Are the FERs leading to more effective programming by the grantees and is it shaping/changing their behavior to become more effective?
6. Access and continuity: How effective were the FER in improving access and retention for its targeted children and otherwise most marginalized including girls and children with disabilities?
7. Equity and gender equality: How effective are the FERs in addressing the different education needs of girls and boys, including the most vulnerable and those with disabilities, and those in displaced populations (refugee/IDPs)?
8. Safe learning environment: How effective were FER investments in the creation of safe learning environments? How adequate do FER investments promote and act on (i) the protection from education related (gender-based) violence, and (ii) the provision of psychosocial support to the target groups?
9. Quality and learning: Relative to the scope of the FER, does its design and implementation promote a holistic approach to quality education and learning, and what could be improved? To what degree is there any evidence about improved holistic learning outcomes (literacy,

¹⁴ This question evaluates the relationship between the FER and the acceleration facility (AF) of which the latter aims to focus on knowledge creation via the development of public global goods.

¹⁵ The “package” of support is elaborated in the Theory of Change section of this ToR and it is the combination of ECW support (systemic objectives) combining a) political commitment with increased funds to EiE, b) technical assistance and capacity development, and c) facilitation and coordination in-country, all based on d) evidence and data.



numeracy, social-emotional learning) for all children targeted by the intervention, including girls and children with disabilities?

10. Were the relevant INEE minimum standards aimed for and met by the FERs?
11. To what degree have FERs mainstreamed, integrated and/or targeted gender throughout all steps of the investments cycle to ensure that education services are provided, with attention to children's and adults' safety, dignity and equal access?
12. Have there been any unintended positive or negative side-effects on beneficiaries because of the aid that was provided under the FER; and if so, how was this dealt with by the implementing partners?

5. Methodology and Approach

These Terms of Reference purposely do not impose specific methodologies since it is expected that proposals will suggest adequate methodologies towards answering the evaluation questions. However, to clarify expectations, some recommended features of the methodologies to be proposed by the consultants/firm in their proposal include:

- While upholding independence and objectivity, a participatory approach whereby the evaluation team works closely with the ECW Secretariat, country grantees and other key education actors (incl. those who did not receive funds) to ensure that the findings of the evaluation are credible, sustainable and can be used to improve programming, is welcomed.
- The analysis of the FER portfolio is expected to both "sample" individual FER projects for in-depth analysis (including those involving the four country visits), and to perform an overall assessment of the FER portfolio including its results, thematic (gender, MHPSS and protection) and geographical focus and other characteristics.
- ECW expects a thorough analysis and assessment of the pathways of change of the FER connecting the global with the national level results. A contribution analysis of ECW on the different contribution claims of ECWs ToC (global and local) would be welcomed.
- A generic ToC on country level is expected to facilitate the comparison between FERs.
- An evaluation matrix is expected that presents the final evaluation questions, data collection methods and sources of verification.
- Use of credible mixed methodologies to allow for triangulation of information is expected.
- The firm is expected to take full advantage of the available reports and data to inform its findings and recommendations. Hence, the evaluation will not require the firm to conduct extensive primary data collection.
- A gender sensitive approach is expected throughout the design, collection, analysis and reporting of the evaluation¹⁶. When findings of beneficiaries differ for boys/girls, men/women, less abled/abled, these should be presented.
- Innovative approaches towards partnership working, particularly at the country level, are encouraged.

¹⁶ *UNEG Norm 8 Human rights and gender equality*. The universally recognized values and principles of human rights and gender equality need to be integrated into all stages of an evaluation. It is the responsibility of evaluators and evaluation managers to ensure that these values are respected, addressed and promoted, underpinning the commitment to the principle of 'no-one left behind.'



- The assessment of efficiency should describe if ECW resources have been spent in relation to the best possible use of resources vis-à-vis the stated objectives; and how the preparation and disbursement speed has affected implementation and results.
- The evaluation will be evidence-based. All findings and conclusions should be based on evidence which is presented in the evaluation report (including the annexes) and on the triangulation of different sources of evidence to verify and substantiate assessment. In cases where the source of information is interviews, the method of selecting those to be interviewed should be presented in the evaluation report and the findings noted as the views of a stakeholder or group. In the case of surveys, the questionnaire, information on the population or samples, and the response rates should be presented in the report.
- The evaluation firm should ensure that all data are collected according to ethical standards and that collected data are organized, secured and preserved for potential re-analysis in the summative ECW evaluation. All data and findings will remain the property of ECW at the end of the evaluation contract.

Proposed country field visits

The ECW secretariat made a pre-selection of proposed countries to visit. The selection is based on the following criteria:

- Country budget size above average budget size of the average grant in the funding modality.
- Geographical balance.
- Chosen FER grants are relatively recent: minimum 3 months before/after completion of FER.
- Coverage of different types of crises i.e. acute emergency/disaster & protracted crises.

Colombia, Niger, Nigeria, and Mozambique are proposed as country field visits. These countries witnessed major crises of different types over the last two years –natural disasters, protracted crises as well as crises characterized by mass displacement.

6. Planning and deliverables

Deadline of proposals is **Friday 24th of January 2020**. Questions can be asked until January 10th, 2020 and answers will be shared with all potential applicants.

It is expected to select a contractor on or before 4th of February 2020. Contract is to be signed mid-February 2020.

The firm will provide the following deliverables with suggested timeline:

Item	Description	Timeframe 2020
1	Draft inception report incl. evaluation framework, final evaluation questions, updated evaluation workplan.	3 weeks after signing of the contract
2	Final inception report incl. evaluation framework, final evaluation questions, updated evaluation workplan (max. 50 pages)	5 weeks after signing of the contract
3	Four brief maximum 20-page country level FER evaluation reports	10 th of June 2020
4	Draft evaluation report incl. findings, conclusions and recommendations	30 th of June 2020



5	Presentation on evaluation findings ¹⁷	Between 1-10 July
6	Final evaluation report incl. annexes and executive summary	End of July

The design phase and consequent inception report (max. 50 pages) should focus on and describe, as a minimum:

- A causal model and generic in-country Theory of Change of the FER funding modality based on the ECW ToC illustrated above;
- Refined qualitative and quantitative evaluation methodologies combined with a clear data collection and analysis strategy, methods, and tools;
- An evaluation matrix connecting evaluation questions with methods;
- A robust, well-justified sampling strategy that ensures geographic and grant size balance;
- Assess the availability of documentation and conduct a review of available materials¹⁸;
- A timeline with deadlines for the main deliverables.

The inception period requires a ± 2-3-day intake session at ECW Secretariat in New York.

The draft and final evaluation report should be no longer than 60 pages excluding annexes.

The presentation and consequent discussion should take place about ½ - ¾ of a day and takes place in New York, USA or Geneva, Switzerland.

The final evaluation report should indicatively be structured as follows:

- Executive summary
- Introduction
- Brief description of FER modality linked to the ToC incl. a generic ToC on country level.
- Methodology and methods used incl. limitations on the study design
- Findings
- Conclusions and recommendations
- Annexes

All deliverables must be written in English. Deliverables 2 and 4 will be approved by ECW before continuation.

7. Governance and tasks to be performed by the ECW Secretariat

The following tasks will be performed by ECW:

- ECW will provide all relevant technical and financial documentation to the evaluators as required.
- ECW will facilitate access to respondents on a global level. Access to respondents in the country is to be facilitated by ECW grantees.

¹⁷ New York or Geneva.

¹⁸ ECW has two annual results reports for 2017 and 2018 accessible [here](#)



- ECW will appoint contact persons for the evaluation at ECW Secretariat level and with grantees at country field level.

The evaluation will be managed by the ECW M&E team. An advisory group is established consisting of members of ECW's executive committee representing donors, civil society, and UN agencies. The advisory group works with the M&E team of the Secretariat to provide backstopping and quality assurance to the evaluation process. Annex 3 provides the process flow of the evaluation.

Contracting will follow UNICEF's rules and regulations as ECW follows UNICEF's administrative rules and regulations. Contracting is done via existing long-term agreements (LTA's).

8. General guidelines, submission and selection criteria

A technical proposal and a financial proposal should be submitted in 2 separate PDF documents to info@un-ecw.org and cc. to mspoelder@un-ecw.org with the subject line: "Confidential proposal for ECW FER modality evaluation."

Deadline for submission is **Friday 24th of January 2020**. Questions can be asked until January 10th, 2020 and answers will be shared with all potential applicants.

Technical proposals should as a minimum include a section on:

- (i) Background and contract management capacity of the firm,
- (ii) Understanding of the ToR incl. feedback on the ToR,
- (iii) Approach and methodology,
- (iv) Methods and sampling,
- (v) Workplan incl. deliverables,
- (vi) Proposed team incl. roles and responsibilities and time-input allocation for each team member.
- (vii) Relevant annexes of the firm are expected that further substantiate the technical bid and include as a minimum the following: company profile, updated relevant references incl. contact details of clients, a minimum of 2 examples of evaluation reports recently completed (preferably by members of the evaluation team) that are relevant to the subject of the evaluation¹⁹, recommendation letters are optional but promoted.

The currency of the financial proposal is United States Dollars (USD). Please assure that the technical proposal does not refer to any financial figures of the bid.

All eligible proposals will be assessed based on this Terms of Reference. They will be granted scores following objective technical criteria under four categories. Percentages on how much each criterion influences the total score are given in brackets below:

- A. Expertise of the firm or institution (15%):
 - Minimum of 10 years of experience in conducting programmatic evaluations in both the humanitarian and development sector in (post) conflict countries is required;

¹⁹ Reference to already submitted reports as part of the LTA is allowed.



- Strong expertise in education, international development, and education in emergencies program evaluations.
 - Experience with the UN systems is desirable;
 - Experience with evaluating multi-donor initiatives and funding mechanisms.
 - The proposal should include a minimum of 2 examples of evaluation reports recently completed (preferably by members of the evaluation team) with are relevant to the subject of the evaluation.
- B. Proposed approach, methodology and work-plan (30%):**
- The technical proposal will include and clearly articulate the approach, methodology, methods proposed of the evaluation.
 - The proposal should include a clear work-plan with roles/responsibilities and allocation of days for the different team members.
- C. Qualifications and experience of the evaluation team (35%):**
- All team members should have at least an advanced university (masters) degree in education, international development, organizational development, humanitarian, security and/or conflict/peace studies, social sciences including as relevant gender specific training, public policy or related areas (mandatory).
 - The team should have experience of:
 - The global discourse on SDGs, education 2030 agenda, Grand Bargain, Refugee Education 2030: a strategy for Refugee Inclusion, and other global frameworks that guide international/humanitarian development;
 - Experience in evaluating programs and policies in both the development and humanitarian context of least developed country settings;
 - Specialized thematic expertise on the subject matter evaluated i.e. EiEPC settings, the IASC and refugee coordination architecture, quality in education, gender in education, equity, MHPSS, safe learning environment, teacher development;
 - Proficiency in English, Spanish and French in core team is mandatory. Arabic and Portuguese are an advantage;
 - Strong research capacity including a) rigorous quantitative and qualitative data collection, analysis, and data visualization skills as well as b) respect the dignity and rights of children and adults.
 - Strong interactive presentation and workshop facilitation skills;
 - Strong English reporting skills;
 - Strong communication, inter-personal, people and team management skills to facilitate a smooth process of the evaluation.
 - The team leader should have a minimum of 15+ years of professional evaluation experience in program/policy evaluation in education or international (humanitarian) development. Oral and writing in skills in English of the highest standard.
 - A gender balanced team of international and national experts is strongly desired.



Core tasks, roles and responsibilities, and time input from each of the team members and the team lead are to be clearly articulated in the proposal.

Experts can only be part of one proposal. Contractors can only submit one proposal.

D. Pricing (20%):

The estimated budget should include all costs, including travel and accommodation for visits to 4 beneficiary countries and New York/Geneva (2x). In-country transport in the capital/major cities is to be budgeted for. Travel in-country to the field is covered by ECW or grantees. The budget should offer details so that costs of expertise and travel are visible.

Existing price-agreements of the Long-Term Agreement (LTA) with UNICEF as ECWs hosted fund are to be followed.

The total budget range for this proposal is between 300.000 – 350.000 USD. A lumpsum contract will be provided. Contracts are in USD.

The proposed payment schedules are:

- 30% at approval of inception report.
- 40% at approval of draft evaluation report.
- 30% at approval of final evaluation report and presentation.

9. Bibliography

Strategic documents of ECW such as the strategic plan, annual results report 2017 and 2018, gender strategy can be found [here](#)

FER related project information can be found [here](#)

Other documentation will be shared electronically as requested with all applicants.

Annex 1: Work flow for FER grant applications

	Green Emergency Information System Day 1	Approval Day 2	Communication Day 7	Concept note Day 11	Final concept note Day 18	Application form Day 21	Review All documents Day 25-30	Final Approval Day 35-37	Final document Day 38-39
Coordination Leads (Ouster/EEWG/UN-CR)			Communicate funding opportunities to all represented country partners	Lead/drafting of concept note in consultation with national government and all appropriate partners	Responds to requests for concept note from ECW Secretariat	Contributes and leads process of completing application form in consultation with national government and partners, including appropriate partners and implementing partners. Approves and signs off on the Application form and submitting partners to ECW Secretariat of terms and conditions in consultation to apply	2. Responds to ECW Secretariat feedback and re-submits application form within 2 days		
Grantees						Contributes to development of application form	3. Responds to requests for clarification from Coordination Lead		3. Responds to requests for signature from UNICEF FPO, and to return signed agreement
All other appropriate country partners									
Fund Custodian (UNICEF FPO)									2. Contacts partners to establish agreement and financial terms, in consultation with ECW Secretariat
ECW Secretariat	Decision made to submit 18 month emergency response trials	Funding opportunities announced in writing to email from ECW Secretariat and copied to coordination leads in country and global cluster leads	Support development of concept note as requested	Reviews concept note, in consultation with coordination lead, and invites completion of full application form, as requested	Support development of application form as requested	1. Reviews application form and provides feedback within 2 days	Approves or revises to Executive Committee for approval of above. This is the governor and allows coordination lead and governor of additional	4. Reviews UNICEF concept agreement to submit grant funds and financial terms. Communicate with grantee to finalize agreement to finalize in country and apply process	
Executive Committee							Reviews and approves application form if the total value above \$5m or if UNICEF is the grantee		

Note: Number of days refers to working days.

Annex 2: Summary of systemic education response gaps

Table 1: Summary of systemic education response gaps

Obstacle	National response gaps	Global response gaps
Low priority and uneven attention to education across crises	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of focus on education in crisis leading to weak response and insufficient investment Lack of sufficiently rigorous, detailed and funded contingency strategies, needs assessments and implementation plans that would guide actors and their donors at crisis onset Certain groups, such as refugees or displaced, forgotten or excluded from education support in development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Poor prioritisation of education in the humanitarian system, with Humanitarian Coordinators and other leadership not well versed on emergency education needs Uneven political engagement, with uneven donor support, resulting in what are known as 'forgotten crises'
Interrupted education owing to the impact of crises and poor links across different actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of involvement of national/local authorities in early planning, resulting in lack of ownership in response Inadequate national capacity to consolidate plans across emergencies and longer-term crises, as well as to coordinate actors Poor in-country coordination between clusters and development coordination In refugee contexts, owing to structural barriers, refugee affairs ministries responsible for education may not collaborate with ministries of education Unclear lines of responsibility for preparedness and disaster risk reduction 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Breakdown between humanitarian and development actors in coordination, planning and financing modalities Disjointed approaches and priorities for needs assessments and planning processes Standard emergency appeals and responses not geared to likelihood of long-term stabilisation needs, resulting in lack of sustainable planning for and support to eventually protracted crises Insufficient financing mechanisms that support both emergency response and systems building in single plan
Insufficient funding to cover all education needs across all crises	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Overstretched domestic finance for education, exacerbated by inefficiencies and poor public financial management Many countries do not build crisis response into their education sector strategic plans, and therefore lack links to budget planning processes and miss out on support by development donors to align to these national sector plans Host governments frequently without financial or capacity resources to support education for refugees 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Underfunded humanitarian appeals for education; less than 2% of humanitarian budget allocated to education Unpredictable short-term funding disconnected from longer-term support Reliance on traditional humanitarian donors, with difficulties in bringing in development donors to immediate crisis response Lack of innovative finance mechanisms and dialogue with new and non-traditional potential donors
Inadequate capacity to lead and deliver education and recovery efforts, both nationally and internationally	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Few teachers, senior staff and administrators skilled in emergency response or coping with long-term crises Insufficient finance capacity to engage sufficient additional staff Poor early engagement of national/local authorities in education response, leading to disenfranchisement Failed or destroyed supply and infrastructure systems Education in emergencies and social cohesion not part of standardised teacher qualification training in crisis regions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pattern of short-term, and lack of predictability in, funding deployments Lack of seniority and skills in deployable workforce Stop-gap international support does not have time required to build capacity for national actors during crises, and frequently works in parallel for sake of efficiency Limited number of agencies able to operate at scale Agency mandates can exacerbate difficulties to finetune multi-year education approaches in emergencies
Lack of real-time and up-to-date data and analysis to inform decisions on education response	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Authorities side-lined in design of assessment tools Ineffective and at times parallel information systems, leaving gaps in data collection and analysis Poor real-time, and regularity of, data collection, leaving in-country actors unclear on scale of crisis Insufficient analysis of existing data and assessments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assessments tools tend to be narrow, focusing on access and primary, rather than full range of, needs Limited analysis, and ineffective use of data, makes it difficult to communicate priorities and needs Scarcity of research in this area and lack of application of lessons from existing research

Source: ODI (2016). *Education Cannot Wait: proposing a fund for education in emergencies*, p. 13

<https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10497.pdf>

Annex 3: Process flow and roles and responsibilities of the different actors involved during the FER evaluation




Figure 2: Process flow investment windows and thematic evaluations

Annex 2 Interview Respondents

Table 17 List of people met

Name	Position, Organization
Inception phase	
1. Zeinab Adam	Chief, Coordination & Strategic Planning, ECW
2. Rekiya Adamu-Atta	Chief, Multi-donor Trust Fund Management and Operations, UNICEF
3. Maria Agnese Giordana	Global Education Cluster Coordinator, UNICEF
4. Maarten Barends	Chief, Humanitarian Liaison & External Relations, ECW
5. Rachel Besley	Manager, Risk and Child Safeguarding, ECW
6. Niladri Bhattacharjee	Specialist, Finance, ECW
7. Michael Corlin	Chief Adviser to the Director, ECW
8. Anouk Desgroseilliers	Manager, Advocacy and Communication Strategy, ECW
9. Robert Edward Dutton	Manager, Emergency Education, ECW
10. Malin Elisson	Chief, Field Support & Reporting, ECW
11. Nasser Faqih	Chief, Strategic Partnerships, ECW
12. David Hartstone	Former Grants Manager, ECW
13. Diane Kepler	Deputy Director, Division of Financial and Administrative Management, UNICEF
14. Manan Kotak	Specialist, Education, ECW
15. Graham Lang	Chief, Education, ECW
16. Michelle May	Specialist, Education (MHPSS and Protection), ECW
17. Nagi Messiha	Deputy Director (Operations), ECW
18. Anthony Nolan	Global Education Cluster Coordinator, Save the Children
19. Aida Orgocka	Manager, Gender & Development, ECW
20. Yoshiyuki Oshima	Manager, Grants, ECW
21. Kent Page	Chief, Advocacy & Communication, ECW
22. Yasmine Sherif	Director, ECW
23. Maurits Spoelder	Specialist, Monitoring & Evaluation, ECW
24. Christian Stoff	Chief, M&E & Global Reporting, ECW
25. James Thomas Vargas	Chief, Forced Displacement Response, ECW
26. Madge Thomas	Manager, Innovative Financing, Private Sector & Resource Mobilization, ECW
27. Matteo Valenza	Manager, Monitoring & Evaluation, ECW
Main evaluation phase: Global interviews	
1. Guido Calvi	HQ Focal Point for Humanitarian Aid and EiE, AVSI
2. Kaela Glass	Institutional Partnership Adviser, NRC
3. Altan Butt	Senior Partnership Officer, WFP
4. Felicien Hatungimana	Country Director, RET Mali
5. Angela María Escobar	Director of the Strategy and Planning Area for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), RET
6. Maria Agnese Giordano	Global Education Cluster Coordinator, UNICEF
7. Arpana Pandey	RRT Cluster Coordinator, Global Education Cluster
8. Anthony Nolan	Global Education Cluster Coordinator, Save the Children
9. Elisa Radisone	Senior Knowledge Management Adviser, Global Education Cluster, Save the Children
10. Nina Papadopoulos	USAID ExCom member; Team Lead, Education in Crisis and Conflict, USAID

Name	Position, Organization
11. Ashley Henderson	Education Specialist, Education in Crisis and Conflict, USAID
12. Clio Dintilhac	Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
13. Kerstin Holst	EiE Specialist and UNESCO ExCom member, UNESCO
14. Linda Jones	Senior Advisor, EiE, Education Section, UNICEF
15. Emma Wagner	Senior Education & Advocacy Adviser, STC
16. Geoff Loane	Head of Education, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
17. Emma Gremley	Lead Technical Adviser, EiE, DFID
18. Anushya Devendra	SRO for ECW Investment & Governance, DFID
19. Dean Brooks	Director, INEE
20. Jordan Naidoo	Director and Country Representative, UNESCO Afghanistan, Kabul Office
21. Victoria Kisaakye Kanobe	UNESCO International Institute for Capacity Building in Africa (IICBA), Ethiopia
22. Kamila Partyka	EiE Desk Officer, ECHO
23. Michael Revillard	Initiatives Lead, Lego Foundation
24. Mamadou Dian Balde	Deputy Director, Socio-Economic and Inclusion Service Division of Resilience and Solutions, UNHCR
25. Rebecca Telford	Chief, Education Section Chief, UNHCR
26. Per Magnusson	Senior Programme Manager – Education, Sida
27. Meritxell Relano	Deputy Director, EMOPs, UNICEF
28. Benoit d’Ansembourg	Senior Education Officer, Division of Resilience and Solutions
29. Keiko Miwa	Acting Director, Education previously, now Regional Director Human Development in MENA, World Bank
30. Pdraig Power	Chief Financial Officer, Global Partnership for Education
31. Randi Gramshaug	Senior Adviser, Department for Education and Global Health, Norway
32. Zahra Boodhwani	Senior Education Specialist, Global Affairs Canada
33. Alice Birnbaum	Senior Analyst (Education), Global Affairs Canada
34. Claus Lindroos	Director, Unit for Humanitarian Assistance, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Finland
35. Nilse Ryman	Regional Manager, GPE
36. Margarita Licht	Senior Education Specialist, GPE
37. Megan Lees-McCowan	ECW Lead, Street Child
38. Ramya Medhavan	Head of Education, Street Child
39. Helene Ferrer	Education Unit, Sustainable Development Dept, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France
40. Line Baagø-Rasmussen	Senior Development Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark.
Main evaluation phase: Mozambique case study	
1. Raul Albertino	Provincial Officer, CESC, Cabo Delgado
2. Carlos Almeida	HELPO Coordinator in Mozambique
3. Louise Banham	Regional Education Adviser, DFID
4. Manuel Barare	School Headteacher, EPC Mussangadzi, Macate, Manica
5. Ana Cristina Botelho de Azevedo	Education Specialist (CO Education in Emergency Specialist), UNICEF
6. Saul Butters	Assistant Country Director, Care

Name	Position, Organization
7. Carlos Candeado	Project Manager EiE, Plan International
8. Emma Cardoso	Program Lead, CESC
9. Adriano Cerveja	Provincial Focal Point EiE, Provincial Directorate of Education, Sofala
10. António F. Chaora	Monitor for Accelerated School Construction, Provincial Directorate of Education, Manica
11. Manuel Chicamisse	Former Provincial Director of Education and Human Development in Sofala
12. Paulino Chihoto	Teacher, CAEPC CHINETE, Macate, Manica
13. Lorelie Clark	Humanitarian Focal Point and Education Specialist, Global Affairs Canada
14. Pedro Cossa	Head of Department for Community Involvement, Ministry of Education and Human Development
15. Marta Cumbi	Member of Fiscal Council, MEPT (Movimento de Educação para Todos)
16. Sergio Dinoi	Head of Humanitarian Advisers Team, Mozambique
17. Malin Ljunggren Elisson	ECW
18. Elena Esposito	Programme Coordinator, AVSI
19. Sarita Farinde	Hygiene and School Health Officer, Provincial Directorate of Education, Sofala
20. Female respondent	School Headteacher, Macharote Secondary School, Dondo
21. Jaime Fernandes	Head of the Construction Unit, Construction Unit, Provincial Directorate of Education, Sofala
22. Arsénio Filimone	Construction Unit staff member, Construction Unit, Provincial Directorate of Education, Sofala
23. Lemos Francisco	Education Coordinator, Save the Children
24. Baptista Francisco	Provincial Director for Education, Manica
25. Fiona Gaffney	Program Development & Quality Manager – Humanitarian Response, Save the Children
26. Monica Gaspar	Business Development Manager, Plan International
27. Domingos Vasco Gemo	District Director for Education, Youth and Technology, Dondo, Sofala
28. Ruben Harrisson	Cluster Co-lead, Save the Children
29. Mário Jeque	Nutrition and School Health Officer, Provincial Directorate of Education, Sofala
30. Feliz João	Member of School Council, EPC Mussangadzi, Macate, Manica
31. Amelia Joaquim	School Council Chair, EPC Mussangadzi, Macate, Manica
32. Rosa José	Teacher, EPC Mussangadzi, Macate, Manica
33. Michael Jumo	EiE Program Manager, Save the Children, Manica
34. Lusungo Kaunda	Project Development Manager, Food for the Hungry
35. Manan Kotak	Education Specialist and ECW Focal Point for Mozambique, ECW
36. Marianne Kujala-Garcia	Education Counsellor, Finland
37. Graham Lang	Head of Education, ECW
38. Ilidio Liva	Teacher, CAEPC CHINETE, Macate, Manica
39. Sian Long	Roving Education Adviser, Save the Children Norway
40. Jill Lovell	Projects Director, Mission Educate
41. Antonella Ludici	Operations Manager, AVSI

Name	Position, Organization
42. Tomás Pereira Maguru	Provincial Director for Education, Provincial Directorate of Education, Sofala
43. Kuziwa Makamanzi	Programme Manager, Food for the Hungry
44. Nelio Manjate	National Education Coordinator, Save the Children
45. Juan Nacho Martinez	Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Manager, UN-Habitat
46. Ventura Mazula	EiE Programme Officer, World Vision International, Beira
47. Florêncio Mbique	Provincial Coordinator, NUCODE
48. Joaquim Meque	Construction Unit staff member, Construction Unit, Provincial Directorate of Education, Sofala
49. Rafael Moreno	UNICEF, Sofala
50. Laura Morisio	Current Country Programme Director, AVSI
51. Dulce Domingos Mungoi	Programme Lead, UNESCO
52. Joaquim Ngomane	Education Officer, ADPP (Aid for the Development of People for People)
53. Abelardo Nhateve	SCI/COSACA, Beira
54. Emmaculate Paunde	Teacher, EPC Mussangadzi, Macate, Manica
55. Pita Penicela	School Headteacher, CAEPC CHINETE, Macate, Manica
56. Flavio Portugal	Construction Supervisor, Provincial Directorate of Education (PDE), CAEPC CHINETE, Macate, Manica
57. Pieter Potter	National Education Cluster Coordinator, UNICEF
58. Ivaldo Quincardete	Provincial Director of Education, Cabo Delgado
59. Elise Rafuse	Lead of the Education Team, Global Affairs Canada
60. Mariana Rocha	School Feeding Specialist, WFP
61. Reginaldo Rodrigues	Teacher, EPC Mussangadzi, Macate, Manica
62. Silvia Scholl	Field Manager, UN-Habitat
63. James Mateus Shamu	Head of the Construction Unit, Provincial Directorate of Education (PDE), Manica
64. Jess Shaver	Education Specialist, UNICEF Regional Office (ESARO)
65. Tomoko Shibuya	Chief Education Officer, UNICEF
66. Gina Alfiado Siteo	National Project Officer, UNESCO
67. Andreia Soares	EiE Adviser, Finnish Church Aid
68. Shelby Stapleton	Programme Manager, World Vision International
69. Nassone Titosse	Provincial Focal Point EiE, Provincial Directorate of Education, Manica
70. Hora Vasco	Member of School Council, CAEPC CHINETE, Macate, Manica
71. Natália Zacarias	Teacher, CAEPC CHINETE, Macate, Manica
72. Ziano José Zano	Community Leader, EPC Mussangadzi, Macate, Manica
73. Inácio Zaquias	School Council Chair, CAEPC CHINETE, Macate, Manica
74. Martina Zavagli	Previous Country Programme Director, AVSI
75. Benedita Zunguze	Focal Point for COVID-19, Provincial Directorate of Education, Sofala
76. Anilsa	Construction Unit staff member, Construction Unit, Provincial Directorate of Education, Sofala
77. Fabio	CARE/COSACA, Beira
Main evaluation phase: Nigeria case study	
1. Rukaiya Mohammed Abbas	Education Officer (vocational training), UNICEF, Borno
2. Hussaini Abdu	Country Director, Plan International

Name	Position, Organization
3. Folashade Adebayo	Communication/Report Officer, UNICEF, Borno
4. Olatunde Adekola	Senior Education Adviser, World Bank
5. Zulfiqar Ali	EiE Specialist, Plan International
6. Ngozi Amanze	Education Officer, UNESCO
7. William Anawaduwe	Education Officer, Gender Equality Peace and Development Centre (GEPaDC)
8. Taiye Babarinsa	Deputy Director (Humanitarian), Save the Children
9. Danlami Bashiru	Chair, UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Nigeria); Former President, Joint Association of Persons with Disabilities (JONAPWD)
10. Nwobu Clinton	Education Manager, Gender Equality Peace and Development Centre (GEPaDC)
11. Patricia Donli	Executive Director, Gender Equality Peace and Development Centre (GEPaDC)
12. Terry Durnnian	Former Chief of Education, UNICEF Nigeria
13. Malin Elisson	Chief of Field Support & Reporting; Nigeria Focal Point, ECW
14. Jake Epelle	National Convener, Albino Foundation
15. Susan Erb	Education in Emergencies/Senior Humanitarian Adviser – North East, DFID Nigeria
16. Stephen Gannon	EiE Adviser, Save the Children Norway
17. Lydia Giginna	Director, Education Support Services, Federal Ministry of Education
18. Judith Giwa-Amu	EiE WG Coordinator, UNICEF
19. Bala Hamidu Ibrahim	Director, Planning, State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB), Adamawa
20. Godwin Ilukhor	Education Officer, Basic Education, UNICEF, Borno
21. Abubakar Isah	Director, ICT and Chair, Ministerial Task Force on COVID-19 Response, Federal Ministry of Education
22. Masanso, Jacob	Former Head of Education, Save the Children Nigeria
23. Benjamin John	Programme Manager, ROHI
24. Kate-Anwuli Kanebi	International Cooperation Officer, EU Delegation to Nigeria
25. Graham Lang	Chief Education Officer, ECW
26. Mukhtar Liman	Education Officer (Out-of-School Children Programme), UNICEF, Borno
27. Eunice Muchilwa	Former Programme Manager, International Rescue Committee (IRC), north-east Nigeria
28. Badar Ikuwuta Musa	North East Education Cluster Coordinator, Save the Children
29. Rosemary Nwangwu	Education Officer, UNICEF
30. Denise O' Toole	Head of Education Section, USAID
31. Uche Onwuama	EiE WG Federal Ministry of Education Coordinator, Federal Ministry of Education
32. Amanze Onyedikachi	Education Programme Officer, UNESCO
33. Geoffrey Opira	Education-Sector Manager, Save the Children
34. Sarah Passa	Education Officer, American University of Nigeria
35. Amani Bwami Passy	North East Education Cluster Coordinator, UNICEF
36. Elizabeth Raymund	Education Manager, American University of Nigeria
37. Male Respondent	M&E Officer, ROHI

Name	Position, Organization
38. Abiola Sanusi	EiE WG, Chair of the EiE Working Group Sub-Committee for Safe Schools, Riplington Education Initiative (RAI)
39. Ibijoke Toluwase	MEAL Officer, Gender Equality Peace and Development Centre (GEPaDC)
40. Comfort Umahi	ECW 2018 FER Programme Manager, Plan International
41. Muhammad Umar	Senior Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Officer, American University of Nigeria
42. Marcello Viola	Programme Director, Street Child
Main evaluation phase: Colombia case study	
1. Zeinab Adam	ECW Secretariat Focal Point for Colombia
2. Ayse Kocak	EiE Cluster Co-Lead and FER Grantee; EiE Technical Advisor, Save the Children
3. Valerie Dourdin	Emergency Response Team Leader, Save the Children Colombia
4. Ana Maria Rodriguez	Education Specialist, UNICEF; Education Sector and EiE Cluster Lead, Grupo Interagencial sobre Flujos Migratorios Mixtos (GIFMM)
5. Pedro Cerdan-Infantes	Education Team Lead, World Bank
6. Manuel Fernandez Quilez	EU Delegation focal point, European Union
7. María Paula Martínez	Executive Director, Save the Children Colombia
8. Camilo Valenzuela	Education Coordinator, International Rescue Committee
9. Manuel Ospino	Education Official, Norwegian Refugee Council, Santa Marta (Magdalena)
10. Raquel Rangel	Education Officer, Norwegian Refugee Council, Villas del Rosario
11. Maritza Lucumi	Education Programme Manager, Norwegian Refugee Council
12. Carlos Vergara	Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, Norwegian Refugee Council
13. Yasmin Yesenia Castellanos	Protection Specialist/Coordinator, Early Childhood Development, Cucuta (Norte de Santander Department)
14. Katherine Maldonado	Protection and Gender Specialist/Coordinator ECW in Riohacha and Maicao (La Guajira Department)
15. María Paula Martínez	Executive Director, Save the Children Colombia
16. Camilo Rocha	Manager of Humanitarian Action, Plan
17. Rosemberg Parra	Manager for Crisis Response, World Vision International
18. Paula Alarcón	Monitoring and Evaluation, World Vision International
19. Julia Elsa Solano	Director, Corporación Infancia y Desarrollo (CID)
20. Carolina Perdomo	Deputy Director, Corporación Infancia y Desarrollo (CID)
21. Monica Hoyos	Programme Deputy Director, Corporación Infancia y Desarrollo (CID)
22. Mónica Mendoza	Educator (Focus Group Discussion with Educators in Norte de Santander)
23. María Fernanda Canal	Educator (Focus Group Discussion with Educators in Norte de Santander)
24. Johanna Ortega	Educator (Focus Group Discussion with Educators in Norte de Santander)
25. Gerard Gómez	Deputy Coordinator/Deputy Head of Mission for International Migration (GIFMM)
26. Federico Salcedo	Development Officer, Education, Embassy of Canada

Name	Position, Organization
27. Vicente Palacios	ECHO, EU Bogotá
28. Patricia de Narváez	Asesora en Asuntos Migratorios, Gerencia para la Respuesta a la Migración desde Venezuela
29. Ana White	Coordinator of GIFMM, UNHCR
30. Felipe Cortez	Focal Point for Migrant Issues, ICBF, National Institute of Family Welfare
31. Ariel Rivera	Programme Manager, Norwegian Refugee Council
32. Corita Tassi	Regional Emergency Expert, ECHO, EU Panamá
33. Patricia Pinto	Teacher in La Guajira, Centro Etnoeducativo el Paraíso sede Wakaipamana
34. Angelina Fuentes Amaya	Coordinator, Centro Etnoeducativo No. 5 (Focus Group Discussion with public school teachers in La Guajira)
35. Jorge Meza	Centro Etnoeducativo No. 1 Limoncito sede indígena María Concepción Epinayu (Focus Group Discussion with public school teachers in La Guajira)
36. Margarete Sachs-Israel	Regional Education Adviser & Education Sector Lead, UNICEF LACRO Panama
37. Ruth Custode	Regional Education Specialist, UNICEF LACRO Panama
38. Juan Pinzon	Education Specialist, UNICEF LACRO Panama
39. Julia Isabel Borrero	Teacher, Matacandela (Focus Group Discussion with public school teachers in Arauca)
40. Ramón Oswaldo Rincón	Art Teacher Escuela General Santander, sede Mira Mar (Focus Group Discussion with public school teachers in Arauca)
41. Tatiana Santafé	Programme Officer, Education in Emergencies, Save the Children, Arauca
42. Marisela Duran	Programme Officer, Education in Emergencies, Save the Children, Arauca
43. Sara Mestre	Adviser to the Viceminister of Basic Education, Government of Colombia
44. Peter Gape	National Director, World Vision
45. Nohora Leal Acevedo	Rector, IE Villas del Rosario (N. de Santander) – Maria Inmaculada School (Focus Group Discussion with School Principals and Secretariats of Education)
46. Ludwing Caicedo	School Principal in Santa Marta, Magdalena (Focus Group Discussion with School Principals and Secretariats of Education)
47. Jorge Adrian Rangel	Education in Emergencies Specialist, UNICEF in N. de Santander Department (Focus Group Discussion with School Principals and Secretariats of Education)
48. Roberto Munarryz	Quality Director, Secretaría de Educación (Focus Group Discussion with School Principals and Secretariats of Education)
49. Carmen Olmos	Professional Pedagogical Specialist, Plan
50. Alicia Herrera	Public School Teacher, Institución Educativa Mixta de Bayunca, Cartagena (Focus Group Discussion with public school teachers)
51. Cristian De Jesus Adión Angulo	Public School Teacher, Institución Educativa Santa Maria, Barranquilla (Focus Group Discussion with public school teachers)

Name	Position, Organization
52. Lisbet Maria Ojeda Cuello	Public School Teacher, Institución Educativa Santa Maria, Barranquilla (Focus Group Discussion with public school teachers)
53. Luis Caroprese	Emergency MEAL Coordinator, Save the Children Colombia
54. Alejandro Anaya	Adviser on Migration and Emergencies, Coverage and Equity Directorate, Ministry of Education, Government of Colombia
55. Fernando P Ramirez	US Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration, US State Department
56. Santiago Fernández de Soto	Ministry of Education, Government of Colombia
57. Diana Carolina Murcia	Ministry of Education, Government of Colombia
58. Solene Vade	M&E Coordinator, Plan Colombia
59. Valentina Zuluaga	Education in Emergencies Manager, Plan Colombia
60. Jorge Contreras	School Principal, Francisco José de Caldas (Focus Group Discussion with local coordination leads and school principals in Arauca)
61. Karen Molina	ACNUR/UNHCR, GIFMM (Focus Group Discussion with local coordination leads and school principals in Arauca)
62. Angela Amortegui	OIM/IOM (Focus Group Discussion with local coordination leads and school principals in Arauca)
63. Julian Cortes	Education in Emergencies Coordinator, Save the Children, Arauca
64. Arles Bello	MEAL Officer, Emergencies Venezuela, Save the Children, Arauca
65. Cecilia Morales	District Education Secretary Cartagena – Director of Quality (Focus Group Discussion with local education authorities and school principals, Cartagena)
66. Juan Carlos Castillo	Principal of Public School, Institución Educativa Mixta de Bayunca, (Focus Group Discussion with local education authorities and school principals, Cartagena)
67. María Gabriela Sastre	Official of UNICEF EiE, (Focus Group Discussion with local education authorities and school principals, Cartagena)
68. Constanza Liliana Alarcon	Vice-Minister of Basic Education, Ministry of Education, Government of Colombia
69. Lorena Crespo	Ministry of Education, Government of Colombia
70. Sara Mestre	Ministry of Education, Government of Colombia
71. Laura Ochoa	Technical Director of Early Childhood Development, ICBF, National Institute of Family Welfare, Government of Colombia
72. Graham Lang	Chief of Education, ECW Secretariat
Main evaluation phase: Niger case study	
1. Eddie Dutton	Education Specialist/Focal Point, ECW
2. Graham Lang	Head of Education, ECW
3. Patrick Likele Zangonda	Education Cluster Coordinator, UNICEF
4. Daouda Boureima	Focal Point for Emergencies, UNICEF
5. Arima Chegou	Focal Point for Emergencies, Ministry of Education
6. Murielle Pallares	Specialist, Child Protection in Emergencies, UNICEF
7. Ramatou Seydou Kalilou	Representative for Cluster-Education and Protection, Prime Minister's Office

Name	Position, Organization
8. Hinsa Garba	Director General of Education, Ministry of Secondary Education
9. Issoufou Kasso	Assistant Director, Maradi Region
10. Ousmane Issifi Moumouni	Departmental Director of Secondary Education, Gotheye
11. Alhassane Issoufou	Primary School Inspector, Gotheye
12. Maman Moutari Dan Tawey	Inspector, Chadakori
13. Amadou Mahamadou	Inspector, Guidan Roumji Department
14. Adamou Hamani	Representative, CONCERN, Tillabéri
15. Inspecteur Ayorou	Inspector, Ayorou
16. Niandou Abdoul Karim	Focal Point for Education, Regional Council, Tillabéri
17. Stephen Gannon	Senior Donor Adviser, ECW, Save the Children Norway
18. Sian Long	Education in Emergencies Adviser, Save the Children
19. Bruno Fugah	Head of Programs, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)
20. Idrissa Abdou	Education Cordinator, NRC, Maradi
21. David Tambou	Education Cordinator, NRC, Maradi
22. Alio Maidaji	COVID-19 FER Contact Person/Business Development Manager, Plan International
23. Samaila Salifou	Business Development Specialist, Plan International
24. Hassane Hamadou	Project Manager, Plan International
25. Mme Adamou Haza	Acting ECW Focal Point, Plan Niger
26. Cecilia Meynet	Currently Education Cluster Coordinator in Mali (ex-EiE Specialist, WCA regional office), UNICEF
27. Cecilia Baldeh	Regional Education Adviser, West and Central Africa, UNICEF
28. Koffi Akakpo	COVID-19 FER Contact Person/Head of Program, World Food Program/PAM
29. Maman Rabi Garba Alfa Bano	Contact person COVID-19 FER/Education Technical Program Manager, World Vision
30. Bertrand	Grant Manager, World Vision
31. Zakari Saley	Field Officer, World Vision, Maradi
32. Charlotte Berquin	Regional Bureau for West and Central Africa, Protection Service, UNHCR
33. Soumane Hassane	Responsible for Education, COOPI
34. Abdourahamene Chaibou	Project Manager, ECW Tillabéri, COOPI
35. Zucchelli Morena	Director, COOPI
36. Jean Christophe Gerard	Education Coordinator, Concern Niger
37. Issoufa Halidou	Education Programme Lead, Concern
38. Mohamed Ilhidji	Coordinator, Investir dans l'Enfance (IED)
39. Saroumou Mahamadou	Director of Administration, IED
40. Tracy Sprott	Office Manager, EU ECHO
41. Amadou Alzouma	Education Specialist, EU Echo
42. Ed Lamot	Focal Point Niger, Global Partnership for Education
43. Hamidou Iissaka	School Principal, SAYA, Gotheye/Tillabéri
44. Abdou Harouna	School Principal, Garin Kaka

Annex 3 Evaluation Methodology

Evaluation approach and instruments

1. The evaluation is a formative, qualitative evaluation against the evaluation criteria, to assess the degree to which the FER modality is contributing to restoring education functions in sudden onset and escalating crises. The evaluation assesses the FER modality, its application and its outcomes at the global, regional/country and project/grantee level.
2. The evaluation was affected by the global COVID-19 pandemic. Firstly, the scope of the evaluation was adapted to include the first ECW COVID-19 FER response round, to ensure that the results of the evaluation are fully relevant to ECW. Data collection and team synthesis processes were also affected by the global pandemic: most data collection was virtual through distance interviews and communication, although some in-person site visits were possible in the case studies.

Theory of change


3. The evaluation is theory-based, meaning that it investigates whether ECW's theories of how the FERs will result in systemic and beneficiary outcomes at country level are valid – and, in particular, it assesses whether the assumptions, explicit or implicit, that were made in designing the FER, hold in practice.
4. The FER theory of change (TOC) is based on the overall ECW theory of change, as set out in the Strategic Plan 2018–2022. The TOC was formulated by the evaluation team after inception phase discussions with the ECW Secretariat and presented in the inception report. The TOC, the basis for the evaluation, is presented below in Figure 14.
5. The FER TOC shows the following:
 - It shows the ECW overall global results chain and operations and illustrates that the global ECW inputs, outputs and systemic outcomes (the vertically arranged results chain on top) are expected to contribute at two levels to FER implementation at country level, namely by providing the underpinning for (i) country- or FER-specific inputs (the yellow column on the left of the country FER results chain); and (ii) country systemic outcomes, including by influencing the emergency coordination and capacity context within which the country emergency occurs.
 - It shows that besides the country emergency capacities and funding context, the pre-crisis country context is also an important determinant of both systemic and beneficiary outcomes.
 - It shows that the intermediate first country output from ECW FER inputs is expected to be a rapid, joint, inclusive and coordinated response (the second – green – column of the country outputs chain), as a result of the FER inputs, but also of the context.
 - It shows that the FER processes are expected to contribute to the systemic outcomes at country level, which should also be influenced by the global efforts of ECW.
 - It shows that if this output is in place, ECW's theory is that with FER financing and further capacity support (via ECW but also via the global EiEPC and country EiEPC system), the FER-financed projects will be implemented (the third – green – column

of the country results chain), leading to the targeted outputs from the FER grants. ECW FER inputs in this process are not just the financing, but also its own financial and results monitoring processes and feedback.

- Finally, it shows that if these outputs are at a sufficient level, targeted well and designed well, they are expected to contribute to the achievement of country beneficiary results.
- These in turn will aggregate up to contribute on ECW's global result targets and goals, with a feedback loop into ECW's global systemic outcomes, including on the role of education in humanitarian situations, political commitment and incremental growth in resource commitments to EiEPC. There is also a feedback loop to strengthened global EiEPC systems, as lessons learnt through country FERs translate into global knowledge on EiEPC responses and ECW's FER modality.

6. The key assumptions of the TOC that were tested are shown in the white circles in Figure 14. Their positioning in the TOC is only approximate and the sequencing of numbers unimportant, but some refer more clearly to the relationship between inputs and activities, and between activities and outputs, and so on.

Figure 14 Generic FER theory of change



7. The key assumptions are as follows:

1. Capacities at the global level will translate directly through ECW-centred mechanisms and indirectly through other mechanisms of the global EiEPC system, into a more enabling environment and improved capacities at country level, including additional funding for education from other sources.

2. ECW selects the right emergencies to respond to, so that the most vulnerable crisis-affected boys and girls, and youth, are assisted
3. The ECW Secretariat provides relevant support to country design and implementation processes, including ensuring that the micro-assessments provide a good enough assessment of grantees and risks, so that country capacities to plan, implement and monitor are developed in time to affect the quality of the FER proposal, its legitimacy and its implementation.
4. Country coordination mechanisms are sufficiently inclusive and transparent to result in legitimate, country-owned applications/FERs. The funding provided by the FERs will act as an incentive to mobilize EiEPC actors to provide a coordinated response to the emergency
5. The FER templates and Q&A strike the right balance between enabling a rapid response and improving the quality of the FERs.
6. There is a minimum of country data available, and enough information about the needs of affected populations, including the most vulnerable.
7. The country coordination mechanism/EiEPC actors have made an effort to understand the needs and priorities of affected populations, especially women and girls and the most marginalized and vulnerable populations, and the design responds to these needs.
8. Grantees and sub-grantees are sufficiently diverse and can reach the most vulnerable affected population.
9. Grantees have or develop sufficient capacity through ECW and other support, to implement the FER in gender- and human-rights-sensitive ways, and to provide accurate and timely reports and collect results data.
10. The right projects/interventions and grantees were chosen by the country coordination mechanism or in the country FER application process.
11. The right outputs were achieved at sufficient thresholds and in a timely manner to deliver beneficiary results.

Evaluation criteria

8. The TOR require the assessment of the FER modality on its relevance/appropriateness, reach/coverage, efficiency, effectiveness, and coherence/connectedness. Table 18 below provides definitions for each of these criteria, drawing on the revised definitions of the evaluation criteria drawn up by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD DAC)⁴⁶ and the criteria for the evaluation of humanitarian programmes devised by the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP).⁴⁷

Table 18 Evaluation criteria

Relevance/Appropriateness	This refers to the extent to which the objectives and design
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⁴⁶ OECD DAC, 2019.

⁴⁷ ALNAP, 2016.

<p><i>Is FER doing the right things?</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • of the FER modality and FERs <i>respond</i> to the global EiEPC needs, and ECW objectives, policies and priorities; • of the activities funded by FERs <i>respond</i> to local needs, including the differentiated needs of affected (most vulnerable) boys and girls; <p>and the degree to which they continue to do so if circumstances change. 'Respond to' includes that the objectives and design of the intervention are sensitive to the economic, environmental, equity, social, political economy, and capacity conditions in which it takes place. The criterion looks at trade-offs between priorities or needs in context.</p>
<p>Reach/Coverage</p> <p><i>Does FER reach the right people?</i></p>	<p>The extent to which major crisis-affected child population groups facing life-threatening suffering and significant exclusion from education were reached by the FER modality or the FERs.</p>
<p>Efficiency</p> <p><i>Does the FER use resources well?</i></p>	<p>The extent to which the FER modality and projects deliver, or are likely to deliver, results in an economic and timely way. The criterion looks at inputs (funds, expertise, natural resources, etc.) relative to the entire results chain (outputs, outcomes and impacts). Economic refers to the conversion of inputs into results in a cost-effective manner in context. This may include assessing operational efficiency (how well the intervention was managed).</p>
<p>Effectiveness</p> <p><i>Is the FER achieving its objectives?</i></p>	<p>The extent to which the FER modality and FERs achieved or are expected to achieve the targeted objectives and systemic and beneficiary results, including any differential results across groups. This includes the extent to which the FER modality adds value (particularly beyond its own financing) to the role of education in humanitarian situations at country, regional and global levels. This includes value added to ECW's systemic objectives and to mobilization of overall incremental financing of EiEPC.</p>
<p>Coherence/Connectedness</p> <p><i>How well does the FER fit?</i></p>	<p>The extent to which</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the FER modality is compatible with other interventions at the global level (external coherence) and connected to the other ECW modalities so that longer-term and interconnected problems are taken into account (internal coherence and connectedness); • the FERs are internally coherent, and compatible with other interventions at country level; and • the FERs are consistent with international and national norms and standards and take longer-term and interconnected problems at the country level into account.

Evaluation questions and evaluation framework

9. The evaluation framework streamlined the TOR questions into a more manageable set of evaluation questions. The framework is provided below. The framework was applied in assessing the FER modality and its implementation at regional and country level through the various FERs of 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020 (including the COVID-19 FERs approved by the end of April 2020).

Table 19 Evaluation framework and questions

KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
Relevance/ Appropriateness <i>Is the FER modality the right thing? Are the FERs doing the right things?</i>		
EQ 1. How relevant and appropriate are the FER modality and the approved FER proposals?		
<p>1.1. To what extent is the FER modality likely to add value to education in emergencies responses by design? How?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is the FER model the right choice for achieving the objective of restoring education in sudden onset and escalating emergencies, reaching the most marginalized and vulnerable? • Does its design succeed in not only not competing with, but adding to other funds? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the global and country humanitarian and education context, and changing context, the design of the FER modality, is relevant because it adds value, by <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Facilitating the mobilization of resources that would not have been mobilized otherwise for immediate and rapid responses; ○ Ensuring non-competition and complementarity that adds value with implementing agencies for programming funds in immediate and rapid responses; ○ Facilitating joint planning and close collaboration amongst all actors on the ground in immediate and rapid responses ○ Promoting the centrality of education in crises on the global stage ○ Bridging the gap between humanitarian and development actors from the early stages of emergencies and/or ○ Reaching the furthest behind with special emphasis on equity, girls and women, and the well-being and safety of its beneficiaries ○ Promote context and crisis sensitivity ○ Promote the localization agenda 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comparison with like funds • Global Interviews with donors and humanitarian and development actors • Country case study research: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Interviews with country coordination mechanism leads and partners ○ Interviews with country humanitarian actors ○ Interviews with local key informants (KIs) ○ Interviews with grantees
<p>1.2. To what extent are the FERs appropriate to local needs and conditions?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The FERs are tailored to or respond to the most urgent immediate differentiated learning and education needs of affected girls, women, boys and men in context, to 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comparison with like funds • Country case study research: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Interview with ECW FER focal point

KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent did the FER modality respond to the immediate learning/education needs of boys/men and girls/women, including persons with disabilities in different emergency contexts? • Were the choices of grantees the correct ones given country context and needs, and why (not)? • Did ECW apply its Standard Operating Procedures sufficiently flexibly to adjust the FER appropriately to country and emergency-related circumstances and need? 	<p>continue/restore access to education that is safe and equitable, as identified in a credible need assessment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The choices of grantees balanced Grand Bargain commitments to localization and reaching the most vulnerable women/girls and boys/men with the need for fast disbursements and accountability for resources used and results, in the country context. • The FER design allows sufficient flexibility to adjust standard operating procedures and requirements to country needs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Interviews with government ○ Interviews with country coordination mechanism leads and partners ○ In regional crisis countries, interviews with regional coordination leads ○ Interviews with country humanitarian actors ○ Interviews with local KIs, including organizations representing women or people with disability, or working on gender, disabilities, mental health etc. ○ Study of country background documentation and data, humanitarian response and education needs assessments and plans ○ Study of FER documentation and communication trails • Additional project desk reviews <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Study of country background documentation and data, needs analysis, humanitarian response and education plans ○ Study of FER documentation and communication trails ○ Interview with selected actors • Analysis of global project database (flexibility and consultation) • Grantee survey (flexibility)

KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
<p>1.3. How relevant is the support provided by ECW and its Secretariat towards the design and implementation of FER grants so as to achieve collective outcomes?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Across the FERs the support provided by ECW responds to the needs of country actors, including grantees, and is tailored towards enabling actors to achieve targeted collective outcomes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As above • Grantee survey
<p>Coverage/Reach <i>Does the FER modality reach the right people?</i></p>		
<p>EQ 2. Is the coverage/reach of the FER portfolio optimal? Why (not)?</p>		
<p>2.1. Does the FER portfolio focus on the most urgent education crises?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The FERs provide a response in areas of the globe where education is most affected by conflict and disaster, prospectively and retrospectively <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ FER responses versus L1, L2 and L3 emergencies (UNICEF, UNHCR and IASC lists) taking into account new displacements / increasing number of children out of school • There are not “forgotten crises” where FERs should also or rather have been in place. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Global Interviews with donors and humanitarian and development actors • Follow-up interviews with ECW Secretariat • Review of global & country documentation on humanitarian crises 2017-2020; and documentation on country education status and needs • Comparison study • Review of ECW documentation • Financial analysis of FER funding flows in comparison with overall humanitarian flows
<p>2.2. To what extent does the FER modality reach the most marginalized and vulnerable unable to access education and learning otherwise proportionate to their needs? Why? And Why not?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The choices made in FERs reach the most marginalized and vulnerable, including girls and adolescent women, minorities, children with disabilities and youth, in any crisis where it provides funding • Those reached are assisted to access education equitably – including by taking into account in line core standards for EiE (e.g. INEE Minimum Standards and IASC Guidelines) and ECW policies and standards – according to their differentiated: 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Country case study research: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Study of country background documentation and (disaggregated) data, humanitarian response and education needs assessments and plans ○ Study of FER documentation and communication trails ○ Interview with ECW FER focal point ○ Interviews with government

KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Psycho-social needs ○ Needs on account of disabilities ○ Needs on account of gender ○ Relative urgency of learning needs <p>The evaluation’s ability to assess this criterion may be limited by availability of baseline information on needs at the time of initiating the FERs.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Identify common context factors contributing to reaching/not reaching the most vulnerable according to need <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ within ○ outside <p>the control of the cluster coordination mechanism</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Identify common ECW factors contributing to reaching/not reaching the most vulnerable according to need in the FERs? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Interviews with country coordination mechanism leads and partners ○ Interviews/FGDs with country humanitarian actors ○ Interviews/FGDs with local KIs, including from NGOs, academia and education sector experts (including organizations representing marginalized groups or working on issues such as gender or disability) ○ Additional project desk reviews ○ Study of country background documentation and data, humanitarian response and education needs assessments and plans ○ Study of FER documentation and communication trails ○ Database analysis
<p>Coherence/Connectedness <i>How well do the FERs fit? How well do they take long-term and connected problems into account?</i></p>		
<p>EQ 3. Are the FERs coherent with the humanitarian system and connected to development efforts? Why (not)?</p>		
<p>3.1. To what extent is the FER investment linked to and aligned with humanitarian response plans (HRPs) and other relevant policy frameworks (such as IASC and INEE frameworks)?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The FER projects, activities and results targets do not contradict and do align with the same in HRPs ● The FER projects are conflict-sensitive, do no harm, and links to peace-building efforts in conflicts ● The FER projects and activities align / are not contradictory to global and country relevant policy frameworks <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ E.g. country education strategic plans, education laws and policies; ○ Global education targets and standards, such as IASC and INEE frameworks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Country case study research: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Interviews/FGDs with ECW FER focal point; government actors; country coordination mechanism leads and partners; country humanitarian actors; local KIs, including from NGOs, academia and education sector, gender, MHPSS and protection experts; grantees ○ Study of country background documentation (socio-economic

KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
		<p>policies, plans and assessment) and data, humanitarian and education needs assessments and response plans</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Study of country coordination mechanism and FER documentation and communication trails ○ Additional project desk reviews ○ Study of country background documentation and data, humanitarian response and education needs assessments and plans ○ Study of FER documentation and communication trails ○ Interview with country focal point and country mechanism coordinator ○ FGD with selected country partners ○ Comparison study
<p>3.2. To what extent do the FER funds align, collaborate with and add value to other sources of funding (government, other donors or NGOs), especially development funding?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is complementarity (additionality/non-duplication and not contradictory) between the FERs and projects and activities funded for affected populations by other sources of funding so that the most urgent needs of those targeted are funded 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Country case study research: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Interviews/FGDs with ECW FER focal point; government actors; country coordination mechanism leads and partners; country humanitarian actors; local KIs, including from NGOs, academia and education sector, gender, MHPSS and protection experts; grantees ○ Study of country background documentation (socio-economic policies, plans and assessment) and data, humanitarian and education needs assessments and response plans

KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Study of country coordination mechanism and FER documentation and communication trails • Comparison study
<p>3.3. To what extent did the FERs short-term emergency nature take longer-term and interconnected institutional/systemic problems into account (i.e. resilience) during its design and execution?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The FERs’ needs analysis includes a review/an analysis of long-term and interconnected institutional/systemic problems into account • Disaster risk reduction is integrated into the FERs to the maximum extent given their nature, time frame and context • The FER projects included effective efforts not to make these problems worse through choices of delivery modes and their implementation • The FER projects included effective interventions to address these problems within financial and time constraints where possible 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Country case study research: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Interviews/FGDs with ECW FER focal point; government actors; country coordination mechanism leads and partners; country humanitarian actors; local KIs, including from NGOs, academia and education sector, gender, MHPSS and protection experts; grantees ○ Study of country background documentation (socio-economic policies, plans and assessment) and data, humanitarian and education needs assessments and response plans ○ Study of country coordination mechanism and FER documentation and communication trails • Additional project desk reviews <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Study of country background documentation and data, humanitarian response and education needs assessments and plans ○ Study of FER documentation and communication trails ○ Interview with country focal point and country mechanism coordinator ○ FGD with selected country partners

KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Follow-up interviews with ECW Secretariat, donors and Global Education Cluster coordinators • Comparison study
<p>3.4. Do the MYRPs build on the FERs?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is appropriate continuation from the FERs into the MYRPs so that gains made under the FERs are made more sustainable 	<p>For countries with MYRPs and FERs</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Country case study research: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Interviews/FGDs with ECW FER focal point; government actors; country coordination mechanism leads and partners; country humanitarian actors; local KIs, including from NGOs, academia and education sector, gender, MHPSS and protection experts; grantees ○ Study of country background documentation (socio-economic policies, plans and assessment) and data, humanitarian and education needs assessments and response plans ○ Study of country coordination mechanism and FER documentation and communication trails • Additional project desk reviews <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Study of country background documentation and data, humanitarian response and education needs assessments and plans ○ Study of FER documentation and communication trails ○ Interview with country focal point and country coordinator • Follow-up interviews with ECW Secretariat, global education actors,

KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
		donors and Global Education Cluster coordinators
<p>3.5. Is ECW learning in the FERs? Is evidence from the FERs used for learning and improvement, also through coherence with the AF?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internally within a FER/project/grant? • Externally, through the AF, so that lessons learned from the FER were used to support global knowledge development, exchange and learning and vice versa? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The FER processes have active feedback loops so that improvements can be observed over the lifetime of a FER, and between FERs and countries • All most relevant lessons learnt from the FER were used through the AF and other ECW or global processes to effectively support global knowledge development • Improvements can be observed to the FER model and processes based on global knowledge exchange, including through the AF 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis of AF activities and outputs • Country case study interviews • Grantee survey • Global follow-up interviews
<p>Efficiency <i>Were FER resources used well?</i></p>		
<p>EQ 4. Are the FERs managed in an efficient, timely and transparent manner?</p>		
<p>4.1. Do countries become aware of potential ECW funding in a timely, clear and transparent manner?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The cluster coordination lead and all appropriate country partners, and the global cluster leads, are aware of the availability of ECW/FER funding within 2 days of the crisis being signaled • There is clear communication on ECW and the FER purpose, approach and position in the humanitarian context • The communication of fund availability is clear and all appropriate partners are aware in a timely manner, of how the FER application process will be managed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Follow-up global interviews with Global Education Cluster co-coordinators • Country case study research: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Interview with ECW FER focal point ○ Interviews with government ○ Interviews with country coordination mechanism leads and partners ○ Interviews/FGDs with country humanitarian actors ○ Interviews/FGDs with selected relevant national organizations that are not formally part of the coordination mechanism (e.g. gender / MHPSS / protection groups)

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		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Study of FER and project documentation and communication trails ○ Comparison study
<p>4.2. Are design, contracting, implementation and reporting/monitoring processes of the FERs timely, transparent and cost-effective in practice?</p>	<p>Transparency:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The guidelines for FERs are clear and well understood by country partners; reasons for deviating from guidelines are explained to all relevant stakeholder and understood • All communication is documented and all partners know what decisions were made by whom, when and why <p>Cost-effective design and contracting:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Each of the processes required for a FER from the onset of a crisis to disbursement of funds is necessary, cost-effective and as short as possible to add value in ensuring appropriate, immediate and rapid funding for education in sudden onset and escalating emergencies. Value addition may be in terms of, for example <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Clarity, transparency and good governance ○ Better alignment with the humanitarian existing processes and architecture ○ Better funding allocations ○ Better reach of the most vulnerable and marginalized, including girls and adolescent women ○ Better protection and well-being of the reached beneficiaries ○ Fiduciary, programmatic and safeguarding risk management • Each of the processes required in implementing a FER (procurement, reporting, checks and audits, 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comparison study • Country case study research: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Interviews with ECW FER focal point; government actors; country coordination mechanism leads and partners; country humanitarian actors; local KIs, including from NGOs, academia and education sector, gender, MHPSS and protection experts; grantees ○ Study of country coordination mechanism and FER documentation and communication trails • Survey of grantees • Additional project desk reviews <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Study of country background documentation and data, humanitarian response and education needs assessments and plans ○ Interview with country mechanism coordinator ○ FGD with selected country partners ○ Study of FER documentation and communication trails • Financial analysis of FER funding flows

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	<p>monitoring, feedback and review) is necessary, cost effective and adds value in terms of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Economy and efficiency in resource use ○ Risk management ○ Accountability for resources and results, or ○ Learning <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Across countries and FERs differences in the time taken can be linked to value-add factors 	
<p>4.3. Given cross-country and country evidence, could the FERs' results have been delivered more cost-effectively?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● In the country case studies, there is not enough credible evidence that more cost-effective means to deliver the achieved results were available when the FER was designed and procurements made ● Apparent differences in the cost of outputs between FERs, projects and grantees within a country (and similar outputs of FERs across countries) can be explained by <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Difficulty in context of reaching the most vulnerable and marginalized ○ The availability of human resources and supplies in context / the shortest length of supply chains ○ ECW commitments to the protection of reached beneficiaries, and manages safeguarding risks ○ ECW commitments to localization ● The administrative costs of the ECW Secretariat and UNICEF as fund manager are not excessive 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Country case study research (on cost-drivers in responses and availability of alternative means of delivering results): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Interviews/FGDs with ECW FER focal point; country coordination mechanism leads and partners; country humanitarian actors; local KIs from education sector; grantees ○ Study of country coordination mechanism and FER documentation and communication trails ● The analysis of the FER project database, more in-depth study of selected projects, and financial analysis of FER funding flows (for cross-country FER efficiency comparisons) insofar data is conducive ● Comparator study (not on project data, but only on administrative overheads, insofar information is available)
<p>Effectiveness: <i>Were ECW able to deliver the results chain from inputs to outputs, and contribute to systemic and beneficiary outcomes?</i></p>		
<p>EQ 5. Do ECW's fund mobilization efforts support FERs, and have the FERs contributed to education in humanitarian situations at country, regional and global levels?</p>		

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<p>5.1. To what extent has ECW's global and national advocacy and resource mobilization efforts facilitated the quality of funding for EiE, including specifically the (i) design, (ii) implementation, and (iii) co-financing of the FER in countries?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is evidence that ECW's global and in-country advocacy and resource mobilization efforts have contributed to better FER design and implementation, including through <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Ensuring global and country political commitment to education in emergencies, and facilitating coordination ○ Ensuring that design and implementation processes are appropriately financed/supported ○ Ensuring that enough technical expertise is available to advise on FER projects and grantees at global and country level ○ Ensuring awareness and understanding of ECW and FER at country level to ease FER design and implementation ○ ECW's global and in-country advocacy and resource mobilization efforts have facilitated (potential) co-financing of the FERs in countries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis of ECW and FER financial flows (including to case study countries) • Key informant interviews <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ ECW Secretariat ○ Global EiE actors and donors ○ Implementing agencies • Country case studies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Interviews with ECW FER focal point; government actors; country coordination mechanism leads and partners; country humanitarian actors; local KIs, grantees • Survey of grantees
<p>5.2. What effect have ECW FER funds had on the role of education in humanitarian situations globally, regionally and at country level, and the mobilization of additional resources for EiE to date, on a global and/or country level?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The FERs have enabled ECW to raise funds globally or in-country • The FERs have had an effect beyond ECW's own funding on the commitment to including education in emergency responses, and has resulted in additional funding for EiE. • ECW funds, including for FERs, are additional so that ECW/FERs do not compete with other modalities or displaced funding that would have gone to implementing agencies in any case 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis of ECW and FER financial flows, as well as global flows to humanitarian situations • Analysis of available data on other humanitarian flows including to education. • Global Interviews with donors and humanitarian and development actors • Follow-up interviews with ECW Secretariat • Country case studies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Interviews with ECW FER focal point; government actors; country coordination mechanism leads and partners (including implementing agencies); country humanitarian actors; local KI

KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
<p>EQ 6. Systemic outcomes: Did the FER modality and the FERs promote a rapid, timely, joint, coordinated and inclusive approach to EiE in countries towards the achievement of country outcomes? Why (not)?</p>		
<p>6.1. Were the FERs designed, implemented and monitored in a joint, coordinated and inclusive manner between country partners?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent are the required actors (government, UN, CSOs, humanitarian and development) consulted in the design, planning and MEAL of interventions • Did the FERs contribute to a more coordinated response overall? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The FERs represent a coordinated and inclusive approach to rapidly responding to education needs in sudden onset and escalating emergencies because: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The country coordination mechanism is inclusive of all important partners directly (serving in) or indirectly (consultation and information flows) ○ Important actors are drawn meaningfully into FER design and implementation even if not formally part of the country coordinating mechanism or FER Steering Committee ○ Country choices of grantees and projects show an effort by the country coordination mechanism and ECW to make best choices ○ The FER Steering Committee appropriately balances cluster partners and connects well to the country coordination mechanism ○ Reporting, monitoring and review processes on the FERs promote mutual accountability between ECW, the country coordination partners and the grantees at country level • Local actors have ownership of FER choices, projects and activities, as demonstrated by local leadership, coordination, oversight/accountability in the design and implementation of the FER projects. • The FER processes have led to better coordination amongst actors in EiE. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Country case study research: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Interviews/FGDs with ECW FER focal point; government actors; country coordination mechanism leads and partners; country humanitarian actors; local KIs, including from NGOs, academia and education sector, gender, MHPSS and protection experts; grantees ○ Study of country background documentation (socio-economic policies, plans and assessment) and data, humanitarian and education needs assessments and response plans ○ Study of country coordination mechanism and FER documentation and communication trails • Additional project desk reviews <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Study of country background documentation and data, humanitarian response and education needs assessments and plans ○ Study of FER documentation and communication trails ○ Interview with country focal point and country mechanism coordinator ○ FGD with selected country partners • Global Interviews with donors and humanitarian and development actors • Follow-up interviews with ECW Secretariat

KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
<p>6.2. How effectively were voices of affected populations including girls and women and persons with disabilities considered in the planning, implementation and monitoring of the FER projects?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The country needs assessment/the design of the education response and/or the FER design processes include effective means of engaging with the priorities and needs of affected populations, including girls/women and persons with disabilities • During implementation, the views of affected populations, including girls/women and persons with disabilities, are collected as a check on the effects of FER projects on them 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Survey of grantees • Country case study research: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Interviews/FGDs with ECW FER focal point; government actors; country coordination mechanism leads and partners; country humanitarian actors; local KIs, including from NGOs, academia and education sector, gender, MHPSS and protection experts; grantees ○ Study of country humanitarian and education needs assessments and response plans, and data ○ Study of country coordination mechanism and FER documentation and communication trails • Additional project desk reviews <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Study of humanitarian response and education needs assessments and plans; FER documentation and communication trails ○ Interview with country focal point and country mechanism coordinator • Analysis of project database (FER needs assessments, reports and communication trails) • Comparison study • Survey of grantees
<p>6.3. Were the FERs sufficiently rapid and timely? Why (not)?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The FER design processes were completed within eight weeks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis of FER fund flows and analysis of the global project database • Comparison study

KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Where funds were not disbursed to grantees within eight weeks (or earlier where possible or needed) of the humanitarian system signalling an emergency, there were justifiable reasons, e.g. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ No existing coordination mechanism ○ Delays in the formulation of an HRP / education response plan ○ Delays in agreeing the FER at country level fully outside ECW's control ○ Grantee delays despite UNICEF/ECW interventions • Consequences of being rapid, could be justified by the urgency of needs • Where delays occurred, the consequences to restoring access to education for crisis-affected boys and girls were minimal or justifiable 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Country case study research: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Process timeline of the country FERs ○ Study of country coordination mechanism and FER documentation and communication trails ○ Study of country background documentation on formulation of humanitarian and education needs assessments and response plans ○ Interviews/FGDs with ECW FER focal point; government actors; country coordination mechanism leads and partners; country humanitarian actors; local KIs, including from the education sector, gender, MHPSS and protection experts; grantees • Additional project desk reviews <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Study of country humanitarian response and education needs assessments and plans ○ Study of FER documentation and communication trails ○ Interview with country focal point and country mechanism coordinator ○ FGD with selected country partners • Follow-up interviews of email queries to country focal points other than country case studies and desk reviews, where project database analysis show long processes

EQ 7. Systemic outcomes: Has ECW strengthened country capacities for effective immediate and rapid response to the education needs of affected populations, especially girls/women and the most marginalized through the FERs? Why (not)?

KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
<p>7.1. Has the in-country institutional (coordination groups/clusters) and organizational capacity of grantees and local partners to assess, plan, implement, monitor/report, and evaluate EiE interventions improved due to ECW support?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordination groups/clusters and local partners, including grantees, are more able to assess, plan, implement, monitor/report and evaluate EiE interventions, especially, rapid responses reaching affected populations, especially girls/women and the most marginalized • Country FER processes and choices of grantees and projects show an effort by the country coordination mechanism and ECW to build the capacity of local actors to respond • FER grantees, especially local grantees, became more able to deliver projects, activities and results as planned over the lifetime of the FERs • Capacity building support to country institutional actors included effective support and capacity building on INEE Minimum Standards and strengthening national EiE standards 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Country case study research: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Interviews/FGDs with ECW FER focal point; government actors; country coordination mechanism leads and partners; country humanitarian actors; local KIs, including from NGOs, academia and education sector, gender, MHPSS and protection experts; grantees ○ Study of country background documentation (socio-economic policies, plans and assessment) and data, humanitarian and education needs assessments and response plans ○ Study of country coordination mechanism and FER documentation and communication trails • Additional project desk reviews <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Study of country background documentation and data, humanitarian response and education needs assessments and plans ○ Study of FER documentation and communication trails ○ Interview with country focal point and country mechanism coordinator ○ FGD with selected country partners • Global interviews with the Global Education Cluster • Comparison study • Follow-up interviews with ECW Secretariat • Survey of grantees

KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
<p>7.2. To what extent have the FERs contributed to building the capacity of national authorities?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FER design and implementation processes, analysis and/or engagement have contributed to the capacity of national authorities to plan, coordinate, implement, monitor, review and/or evaluate EiE responses 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Country case study research: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Interviews/FGDs with ECW FER focal point; government actors; country coordination mechanism leads and partners; country humanitarian actors; local KIs, including from NGOs, academia and education sector, gender, MHPSS and protection experts; grantees ○ Study of country background documentation (socio-economic policies, plans and assessment) and data, humanitarian and education needs assessments and response plans ○ Study of country coordination mechanism and FER documentation and communication trails
<p>EQ 8. Beneficiary outcomes: How effective are the FERs in restoring access to quality education that is safe and equitable in sudden onset and escalating emergencies? Why (not?)</p>		
<p>8.1. Did the FERs contribute to restoring safer, equitable access to education for crisis-affected boys and girls?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A strong contribution from the FERs can be argued to (disaggregated) country results on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Improved access and retention for FER targeted and otherwise most marginalized children including girls and children with disabilities ○ Addressing the different education needs of girls and boys, including the most vulnerable and those with disabilities, and those in displaced populations (refugee/IDPs) ○ The creation of safe learning environment, including the protection from education-related (gender-based) violence, and the provision of psycho-social support to the target groups. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis of project database and ECW results data (gender disaggregated) • Follow-up interviews with ECW Secretariat • Country case study research: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Interviews / FGDs with ECW FER focal point; government actors; country coordination mechanism leads and partners; country humanitarian actors; local KIs, including from NGOs, academia and education sector, gender, MHPSS and protection experts; grantees

KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The FERs have effectively implemented INEE minimum standards for EiE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Study of country background documentation (socio-economic policies, plans and assessment) and data, humanitarian and education needs assessments and response plans
<p>8.2. Relative to the scope of the FERs, did their design and implementation promote a holistic approach to quality education and learning?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The FERs in their design, implementation and reporting have exploited all opportunities to improve holistic learning outcomes (literacy, numeracy, social-emotional learning) for all children targeted by the intervention, including girls and children with disabilities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Study of country coordination mechanism and FER documentation and communication trails Grantee survey
<p>8.3. To what degree have FERs mainstreamed, integrated and/or targeted gender throughout all steps of the investment cycle to ensure that education services are provided, with attention to children’s and adults’ safety, dignity and equal access?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The FER process, throughout the investment cycle – from needs assessment, through approval, implementation and reporting/monitoring of grants at global and country level – paid effective attention to gender 	
<p>8.4. Have there been any unintended positive or negative side-effects on beneficiaries because of the aid that was provided under the FER; and if so, how was this dealt with by the implementing partners?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unintended positive and negative side-effects refer to effects from a FER-funded intervention that were not foreseen, such as when interventions result in schools that are not safe places or positive effects when learning quality increases even if not explicitly aimed for 	
<p>EQ 9. Recommendations</p>		
<p>EQ 10. How can the FER modality be improved? The questions below highlight areas in which the TORs specifically require recommendations. Additional areas will be covered under the recommendations, drawing on the evaluation findings and conclusions.</p>		
<p>10.1. Is there a better modality concept to rapidly restore equitable access to quality education in sudden onset and escalating emergencies?</p>		

KEY EVALUATION QUESTION & SUB-QUESTIONS	JUDGEMENT CRITERIA	SOURCES OF INFORMATION
10.2. How can ECW function better to deliver global systemic outcomes (more commitment, more funding, more capacity strengthening and facilitation) to strengthen the FERs?		
10.3. What improvements can be made in the FER model regarding the approach, rules, instruments and roles and responsibilities of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The FER design process • Communication with and at the country level • The selection of grantees (transparency, localization, diversification) • Contracting • Monitoring and reporting • Evaluation and learning To deliver more relevant/appropriate, targeted, effective, efficient and coherent/connected FERs.		
10.4. How can beneficiary results, including approaches to holistic learning be improved?		
10.5. How can capacity building efforts be improved so that country process are better coordinated and more local grantees (and other grantees) are better able to deliver effective projects?		
10.6. How can the evaluation of FERs be organized better in terms of overall approach?		

Data collection methods and processes

10. Data were collected against the evaluation framework through several global and country-based instruments.

11. **Interviews at the global level** were conducted with members of the ECW Secretariat, the ECW executive committee, representatives of the UNICEF FSO and additional stakeholders in ECW. Across these categories, interviews were conducted with representatives from key education sector global institutions (such as the Global Education Cluster, the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies and the Global Partnership for Education), relevant UN Agencies, selected ECW current and potential donors, and key International Non-Governmental organization (INGO) partners. Annex 2 provides a list of people met.

12. Global interview data was triangulated across interviews and with other data, to inform the evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations.

13. **Country case studies** were conducted in Colombia, Niger, Nigeria and Mozambique. The purpose of the case studies was to collect and analyse data on FER implementation at country level, against the generic FER theory of change, and the evaluation framework. A team of two to three people was assigned to each case study, including a national consultant, with a week and two days of data collection expected.

14. The case studies were initiated with a desk review of the country, emergency and education sector context, as well as a review of the FER documentation. A country dossier was drafted presenting a summary of the context, the FER(s) and a country stakeholder analysis. This formed the base for planning primary research processes, which comprised primarily interviews with the ECW Secretariat focal point(s) for the country, country coordinator(s) of the education cluster or education in emergencies working group, government representatives, representatives of relevant UN Agencies, and FER grantees. Where relevant, regional actors who were involved in the FERs were also interviewed. In Mozambique and Niger site visits were possible, given easing in COVID-19 travel restrictions and the security situation.

15. Data collection was in two phases. The main data collection occurred in June and July 2020, while a second smaller set of interviews was held in September 2020, to follow up on the implementation of the COVID-19 FERs. In the second round of interviews, the country team leaders followed up with the ECW Secretariat focal point, the country coordinator and COVID-19 FER grantees on implementation of these grants.

16. The country teams held distance validation workshops with country stakeholders. The aim of the workshops was to validate the case study findings, conclusions and recommendations. The team provided detailed presentations on these aspects beforehand, and also accepted written comments subsequently. These workshops were attended by country coordinators, grantees and in some cases sub-grantees, government representatives, and representatives from the ECW Secretariat monitoring and evaluation and education teams, and the ECW country focal point.

17. Country case study reports were drafted to capture data and country level analysis for internal use by the evaluation. The reports are not published but were provided to the ECW Secretariat for its learning use.
18. A **survey of FER grantees** was conducted to collect grantees' perceptions on the performance of FER operations and systems at country level. Survey questions covered characteristics of the respondents' organization; the size and complementarity of FER Funding in their EiEPC response; how the organization covered various sources of vulnerability, including gender and disability in their FER-funded response; perceptions on FER project design and implementation processes; and challenges experienced in FER implementation. A total of 133 different grantee focal points were targeted by the survey in 32 countries. The team received 81 completed surveys and validated two partial answers. The combined response rate (completed + partial answers) is 62.4 per cent. Annex 5 and Annex 6 provides more detail on the survey questions and responses.
19. **Analyses of the FER global data and document base and financial flows** were undertaken. The ECW Secretariat shared their consolidated FER quantitative, qualitative and financial data, as well as documentation on each FER. These were updated during the evaluation.
20. Three types of project documents were used to analyse key themes arising from the evaluation framework: (i) FER concept notes, project proposals and reports; (ii) FER communication streams; and (iii) Existing ECW quantitative and qualitative data files.
21. The themes investigated included the scope of objectives covered in FER projects; the timeliness of FER projects; government involvement in FER projects; the use of consortia; needs assessments; capacity building through FER projects; resilience and risk reduction in FER projects; proposal coordination and grantee selection; gender, protection and mental health and psycho-social support coverage; and FER implementation challenges experienced by grantees.
22. Financial analysis was done of project budgets and expenditures in selected projects, to inform the findings on cost-effectiveness. This supplemented analysis of financial flows to ECW and the global education in emergencies sector.
23. The analysis data and results fed into the evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations.
24. The evaluation also undertook an assessment of the **complementarity with and alignment between FERs and three other modalities**: the CERF, Common Humanitarian Funds, and accelerated funding of the Global Partnership for Education. The comparison looked at the coherence/connectedness of the FER relative to these mechanisms and was conducted through document review, interviews with representatives from the modalities and including the issue in query frameworks used in country and global level interviews.
25. Finally, the evaluation undertook **additional in-depth** desk-based analysis of specific FERs. These focused on the FERs in Nepal and Afghanistan, to supplement the country case studies, and on the COVID-19 FERs (paying attention specifically to distance education in these FERs) in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Colombia, Ethiopia, the DRC, Mozambique, Niger,

Nigeria, Palestine, Venezuela. These additional FER analyses relied on country and FER documentation.

Analysis and reporting

26. The team used mixed methods of data analysis, mining both qualitative and quantitative data. A key instrument was systematic **contribution analysis** using the evidence and findings at project/country and global level of the FER to investigate how the observed FER inputs, activities and outputs (the FER package) contributed to observed systemic and beneficiary results, taking other non-FER inputs and context into account.

27. This evaluation report is the main output of the evaluation, and will be presented virtually to the ECW Secretariat and Executive Committee to validate findings. This process will be supported by written comments by the ECW Secretariat and other stakeholders, including the Evaluation Advisory Group, as selected by the Secretariat.

Annex 4 Data and additional graphs

Additional data for Relevance findings


Table 20 ECW FER incidence of intervention type by type of grantee

Inter-vention objective	Intervention type	Number of interventions of this type					
		All grantees	INGO	LNGOs	UN agency	UNICEF	STC
Access	Built and/or rehabilitated classrooms	51	31	7	13	11	9
	Built and/or rehabilitated latrines	41	27	8	6	5	5
	Provided school furniture	36	24	6	6	5	5
	Built and/or rehabilitated recreational spaces	14	6	6	2	2	1
	Vocational education	23	13	1	9	8	3
	Provision of cash transfers to students/families	9	6	1	2	2	0
	Awareness campaigns on education and related topics	12	10	0	2	2	2
	Provision of transportation to/from school)	4	3	0	1	1	1
Continuity	Accelerated Learning Programs (ALP)	6	3	0	3	2	1
	Support to organization for end of year exam	44	29	4	11	9	8
	Remedial classes	10	6	2	2	2	0
	School feeding programs	34	20	3	11	8	5
Quality	Provided incentives to teachers	14	9	0	5	2	0
	Trained teachers on pedagogy	11	7	1	3	2	0
	Trained teachers subject knowledge/curriculum	18	13	1	4	3	2
	Trained teachers on Early Childhood and Care Development (ECCD) principles	6	5	0	1	0	1
	Mentorship programs for teachers	12	9	0	3	3	4
	Provision of teaching and learning material for literacy and numeracy to children/youths	50	30	4	16	12	4
	Provision of teaching and learning material for literacy and numeracy to teachers/classrooms	41	26	1	14	13	4
	Provision of materials for socio-emotional learning to children/youths	12	10	1	1	1	2
	Provision of materials for socio-emotional learning to teachers/classrooms	18	10	1	7	7	1
	Life skills programs (i.e. clubs, trainings, after school programs)	9	9	0	0	0	3
	Provision of life skills materials to children/youths	41	26	4	11	8	6
	Provision of life skills materials to teacher/classroom	18	11	3	4	3	1
Safety	Built and/or rehabilitated gender-segregated latrines	17	11	5	1	0	2
	Trained teachers on inclusive education (e.g. children with disabilities)	25	14	7	4	4	2
	Schools adopting/operationalizing a code of conduct (E5.3)	47	31	4	12	11	7

Inter-vention objective	Intervention type	Number of interventions of this type					
		All grantees	INGO	LNGOs	UN agency	UNICEF	STC
	Trained teachers on emergency preparedness, DRR, risk management	8	6	0	2	2	2
	Trained teachers on health and hygiene awareness	14	7	0	7	6	2
	Provision of clean water supply	1	0	0	1	1	0
	Trained teachers on pyscho-social support	29	19	3	7	6	4
	Psycho-social services (children/youths receive services from therapist, counselor, etc.)	18	11	3	4	3	3
System Strengthening	Initiatives to mobilize communities around education (e.g. parents and teachers associations)	9	8	0	1	1	3
	Support to community-driven monitoring systems	47	30	7	10	8	7
	Trainings for education planners and managers in conflict-sensitive and risk-informed education	35	27	2	6	4	4
	Support to national systems for monitoring	40	27	1	12	8	6
	Developed accreditation frameworks for accelerated/NFE programs	10	6	0	4	4	2

Source: ECW FER database, own calculations.

Table 21 Footprints of interventions by EiEPC objective, by type of grantee



Source: ECW FER database, own calculations.

Additional data for findings on Efficiency

Table 22 FER proposal processes and proposals

Who made decision?	FER
Education Cluster Review committee, advisory group or neutral committee	Somalia 2017; Uganda 2017; Ukraine 2017; Mozambique I, II and III 2019); Sahel II 2019; Yemen 2019; Afghanistan COVID 2020; CAR COVID 2020; DRC COVID 2020; Ethiopia COVID 2020; Mali COVID 2020; Nigeria COVID 2020; Uganda COVID 2020
Education Cluster partners	Papua New Guinea 2018; Malawi I and II 2019; Sahel 2019; Zimbabwe I and II 2019; Burkina Faso 2020; Chad COVID 2020; Ecuador COVID 2020; Palestine COVID 2020; Venezuela COVID 2020; Yemen COVID 2020; Zimbabwe COVID 2020
COVID-19 FER	Brazil COVID 2020; Cameroon COVID 2020; Colombia COVID 2020; Peru COVID 2020; Puntland COVID 2020; Somalia COVID 2020
Decision based on partners that could submit a proposal in time	Bangladesh COVID 2020
Government	Afghanistan 2017; Indonesia 2018; Comoros 2019
Select group from Education coordination team	Nepal 2018; DRC 2018; Cameroon 2019; Mozambique COVID 2020; Niger COVID 2020; Zimbabwe COVID 2020; Syria COVID 2020
Specific agency(ies)	Bangladesh 2017; Nigeria 2018; Greece COVID 2020; Malawi COVID 2020; Palestine COVID 2020; Niger 2019
Not clear	Syria 2018; Venezuela 2019; Venezuela regional FER 2019; Somaliland COVID 2020

Additional data for effectiveness findings

Table 23 Consortia in FER grants

Country	Lead applicant	Co-applicant/s	Year
Chad	Humanité & Inclusion (HI)	Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI)	2020
Colombia	Save the Children	World Vision, PLAN International and Norwegian Refugee Council	2019
DRC	Norwegian Refugee Council	Danish Church Aid, Collectif Alpha Ujuvil, Caritas Kasongo	2018
DRC	Norwegian Refugee Council	War Child UK Social Development Centre, Actions et Interventions pour le Développement et l'Encadrement Social	2018
DRC	AVSI Foundation	Actions et Interventions pour le Développement et l'Encadrement Social, Armée du Salut, Ligue de la	2018

Country	Lead applicant	Co-applicant/s	Year
		zone Afrique pour la défense droit des enfants et élèves	
Mozambique	Save the Children	COSACA consortium, STC, Care and Oxfam	
Peru (Reg. Ven.)	RET	PLAN, UNICEF and UNESCO	2019
Uganda	Norwegian Refugee Council	Save the Children	2017
Uganda	Save the Children	Windle Trust	2017
Uganda	War Child Canada	Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) Uganda	2017
Uganda	Save the Children	AVSI, Finn Church Aid, Street Child, Humanity and Inclusion, Windle International Uganda, Norwegian Refugee Council, Jesuit Relief Services, Tutapona, War Child Holland, AYWAD, PLAN, CRS, ZOA, Teach A Man to Fish	2020

Table 24 Countries with budget lines for cluster coordinators

Year	Country	Grantee	Position
2020	Bangladesh	Save the Children	Yes, Education Cluster Coordinator
2017	Bangladesh	UNICEF	Yes, Education Cluster Coordinator
2020	Burkina Faso	Plan	Yes, Education Cluster Coordinator
2020	DRC	Save the Children	Yes, National and Goma Cluster Coordinators
2017	Madagascar	UNICEF	Yes, NOC Cluster Coordinator
2020	Malawi	UNICEF	Yes, Education in Emergencies Cluster Coordinator
2017	Somalia	Save the Children	Yes, Education Cluster Coordinator
2020	Somalia Puntland	Save the Children	Likely, budget includes USD 20000 for support to the Education Cluster
2017	Uganda	UNHCR	Yes, NOC Education Coordinator (through UNOPS, seconded to MoES)
2017	Ukraine	Save the Children	Yes, NGCA Cluster Coordinator
2019	Zimbabwe	Save the Children	Yes, Education Cluster Coordinator
2020	Zimbabwe	Save the Children	Yes, Education Cluster Coordinator

Annex 5 Grantee survey

1. This survey forms part of the independent evaluation of the Education Cannot Wait (ECW) First Emergency Response (FER) window. The survey is one of many data collection exercises, including interviews, focus group discussions and analysis of ECW and FER documents.
2. This survey is intended to assess the perception of FER grantees. This survey has been designed to collect views in a consistent, unbiased manner, allowing for comparative analysis, as well as to widen the range of opinions collected. Please, be assured that we anonymise the survey results and that all individual answers will remain confidential.
3. The survey consists of 30 core questions that all respondents will answer and four additional questions that only some are required to answer. It should take around 20 minutes to complete. Please answer questions for your organization's experience with the ECW FERs to date, including the COVID-19 FERs.
4. We only need one reply per grantee organization and country.
5. We recommend that, once you start, you answer the survey until the end to prevent duplicate answers or partial replies. Nonetheless, if you cannot complete the survey in one sitting, you can enter your email address, which will enable a unique link to be sent to you, allowing you to return to your survey responses at a later date. Please click the 'save and continue' banner at the top of your screen and enter your email address to activate this tool.
6. Please feel free to contact Mokoro if you experience any technical difficulties.
7. Thank you for your time!

1. Please select the country that your answers apply to:

- Afghanistan
- Bangladesh
- Brazil
- Burkina Faso
- Cameroon
- Central African Republic
- Colombia
- Comoros
- Chad
- Congo DRC
- Ecuador
- Ethiopia
- Greece
- Indonesia
- LACRO
- Madagascar
- Malawi
- Mali
- Mozambique
- Nepal
- Niger
- Nigeria
- Palestine
- Peru
- Papua New Guinea
- Somalia
- Syria
- Uganda
- Ukraine
- Venezuela
- Yemen
- Zimbabwe
- Regional Africa
- Sahel Regional

2. In how many FER applications has your organisation participated?

Please count both successful and unsuccessful applications.

- One
- Two
- Three
- Four
- Five
- Six
- Seven

3. In which years did your organisation participate in FERs in your country?

Please tick all applicable years, including both successful and unsuccessful rounds.

- 2017
- 2018
- 2019
- 2020

4. In which years have you been personally involved?

Please tick all applicable years.

- 2017
- 2018
- 2019
- 2020

5. How many FER grants has your organisation held in the country you have indicated above?

Please count successful applications, both open and closed.

- One
- Two
- Three
- Four
- Five
- Six

6. Please indicate the type of organisation/entity you work for: *

- Multilateral organisation/agency
- International NGO
- Local NGO
- Government, central level
- Government, sub-national level
- Other - Write In (Required)

7. Is your organisation a member of the education cluster and/or Local Education in Emergencies Group (LEiEG) in your country?

Please tick the option that applies: *

- My organisation was already a member when we submitted our first FER application to the cluster/LEiEG
- My organisation became a member after submitting our first FER application to the cluster/ LEiEG
- My organisation is not a member of the country education cluster/ LEiEG

8. What proportion of the funding for your organisation's response in the education sector to the emergency is from ECW FER grant(s)? *

- Less than 20%
- 20-39%
- 40-59%
- 60-79%
- 80-99%
- 100%

9. What other funds are you using for your education sector emergency response?

Please tick all that apply. *

- Internal funds
- ECW multi-year response programme (MYRP)
- CERF
- Humanitarian Pooled Funds
- Funding from UNICEF, UNOCHA, UNHCR or other UN agencies
- GPE Accelerated Facility Funds
- Funds from bilateral donors
- Funds from INGOs
- Funds from government
- Corporate/business funding
- Other - Write In (Required)

10. How does the ECW FER funding fit with other funding for your organisation's education in emergency response?

Please tick all the options that apply to the ECW FER grant(s) of your organisation if compared to other sources of funding.

ECW FER funding finances or financed: *

- the first or earlier interventions in our response
- our response in specific geographical areas
- specific interventions or programme areas in our response
- our response for specific population groups
- a proportion of our response, but it is not distinct in terms of being early, geographic areas, interventions and population groups
- Other - Write In (Required)

11. Has the FER grant helped your organisation respond in sectors other than education by freeing up funding? *

- Yes
- No

12. To what degree do you think your FER-financed interventions are tailored for specific vulnerable groups? *

	No tailoring	Slight	Moderate	Significant	Very significant tailoring
Girls and women	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Persons with disability	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Orphans	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Minority ethnic or language groups	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Most remote communities	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

13. Have you tailored your intervention to any other vulnerable group?

If so, please, use the box below to describe the type of vulnerable group and the level of targeting in line with the previous question.

14. Is the tailoring for specific vulnerable groups in your organisation's FER-financed interventions more or less than in your organisation's other education in emergency interventions?

- Tailoring for the needs of specific vulnerable groups is more pronounced in our FER-financed interventions than in other interventions
- Tailoring for the needs of specific vulnerable groups is about the same in our FER-financed interventions as in other interventions
- Tailoring for the needs of specific vulnerable groups is less pronounced in our FER-financed interventions than in other interventions

Section 2 – Perceptions of FER deployment in-country

15. How did you become aware of potential ECW FER funding for your first FER?

You can tick more than one if you participated in more than one FER round

- From the ECW Secretariat
- From ECW public communication channels
- From the country education in emergency coordination mechanism (e.g. Education Cluster or Local Education in Emergency Group)
- From the Global Education Cluster
- Through my Local Education Group, which functions separately from an education in emergency coordination mechanism
- Informally through my organisation's or staff members' contacts
- Other - Write In (Required)

16. How would you rate the following aspects of the FER ECW proposal design and approval processes?

Please answer this question based on your overall impression. We provide a text box below where you can note observations for a specific FER round that was different.

Please use the N/A column if your organisation does not have a view on an aspect

	1 - Very Poor	2	3	4	5 - Very good	N/A
Availability of information up front on how the FER proposal was going to be put together (e.g. timeline, roles and responsibilities, processes)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Availability of information on the amount available for the FER	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Thoroughness of needs assessment and FER concept proposal processes	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Coherence of the ECW FER process and proposals with other humanitarian response processes, needs assessments and plans	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Connectedness of the ECW FER process and proposals with the country's development plans	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Emphasis on the differentiated needs of girls, and others most likely to be left behind	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Inclusion of local NGOs as potential grantees	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Timely availability of information on criteria to decide between grant applicants under the FER	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Coordination of grantees' during proposal design	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Feedback from country coordination mechanism on proposals before deciding on grantees	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Transparency of decision-making on grantees	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Fairness of decision-making on grantees	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Feedback to relevant parties on grantee decisions taken	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

17. Are there specific positive or negative observations on the country's processes to design and approve the FER that you would like to draw our attention to? Were some aspects better or worse in a specific round if you participated in more than one round?

18. How would you rate the clarity of ECW proposal guidance, templates and feedback during FER design and approval?

Use the N/A column if your organisation is not familiar with the ECW FER guidance and templates or has not seen the feedback from the ECW Secretariat

	1 - Very poor	2	3	4	5 - Very good	N/A
Guidance on FER processes	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Guidelines for proposals	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Templates for proposal narratives	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Templates for proposal budgets	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Templates for result measures and targets	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Feedback from the ECW Secretariat on the country FER proposals and/or grantees' proposals	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

19. Were the proposal guidance, templates or feedback better in later FERs?

	More clear	No change	Less clear	I have only participated in one FER round and cannot answer
Guidance on FER processes	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Guidelines for proposals	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Templates for proposal narratives	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Templates for proposal budgets	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Templates for result measures and targets	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

20. Is there anything negative or positive that you would like to draw our attention to specifically regarding the ECW FER guidance, templates and feedback?

21. How would you rate the time required for each of the following stages of the FER design/selection process?

Please, consider that FER is designed for emergency response while addressing the differentiated needs of affected populations well

	Too short	About right	Too long	N/A
Assessment of education needs of affected populations	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Drafting the concept note for the FER	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Preparation of project proposals by grantees	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Review and selection of grantee proposals by cluster	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Review of country and grantee proposals by ECW	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

22. Please can you tell us what were the consequences of some of the design phases being too short or too long?

Section 3 – Perceptions on FER grant implementation

23. When did your organisation undergo the UN's Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers (HACT) assessment process?

Please select the option that applies.

HACT assessments are the process used by UN Agencies to assess organisational financial management systems to determine the risk rating and assurance procedures needed.

*

- My organisation was already HACT-assessed when we first applied for a FER grant
- My organisation's HACT assessment was done after we applied for a FER grant
- My organisation is not yet HACT-assessed

24. Were contracting and fund disbursement processes delayed for any of your grants?

- Yes
- No

25. What delays occurred and why?

Please use the text box below to tell us your experience of the delays.

*

26. How helpful was the ECW Secretariat and the UNICEF Funds Support Office in concluding the contracting and disbursement process after your grant had been approved?

*

- Both the Secretariat and the UNICEF Funds Support Office were helpful to conclude the process
- The ECW Secretariat was helpful to conclude the process
- The UNICEF Funds Support Office was helpful to conclude the process
- Neither the Secretariat nor the ECW Funds Support office was helpful to conclude the process
- N/A

27. How manageable is the ECW FER implementation procedures for your organisation?

Please rate the following aspects of ECW FER grant procedures.

	1 - Very complicated/poor	2	3	4	5 - Very easy/good	N/A
Initial contracting checks and procedures	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Financial procedures	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Narrative reporting requirements	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Financial reporting requirements	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Programmatic or budget changes	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
No cost programme extensions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Feedback of ECW Secretariat on annual report	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

28. How did your organisation consider the views of the beneficiaries of your FER grants, including girls, women, persons with disabilities and other vulnerable groups in planning or implementing the grant?

Please, select all the statements that are true for your organisation. *

- My organisation has not needed to consider the views of target beneficiaries
- My organisation has used available information on the views of target beneficiaries
- My organisation itself has collected information on the views of target beneficiaries
- My organisation itself has made additional efforts to collect the views of girls, women, persons with disabilities and other vulnerable groups specifically
- I don't know

Section 4. Effects of ECW's FER grants

29. What has been the impact of ECW support on the capacity of your organisation in relation to the following aspects/processes? *

	Negative impact	No impact	Positive impact
Planning Education in Emergency interventions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Implementing Education in Emergency interventions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Monitoring/evaluation of Education in Emergency interventions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Coordinating Education in Emergency interventions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

30. Please, can you elaborate on the answers above? For example, why there has been a positive/negative/no impact?

31. In your view, what has been the impact of ECW FER support on the capacity of in-country coordination groups/clusters in relation to the following aspects/processes? *

	Negative impact	No impact	Positive impact
Capacity to plan interventions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Capacity to implement interventions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Capacity to monitor/evaluate interventions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Capacity to coordinate interventions	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

32. What additional support could the ECW Secretariat have provided to your organisation or the in-country coordination group/cluster?

Please, share your thoughts in the text box below. If you believe that support was adequate, you can simply state 'adequate'.

33. Have there been any unintended positive or negative side-effects on beneficiaries because of the aid that was provided under the FER? *

- Yes
- No

34. What were the unintended positive or negative effects and how was this dealt with by the implementing partners? *

Annex 6 Grantee survey summary of responses


1. This annex contains the analysis of the results of the grantee survey. A copy of the survey can be found in Annex 5. The survey is designed to collect grantees’ perceptions on the performance of FER operations and systems at country level. The main features of the survey are described below:

- *Timing and implementation:* The survey was launched on 23 July 2020 and closed on 25 August 2020. The survey was implemented using the SurveyGizmo platform.
- *Scope:* The survey targeted all FER grantees (2017 to 2020). COVID-19 FERs were included. A total of 133 individual focal points were identified.
- *Language:* The survey was delivered in English.
- *Testing:* Before dissemination, the team tested the survey among the team, ECW Secretariat and two grantees. Their feedback helped to fine-tune the survey, and identify and solve any technical problems.

Response statistics

2. A total of 133 different grantee focal points were targeted by the survey in 32 countries and two regions (LACRO and Sahel). The team received 81 completed surveys and validated two partial answers. The combined response rate (completed + partial answers) is 62.4 per cent. The answers covered 25 countries and the two regions. This represents a response rate of 79.4 per cent in relation to the geographical entities targeted. The figure below shows the number of replies by geographical entity.


Figure 15 Number of replies per geographical entity



3. Grantees were also asked a range of statistical questions to be used in the analysis of the results. As shown in Figure 16 below, 53 per cent of the answers were provided by international NGOs (INGOs) followed by multilateral organizations/agencies (43 per cent) and


local NGOs (LNGOs) which accounted for 5 per cent of the answers. Eighty-one grantees (98 per cent of respondents) were already members of the cluster/local EiE group when they applied. Only one respondent became a member of this group after applying and another organization did not become a member of any of these groups after applying. Figure 16 also shows the number of applications per year. 2020 is the year with the highest number of FER applications by grantees as a result of the COVID-19 FERs. This graph includes both successful and unsuccessful applications.

Figure 16 Type of organization/entity and FER applications per year



4. Grantees were also asked about the **number of successful and unsuccessful FER applications**. Figure 17 shows that the 47 per cent of grantees applied for two FERs, 29 per cent applied for one FER and 16 per cent applied for three FERs. Few organizations applied for more than three FERs. When looking at the number of successful applications, the largest group of respondents have held only one FER (47 per cent), followed by two FERs (39 per cent) and three FERs (11 per cent). Just two organizations have held four FERs and one has held five FERs.


Figure 17 Number of total FER applications per grantee (left) vs. number of successful FER applications (right)



FER funding


5. The survey also explored **how FER funding fits into the grantees' overall funding for EiE and what are the complementary sources of funding**. Figure 18 illustrates that FER funding accounted for less than 20 per cent of the grantees' EiE activities in about 50 per cent of the cases. In a further 25 per cent of the cases, FER funds accounted for 20 per cent to 39 per cent of the EiE funding. In general, the dependency on FER funding is higher among NGOs. Figure 18 shows that the main sources of alternative funding are funding from bilateral donors and internal funds, with funding from UN agencies in third place. The graph also illustrates some differences in relation to complementary sources of funding for EiE across the two main grantee groups. Compared to NGOs, multilateral organizations and agencies rely to a larger extent on internal funds, CERF and GPE accelerated facility. At the same time, NGOs seem to have better access than multilateral organizations and agencies to funding from INGOs and government.

Figure 18 Share of EiE funding covered by FER grant (left) and complementary sources of finance (right)



6. When grantees were asked about **how FER funding fits with other EiE funding** (see Figure 19), it seems that geographical differentiation was the most common way to ensure complementarity. Nonetheless, complementarity in terms of timing (first or earlier response), thematic areas and population groups were also significant. The number of grantees indicating that the response using FER funds was not distinct from the response using other EiE funding is particularly high in the case of multilateral organizations and agencies (43 per cent). This poses some questions in relation to potential duplication with funding from other sources. It is possible this could be explained to some extent by the larger reliance of multilateral organizations and agencies on internal funding (see above). In **about 40 per cent of the cases, grantees considered that the FER grant helped the organization respond in sectors other than education by freeing up funding.**

Figure 19 Use of FER funding in relation to other EiE funding




FER grants' tailoring to vulnerable groups

7. Grantees were asked to share their views on the degree to which FER interventions have been targeted to a range of different vulnerable population groups (Figure 20). The results indicate that FER interventions were predominantly targeted to girls and women (65 per cent of grantees ranked tailoring as 'very significant' or 'significant'), followed by the most remote communities (62 per cent) and persons with disabilities (41.5 per cent). Tailoring to minority ethnic or language groups (27 per cent) and orphans (24 per cent) is less common among the grantees who participated in the survey.

8. Grantees were also asked to indicate whether other vulnerable groups were targeted in an open-ended question. Out of the 53 valid replies, 35 grantees identified **refugees and/or IDPs (including returnees) as an important target of FER interventions**. The remaining answers simply confirmed or expanded on the motivations for the replies captured in the main survey question discussed above.

9. The survey also included a question about the **level of tailoring to the needs of specific vulnerable groups in activities supported by FER grants compared to other activities** (Figure 20). In general, and across the main groups of respondents, grantees considered that the level of tailoring was about the same. Interestingly, 22 per cent of grantees considered that tailoring to the needs of vulnerable groups was stronger in activities supported by FER grants. The effect is especially important in multilateral organizations and agencies (32 per cent) compared to NGOs (15 per cent).


Figure 20 FER tailoring to vulnerable population groups (left) and level of FER tailoring compared to other interventions (right)



Perceptions on FER deployment


10. The survey contains several questions about the experience of individual grantees with the FER design and approval process. The first question was on **how each grantee became aware of the possibility of requesting ECW FER funding**. Figure 21 presents the results of the survey with a break down per grantee group. It shows that the country coordination mechanism was the source of information in most cases. The figure also shows remarkable differences between NGOs and multilateral organizations and agencies. Compared to NGOs, multilateral organizations or agencies were less dependent on country coordination mechanisms and relied to a significant extent on direct information from the ECW Secretariat or informal contacts. Bear in mind that there could be some overlap between these two categories. Observed differences between multilateral organizations and NGOs could be explained by the role of UNICEF as cluster coordinator in many countries.

Figure 21 Grantee awareness of ECW FER funding




11. FER grantees are generally **satisfied with different aspects of the design and approval process**. In all areas, the different aspects were rated as 'very good' (5) or 'good' (4) by at least 50 per cent of the grantees. The highest levels of satisfaction are recorded in "Coherence of the ECW FER process and proposals with other humanitarian response processes, needs assessments and plans"; "Connectedness of the ECW FER process and proposals with the country's development plans"; and "Emphasis on the differentiated needs of girls, and others most likely to be left behind." The lowest levels of satisfaction were in "Inclusion of local NGOs as potential grantees"; "Thoroughness of needs assessment and FER concept proposal processes"; "Coordination of grantees' during proposal design"; "Fairness of decision-making on grantees"; and "Feedback from country coordination mechanism on proposals before deciding on grantees."

Figure 22 Satisfaction with FER design and approval process



12. **Differences between grantee groups were significant in some of the areas with the lowest levels of satisfaction** (Figure 23). NGOs were assigned lower values to three of the areas which are related to the selection process: "Inclusion of local NGOs as potential grantees"; "Transparency of decision-making on grantees;" and "Fairness of decision-making on grantees." Answers to the open-ended question that allowed grantees to expand on the answer to this question confirms that several grantees (mostly NGOs) were critical of the level of participation of LNGOs and the transparency of the grantee selection process.


Figure 23 Satisfaction with inclusion of LNGOs (left), transparency of decision-making (centre) and fairness of decision-making (right) by respondent group



13. **Grantee perceptions on ECW’s guidance, template and feedback were also quite positive.** Guidance on the FER process came up as the best valued area, while the quality and clarity of the template for results and targets was the worst valued area. Differences between different types of grantees were not significant. Some grantees gave answers through open-ended questions, including some positive responses in the area of clarity and simplicity. Overall, there is a balance between both positive and critical answers. Critical answers were mostly related to the clarity and complexity of the templates. Some grantees considered there is scope for further simplification if FERs are mainly intended for emergency response. They also indicated that the results framework requires indicators for which data can be difficult or impossible to collect.


14. **Grantees with experience in more than one FER grant process mostly perceived no or positive change in the clarity and quality of FER guidelines and templates** (Figure 24). Templates for proposal narratives is the area where perceived improvement is greatest. The templates for budgets and result measures are the two areas where perceived improvement is weakest. When looking at the evolution of the proposals it is important to bear in mind, for triangulation purposes, that stability can be desirable in areas such as result frameworks where comparability over a period of time is important.

Figure 24 Clarity of ECW proposal guidance, templates and feedback during FER design and approval (left) and perceived improvement in later FERs



15. **Finally, grantees were asked to rate the time required for different stages of the FER design/selection process.** Results are presented in Figure 25. If we look across all the areas, the time required for each stage is generally considered to be 'about right.' The preparation of project proposals and the assessment of education needs are the two areas with a higher number of respondents who thought the process was too short. The review of the open-ended answers indicates that grantees rating the time available for some of the stages as too short usually link it to views about overall quality and/or the need for more consultative, inclusive or transparent processes. However, it is also true that if all open-ended answers are considered, many grantees argue that, in emergency situations, there is a trade-off between the speed of the process and the quality of some of the stages. A better process would require more time and would delay the response. Instances where the process is considered to be too long are generally linked to a few experiences where the proposals suffered substantial delays and/or the revision process was long.


Figure 25 Time required for different stages of the FER design/selection process



Perceptions on FER grant implementation

16. The first question in this section of the survey was about HACT assessments in order to understand better whether this requirement had an impact on the process. **The results indicate that most grantees (83 per cent) had already been assessed before they applied for the FER grant.** Please note that the real figure could be higher as some multilaterals (UN agencies) replied that they have not been through the HACT assessment. The explanation could be that these were UNICEF grantees as at least one of them communicated that this question was not applicable to UNICEF.


Figure 26 HACT assessment among grantees



17. **Only 16 per cent of grantees reported (perceived) delays in the grant contracting and disbursements processes.** Based on open-ended answers, in six out of the 13 cases delays were explained by administrative procedures (including contract negotiation and legal aspects), two were attributed to internal issues within the grantees and another two to adjustments required by the changing context. The remaining three cases did not explain the delays.


18. Grantees generally had a **positive perception of the ECW Secretariat and UNICEF's Fund Support Office during the contracting and disbursement processes.** Figure 27 shows that 83 per cent of the grantees had a positive value of both structures with a further 8 per cent who considered only ECW was helpful; another 4 per cent considered that only UNICEF's Fund Support Office was helpful.

Figure 27 Perceptions on support from the ECW Secretariat and the UNICEF Funds Support Office in concluding the contracting and disbursement process after grant approval



19. The survey included a question about **grantee perceptions on different aspects of the FER implementation procedures**. Figure 28 indicated that generally grantees held positive views across all different aspects. Excluding N/A answers, all areas received at least 70 per cent of 'very good/easy' (5) or 'good/easy' (4) ratings. The areas with the most negative ratings – 'very poor/complicated' (1) or 'poor/complicated' (2) – are ECW feedback on narrative reports and programmatic and budget changes.


Figure 28 Perceptions on ECW FER implementation procedures with (left) and without considering N/A answers (right)



20. Grantees also shared their views on **how they considered the views of beneficiaries during planning and implementation of FER grants**. When answering these question, grantees were allowed to tick more than one answer. Figure 29 shows that across all grantees, there is a balanced distribution between those who used available information, those who collected information and/or those who made additional efforts to collect the views of vulnerable groups. When the data is broken down per type of grantee,

multilateral organizations/agencies relied to a greater extent on available data, while grantee replies suggest a larger share of NGOs collected data and made additional efforts to consider the views of vulnerable beneficiary groups.

Figure 29 Grantee consideration of the views of the beneficiaries in planning or implementing FER grants, including girls, women, persons with disabilities and other vulnerable groups



Effects of ECW’s FER grants


21. Grantees consider that the **FER grant has had a positive impact on their capacity to implement EiE activities**. Figure 30 (left) shows that grantees believe the FER grant has had a greater impact on their capacity to plan and implement EiE activities (around 90 per cent of replies considered the grant had a positive impact). Monitoring & evaluation is the area where the impact is considered the lowest with 70 per cent of grantees reporting a positive impact. The analysis of the open-ended answers reveals different reasons why a positive impact has been reported:

- Improved planning, monitoring and coordination in EiE. This effect is reported both among FER grantees (coordination around the proposal), but also in the wider context of the EiE in-country coordination (requirement to discuss and coordinate within the cluster, data collection, etc.).
- Increased capacity within FER grantees as a result of project implementation. In some cases, FER grantees were responding in EiE for the first time. Also, FER grants allowed some grantees to develop response plans.
- FER grants allowed an EiE response or helped to scale-up activities. This can be linked to the point above, but also speaks about a broader effect at the country/regional level given the limited amount of resources for EiE.

22. Grantees also had very strong positive perceptions about the impact of **FER grants on the capacity of in-country coordination mechanisms** (Figure 30, left). A very significant share of grantees reports a positive impact across all four areas of enquiry. The survey suggests a stronger effect on the capacity to coordinate interventions (as a result of ECW planning and implementation procedures) and a lower effect on the monitoring and evaluation

capacity of in-country coordination mechanisms. Open-ended answers discussed in the previous paragraph provide some additional insight into the reasons why. In addition, several grantees reported significant capacity building needs within in-country coordination mechanisms which FER grants are not designed or intended to cover.


Figure 30 Perceptions on FER grant impact on grantee capacity (left) and the capacity of in-country coordination mechanisms (right)



23. A small share of grantees (14 per cent) reported some form of side effect, either positive or negative (see Figure 31 below). Grantees describe only one example of negative side effects in which project implementation consumed much more time than expected (in relation to radio broadcasts for education purposes). Examples of positive side effects include:

- Activities reached more beneficiaries than expected
- Leverage/influence the activities of other partners
- Improved coordination at sector level
- Demonstration of effects for the wider sector
- Improved understanding of the sector/needs
- Trickle-down effects such as jobs for local communities or strengthened community structures at local level.

Figure 31 Grantees reporting unintended negative or positive side-effects of FER grants



Annex 7 Chronology

Year	Global developments in EiEPC and humanitarian response	Key developments in ECW	Key developments in the FER
2015	<p>First issue of the <i>Journal on Education in Emergencies</i> published in October 2015.</p> <p>The Oslo Summit on Education for Development urged governments, NGOs, foundations, the private sector, academia and CSOs to mobilize collective action and more funding for education in emergencies.</p> <p>At the UN Sustainable Development Summit, world leaders committed to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). SDG4 on education is much more ambitious than its Millennium Development Goal predecessor, aiming to ‘ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.’</p>	<p>INEE facilitated input from over 130 practitioners around the world in May through a Global Consultation on Education in Emergencies and Strengthened Response (Phase I), which identified key challenges and solutions and to generate political, financial, and operational commitment for the field of EiEPC, which fed into the following July ODI paper.</p> <p>In July an ODI paper “Education in emergencies and protracted crises: Toward a strengthened response” recommended a new common platform for education in emergencies and protracted crises to address humanitarian and development architectural issues and ensure seamless support during and after crises, which fed into the Oslo Summit.</p> <p>During the Oslo Summit, a high-level Commission on the Financing of Global Education Opportunities, chaired by former United Kingdom Prime Minister Gordon Brown, was announced to explore new investment opportunities to sustain and reinforce the education sector, including a focus on the need to bridge the divide between humanitarian interventions and long-term development assistance to education, and to mobilize USD 4.8 billion to provide children and young people in crisis situations with quality education.</p>	
2016	<p>The first-ever World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) was held in Istanbul and provided a historic opportunity to raise awareness about the important role that education plays in rebuilding lives during and after crises.</p> <p>The Secretary-General’s outcome report from the WHS and the <i>Agenda for Humanity</i> articulated a New Way of Working that calls on humanitarian and development actors to work collaboratively together, based on their comparative advantages, towards “collective outcomes” that reduce need, risk and vulnerability over multiple years.</p> <p>Grand Bargain agreement between over 30 donors and aid providers was launched during the WHS in Istanbul in</p>	<p>Between January and February, more than 500 practitioners fed into the INEE Global Consultation on Education in Emergencies and Strengthened Response (Phase II), which focused on how to operationalize solutions toward a new platform for global EiEPC work and fed into ODI’s May paper and the work of the Technical Strategy Group that was steering the Common Platform design process.</p> <p>In May an ODI paper “Education Cannot Wait: Proposing a fund for education in emergencies” outlined the potential operation of Education Cannot Wait fund.</p> <p>The Education Cannot Wait Fund, also chaired by former Prime Minister</p>	

Year	Global developments in EiEPC and humanitarian response	Key developments in ECW	Key developments in the FER
	<p>May 2016, aiming to get more means into the hands of people in need and local and national responders, increase transparency and improve the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian action.</p> <p>The New York Declaration: a plan for addressing large movements of refugees and migrants, which calls for better links between humanitarian and development efforts, was signed by 193 Member states. In addition to the Declaration itself, an Annex lays out the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), a core element of which is a joint operational plan and funding appeal that initiates long-term planning for durable solutions from the first stages of an emergency.</p>	<p>of the United Kingdom Gordon Brown, was established during the World Humanitarian Summit, 23–24 May.</p>	
2017	<p>Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA) facilitated the development of The Safe Schools Declaration: A Framework for Action, which provides governments with suggestions, recommendations, and examples of good practice to assist them in implementing the Safe Schools Declaration.</p> <p>The Global Education Cluster launches a revised strategy for 2017–2019 with a focus on strengthening partnership to promote a collective approach; the humanitarian-development nexus; and accountability (to affected populations and for its own performance).</p>	<p>The first Initial Investments (a precursor to MYRPs) were the very first grants disbursed by ECW in 2017. These were two-year programmes in Chad, Ethiopia, Syria and Yemen.</p> <p>In February the HLSG approved the proposed Operating Model Design and Results Framework for ECW, which was developed by external consultants.</p> <p>In the first quarter of 2017, the new governance structure was approved by the HLSG, with appointment of Yasmine Sheriff as Director of ECW, and the setting-up of the Secretariat, making the fund operational.</p> <p>The ECW first grantee operating manual was developed and approved by the HLSG, seeking to help potential grantees better understand how ECW works and how to apply for funding.</p>	<p>In the first quarter of 2017, ECW began to operationalize the FER window. The ECW ExCom approved the overall methodology on 5 April and ECW announced a <i>USD 20 million investment</i> on 21 April for seven crises through the FER: Peru, Central African Republic, Madagascar, Somalia, Ukraine, Afghanistan and Uganda.</p> <p>In August 2017 the first disbursements were transferred to grantees in Ukraine and Somalia.</p>
2018	<p>Establishment of the Joint Steering Committee on Humanitarian and Development Coordination.</p> <p>In May the first consultative meeting of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and its core partners on the implementation of the Djibouti Declaration and Plan of Action on Refugee Education was convened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Djibouti Declaration commits the countries of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda to ensure that every refugee and host community child has access to quality education without discrimination in a safe learning</p>	<p>In line with initial decision by the HLSG that ECW hosting should be reviewed after a year of operation, a hosting review was carried out by independent consultants. This led to the extension of ECW's incubation (physical and administrative hosting) at UNICEF until 2021. A decision will be reached on permanent hosting through the evaluation scheduled for 2020/21.</p> <p>ECW launched its current and first strategic plan for the period 2018-2021.</p> <p>In September, ECW launched its Resource Mobilization Strategy</p>	<p>In 2018 the FER reserve was initially set at USD 15 million by the ExCom.</p> <p>In 2018, six new FER grants were launched in the DRC, Indonesia, Lebanon, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea and Syria.</p>

Year	Global developments in EiEPC and humanitarian response	Key developments in ECW	Key developments in the FER
	<p>environment and the <i>Plan of Action</i> commits IGAD Member States to include refugees in national education sector plans by 2020, establish regional minimum education standards and targets on access and quality, and create a framework and mechanism for recognition of qualifications throughout the region to allow mobility of students across borders. ECW was a key partner in this.</p> <p>The Global Education Cluster launched its Guide to Developing Education Cluster Strategies to ensure the consultative development at country-level of a shared plan to guide partners in their implementation of an effective, timely, and quality emergency response that sustains education during emergencies and are aligned with longer-term education plans. The Global Education Cluster also begins a series of core coordination skills trainings at global, regional and national levels to strengthen the capacity of clusters/coordination teams at country level.</p> <p>In September, INEE, the <i>Journal on Education in Emergencies</i> and NORRAG (the Network for international policies and cooperation in education and training) hosted an “Evidence for Education in Emergencies Workshop” to set an EiE Learning Agenda that could be used to track evidence creation and build consensus around EiE research gaps and themes for investigation. This was the first in a series of inter-agency workshops with a focus on evidence for the field of EiE.</p> <p>In September a High-Level Meeting on Action for Refugee Education ended in the endorsement of a Charter for Action for Refugee Education, reaffirming the education related commitments in the New York Declaration and Global Compact. To accelerate the expansion of quality learning opportunities for refugees and host communities, ECW committed to a USD 1.84 billion resource mobilization target for its ongoing strategic plan to reach 8.9 million children (2018–2021).</p>	<p>2018–2021, which explores sustainable ways of mobilizing resources for education in emergencies and protracted crisis.</p> <p>ECW launches the Gender Strategy 2018–2021, making gender an ECW priority and ensuring that gender is systematically incorporated throughout ECW’s work.</p> <p>ECW’s Advocacy and Communication Strategy 2019–2021 was developed in early 2018 (launched in 2019) providing a framework for ECW’s advocacy and engagement efforts with key target audiences.</p> <p>In 2018 ECW developed the first Multi-Year Resilience Programmes (MYRPs) in: Bangladesh, Uganda, Afghanistan and the Central African Republic.</p>	
2019	<p>In 2019, the European Commission’s humanitarian aid budget allocated to education in emergencies reached 10 per cent, up from 1 per cent in 2015.</p> <p>In December the first-ever Global Refugee Forum was hosted in</p>	<p>In 2019 ECW launched the gender equality policy 2019–2021 and an accompanying accountability framework, which provides detailed guidance on how the policy will be implemented.</p>	<p>In February the ExCom agreed to increase the FER reserve to USD 24.7 million.</p> <p>In 2019, FER allocations were launched for countries responding to Cyclone Kenneth, Cyclone Idai,</p>

Year	Global developments in EiEPC and humanitarian response	Key developments in ECW	Key developments in the FER
	<p>Geneva, through which new funding was pledged to ECW. At the forum there was a pledge to increase financing and coordination to improve education for refugees.</p>	<p>In November ECW evaluation policy was launched along with evaluation plan 2018–2021, which outlines plans for the first evaluation of the FER modality to be conducted in 2020.</p> <p>In 2019 the Acceleration Facility Strategy was launched by ECW, with the goal of helping to address some of the systemic issues facing education in emergencies and protracted crises.</p>	<p>the Sahel insecurity, the Venezuelan refugee and migrant crisis, conflict and displacement in Cameroon, the refugee influx in Greece, and Yemen insecurity.</p> <p>In June the ExCom approved the replenishment of the FER reserve to USD 24.7 million for 2019.</p> <p>In July a Guide for Applying for First Emergency Response Grants was finalized to provide in-country partners with clear information on how to develop a high-quality FER application for funding.</p>
2020		<p>In April a new operational manual, prepared by Cambridge Education, was approved by the ExCom. This outlines policies and procedures related to the operations of ECW and is meant for all ECW partners and stakeholders.</p>	<p>In April, ECW announced a new series of FERs totalling USD 23 million in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The FERs will support 26 countries/emergency contexts and 55 grantees.</p>

Annex 8 Evidence from case studies and deep dives

1. This annex summarizes the evidence from the four case studies and the two deep dives conducted during the evaluation. The case studies were conducted in Colombia, Mozambique, Niger and Nigeria. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the case studies were conducted remotely by members of the evaluation team with the support of local consultants. The case studies are based on secondary evidence collected through the analysis of relevant documents as well as interviews and focus groups with key informants. The deep dives focused on older (2017) FER grants in Nepal and Afghanistan. They were predominantly based on the analysis of documents, including project evaluations.

Colombia

Methodology

2. In June 2019, in a coordinated response to the Venezuela regional migrant and refugee crisis, Education Cannot Wait (ECW) announced a USD 7 million allocation to support first emergency response (FER) grants in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru (ECW, 2019d). The case study examined the 2019–2020 FER grant to Colombia and the linkages with a regional FER grant focused on supporting coordination and advocacy across the four countries through policy strengthening, dialogue and the development of tools. The report also looked at the FER grant approved in the spring of 2020 to respond to the education and protection needs generated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

3. In light of the global COVID-19 pandemic, the Colombia case study was undertaken remotely by collaboration between international and national consultants. The Colombia case study included a desk-phase, including analysis of key documentation (19 May–14 June 2020) and a primary data collection phase, including remote interviews with those involved in managing or utilizing ECW FER grants, as well as other key stakeholders (15 June–15 July 2020). Interviews also took the form of focus group discussions with school teachers, principals and secretaries of education. The primary data collection phase for Colombia was followed by a data analysis and reporting phase. In addition, the country analysis used the country- and region-specific theory of change to examine the pathways and assumptions. In order to gather data on progress in the COVID-19 FER, a second set of remote interviews occurred in September, and were incorporated into the findings. In addition, ECW Secretariat feedback was provided on a first draft and a remote validation workshop was held with representatives from the Ministry of Education, the GIFMM WG/ EC and FER grantee to receive feedback on preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations in order to facilitate revision of the final report.

Context

4. Since 2016, economic, political and social instability in Venezuela has led to the displacement of 5.2 million people, 35 per cent of whom were living in Colombia as of July 2019, of which an estimated 750,000 are under the age of 18. Between October and November 2019, the enrolment of migrant children increased by 506 per cent, which has stretched the Colombian government's capacity to respond to the increasing number of

Venezuelan migrant children while also providing learning opportunities for out-of-school Colombian children, including many in the communities hosting migrants from Venezuela. While the resource needs are high, the education in emergencies sector is grossly underfunded and the coordination arena is complex, with three different education coordination mechanisms and competition and lack of coherence between them.

Evaluation findings

5. The design of the FER modality was perceived by key stakeholders in Colombia and the region as a relevant and appropriate modality for filling a critical gap in funding and responding to the immediate education needs of vulnerable migrant and host community children. In particular, the speed and flexibility of the FER and its promotion of context and crisis sensitivity, commitment to reaching the most vulnerable and working within existing coordination structures was deemed significant and appropriate. The approved FER proposals were relevant and appropriate in relation to the education needs of migrants and host communities in the right geographical areas, responding to the immediate education needs of children through flexible education models through which out-of-school children were able to level-up and enrol in schools. Ultimately, the modality and the approved FER proposals helped to bring EiE to the forefront with the Government of Colombia.

6. The FER grantee – Save the Children – was an appropriate choice, particularly given the design of the NGO consortium model used by the grantee and sub-grantees and the need for fast disbursement and accountability for resources and results. ECW and its Secretariat provided relevant support towards the design and implementation of FER grants, particularly through in-person visits and missions to Colombia, although grantees noted that more proactive guidance and support is needed in countries where the ECW and the FER modality is new.

7. There is significant evidence that the Colombia FERs focused on the most urgent education crises in the region and country. Based on available data on migrants, disaster prone and poor communities, there is evidence and widespread agreement from key informants that the Colombia FERs have reached vulnerable and marginalized migrant and host community children who otherwise would be unable to access education. Nonetheless this evaluation is unable to make a definitive judgement on whether the most marginalized and vulnerable children have been reached not only due to a lack of baseline and monitoring data but also because the needs are too large in Colombia in relation to FER and other resources.

8. The FERs in Colombia have been explicitly aligned with the Humanitarian Response Plans for Colombia and the regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan. In addition, the short-term emergency nature of the FER has taken longer-term and interconnected institutional/systemic problems into account through the design of comprehensive teacher training, certification for teachers, the expansion of learning spaces to absorb current and future students and building the capacity of local education authorities. A deliberate focus on information sharing and learning within the NGO Consortium has deepened partnerships and improved coherence, learning and ultimately coordination between members. While there were initial challenges to learning within the sector within the Interagency Group for Mixed Migration Flows Education Working Group/Education Cluster (GIFMM WG/EC), this is

improving. Moreover, while the ECW Multi-Year Resilience Programme (MYRP) is still in proposal development, there is evidence that stakeholders are actively working to ensure coherence between the FER and the MYRP, which has in turn supported stronger coherence and collaboration in the MYRP discussions.

9. There is a lack of consistent communication and coherence between the national and regional FER, leading to confusion at country level about linkages with the regional FER. However, there is limited evidence of learning in Colombia through the regional FER and widespread confusion at country level about linkages with the regional FER component.

10. There is limited alignment between FER funds and other sources of funding in Colombia. Other funding sources are limited and what exists is neither well tracked nor shared in a coherent manner. Moreover, there has been a lack of consistent communication and limited coherence between the national and regional FER components, but this is improving.

11. Timely and transparent information on the FER and FER application and selection processes in Colombia in 2019 was inhibited by the complexity of the set-up of the regional FER component, a lack of clear selection guidance, perceptions of potential conflicts of interest, and a communication channel that was not effective at reaching all stakeholders. These challenges were compounded by the fact that ECW and the FER were new to the region and country, resulting in a confusing process at the outset. Nevertheless, the FER selection and implementation process that was eventually undertaken was considered to have been transparent, although there were misunderstandings and miscommunication in the early stages of implementation. In many ways, the 2019 FER in Colombia has been a 'process of learning' for stakeholders in terms of gaining understanding and clarity on and achieving transparency of processes. The FER design, subcontracting and implementation processes within the NGO Consortium have been transparent and are thought to be generally cost-effective and efficient, strengthening the partnership between these NGOs and actionizing the New Way of Working based on complementarity, comparative advantage and division of labour.

12. FER funds and ECW's advocacy efforts have helped to fill a funding gap and raised the visibility and profile of EiE needs and work in Colombia. However, they have not yet had a significant impact on the mobilization of additional resources to EiE in Colombia. Financing for the FERs and ECW's advocacy efforts have raised the profile of and commitment to EiE within the government at national and local levels, including with local education secretariats and schools. Moreover, ECW funding and advocacy has been catalytic in contributing to better FER implementation through facilitating and strengthening coordination mechanisms.

13. Managing the FER through the GIFMM WG/EC was initially challenging and most joint coordination occurred within the NGO Consortium and with government. Over time, the FERs have helped to build trust between partners within the wider GIFMM WG/EC and are contributing to strengthened coordination within these mechanisms. For example, the COVID-19 FER and the MYRP process have been more inclusive and better coordinated based on the lessons learned from the 2019 FER process. Voices of affected populations were significantly and effectively considered in the design, planning, implementation and monitoring of the 2019 FER.

14. The FERs have significantly improved the capacity of partners within the NGO Consortium in terms of emergency expertise and technical EiE expertise. They have also contributed to building the capacity of national and local education authorities and teachers. Based on the six-month monitoring data, the 2019 FER has contributed to restoring safe, equitable access to education and holistic learning opportunities (literacy, numeracy and social-emotional learning) for vulnerable crisis-affected boys and girls and mainstreamed and targeted gender throughout the program cycle. However, a number of issues have precluded greater effectiveness in terms of beneficiary outcomes and there is more work to do on learning outcomes and disability. The COVID-19 FER has adapted to pandemic security restrictions and protection risks faced by vulnerable children due to the closure of schools to deliver on cross-sectoral needs, including hygiene, WASH and nutrition services, distance learning materials and protection-based messages to vulnerable children.

Mozambique

Methodology

15. The evaluation of the FER is a formative evaluation, aimed at drawing on experience of initial FER operations to help ECW to increase the effectiveness and impact of the FER. The evaluation investigates the FER modality, and its implementation at regional and country level through several data collection processes, including in-depth country case studies. Mozambique was selected as an illustrative case study of the use of the ECW FER to respond to natural disasters – cyclones Idai and Kenneth and Covid-19. The primary limitation to the Mozambique case study was the COVID-19 pandemic. The adjusted evaluation plan excluded travel for international team members to Mozambique and meant that the majority of interviews were conducted remotely.

Context

16. Two strong tropical cyclones hit Mozambique in 2019 for the first time in recorded history during the same season. First, Tropical Cyclone Idai made landfall on the night of 14 March near Beira City, Sofala Province. Six weeks after Idai, Tropical Cyclone Kenneth made landfall in Mozambique in the province of Cabo Delgado.

17. As a result of Idai an estimated 3,504 classrooms were destroyed and 740,000 children were at risk of missing extended periods of school. Forty-one thousand six hundred and ninety-three school age children were in need of education assistance due to Kenneth and 477 classrooms were partially or completely destroyed. All educational supplies were lost in most affected schools, meaning that teachers and children had no access to learning and instructional materials. The Mozambique Education Cluster was officially activated on 13 March 2019 to coordinate partners to respond quickly to the crisis.

18. These storms impacted on an already fragile education system. About 1.2 million children are out of school, particularly in the secondary age group. Literacy and numeracy indicators are low, quality teaching is an issue and absenteeism among teachers is high. Other barriers include a shortage of classrooms and class sizes averaging over 50.

19. Four rounds of FER funding were mobilized to respond to the successive crises in Mozambique, as follows in the Table 25 below.

Table 25 ECW First Emergency Response Funding to Mozambique

FER Round	Crisis	Grantees	Amount
1	Cyclone Idai	SC, WVI, FHI, AVSI, Plan	\$5,000,000
2	Cyclone Idai	UNICEF/UN-Habitat, CESC	\$5,000,000
3	Cyclone Kenneth	CESC	\$360,000
4	COVID-19	WVI, Plan, UNICEF	\$325,000

Source: ECW First Emergency Response Applications for Grant Funding, Mozambique

Evaluation findings

Relevance and appropriateness

20. The FERs were a relevant and appropriate modality for responding to the impacts of the cyclones and the impact of COVID-19 on the same learners through initial rapid funding and highlighting educational needs. The FER responded to clearly identified educational needs and the requirement for advocacy to mobilize additional humanitarian resources to support the education sector. Surging of experienced staff by UNICEF and STC to support the start-up of the cluster was critical to the effective initiation of the cyclone response FERs.

21. The activities selected to ensure a rapid resumption of learning within the cyclone FERs, and continue education under the COVID-19 FER, were generally appropriate and relevant. For the cyclone-FER this included the provision of safe, inclusive, hygienic learning spaces, the provision of teaching and learning materials and school-based disaster risk reduction – and for the COVID-19 FER support to remote learning during school closures.

22. Individual grantees paid attention to addressing gender in their proposals which included an analysis including protection risks. However, analysis of disability needs was limited and baseline data lacking. It was particularly challenging to mainstream gender and inclusion in the COVID-19 FER.

23. The selected INGO grantees had an established presence and track record in the sector in Mozambique and the knowledge of local systems and context generally made them well qualified for the task. However, the engagement of LNGO's in FERs was limited. This was regarded as a loss to the process as local NGOs bring a strong understanding of the local context and potentially provide a more sustained presence than INGOs. The rationale for including UN agencies was strongest in terms of their normative and coordination roles, but less clear as sub-contractors for implementation.

Coverage and reach

24. There was little transparency in the reasons underpinning the allocative decisions made by the ECW Secretariat to the various FER windows. The relationship of the proportion of needs assessed met through the FER allocations was not consistent between FERs rounds, between countries in the regional response or compared to corporate targets.

25. While information on needs was limited in the immediate wake of the cyclone, the geographical coverage of the FER was guided by the cluster and was broadly aligned to the evolving understanding of needs. To some extent there was a bias towards areas with a pre-existing field presence of grantees. Stakeholders indicated that significant gaps in overall

coverage – a year after the cyclones had hit, many schools had yet to receive assistance – particularly in hard to reach areas, were still not covered.

Coherence and connectedness

26. The various FERs were closely aligned with relevant humanitarian response strategies for education. The cyclone-FER preceded a formal cluster or national response strategy and the FER promoted and supported the development of the humanitarian response strategy which ensured coherence. The COVID-19 FER applications were coherent with the established national COVID-19 education strategy.

27. ECW FER funds complemented other humanitarian financing for education, with coherence and coordination occurring at both the implementing agency and cluster levels. Complementary programming was largely ensured as the funding was typically channelled through the same agencies as ECW grantees. At the operational level the cluster also played a critical role in ensuring coordination with all partners, including Government. However, inter-cluster coordination was weak.

28. The Government used developmental funding for education to build on the earlier humanitarian interventions. Development funding was principally targeted at funding the reconstruction and rehabilitation of educational facilities not covered by humanitarian sources and coordination was reported to be effective. However, strategically there was an unresolved question on whether it was appropriate to use humanitarian funds for resilient classroom reconstruction.

29. Reporting on the FERs was oriented towards accountability rather than learning. There was an appetite amongst grantees to improve the capture and dissemination of learnings on FER supported activities.

Management of the FERs

30. Information on the availability of the FERs was rapidly communicated to cluster members but this channel was not effective in reaching all stakeholders. Potential partners who did not participate in cluster meetings were not reached directly through this channel. This was particularly relevant in Mozambique where the cluster was only constituted at the time of cyclone Idai and many (local) organizations were yet to even be aware of the existence of the cluster. Language was a further barrier.

31. The FER application process was judged to be straightforward by INGO grantees. However, there were significant barriers to some potential applicants, especially local NGOs, including the requirement for HACT assessment.

32. The criteria and processes used for the selection of grantees lacked consistency between rounds. Clear criteria and processes were established for the selection of grantees in the first round. However, the imposition of additional criteria at a late stage by the Government in the second round was problematic, as was direct pre-selection by ECW of grantees for the COVID-19 FERs. The participation of UNICEF and STC staff in the award process raised questions on a potential conflict of interest.

33. While efforts to analyse the cost-efficiency of FER proposals were improving, there was limited use of this in the award process and little consideration of the cost-efficiency of the

FER process as a whole. There was little debate on whether there should be a minimum FER grant size in the interests of efficiency.

Fund mobilization

34. Significant additional humanitarian funds were mobilized to support the emergency education response. Global humanitarian policy commitments were reported as the main drivers to decision-making in Mozambique. However, the FER provided visibility to both education needs and provided confidence in the ability of agencies to respond effectively. Significant additional development funds were also mobilized to support the education recovery. This was principally encouraged through strong government advocacy.

Coordinated approach to implementation

35. Managing the ECW FER through the education cluster provided a very effective platform to ensure coordinated design and implementation across the education emergency response, including government. Community participation in the FERs occurred principally during implementation rather than during design process due to the rapid preparation of proposals.

36. The processing of FER grants failed to meet targeted turnaround periods. The main delays appear to have occurred during the finalization of the proposals. However, these delays were not generally considered significant compared to alternative funding sources.

Contribution to building country capacities

37. The FERs made a limited contribution to the capacity of humanitarian coordination structures through the inclusion of budget support for coordination by UNICEF and STC. However, the Mozambique Education Cluster relied primarily on other resources to be established.

38. There was little evidence that the FER contributed purposively to building capacity of grantees, although the experience of implementation provided an opportunity for agencies to improve their operational capacities and skills. LNGOs expressed a strong demand to enhance their capacities for proposal preparation.

39. While not a specific objective of the FERs, ECW funded activities made some contributions to the capacity of government to respond to education in emergencies in areas such as standards and monitoring. There was some evidence that innovations in teacher training and curricula advancements promoted by the FERs were being mainstreamed into national systems.

Effectiveness

40. The FERS contributed to restoring post-cyclone access to education for crisis-affected boys and girls, albeit with some delays partly attributed to a range of contextual factors outside the control of grantees. The provision of education materials was noted to be a particularly effective intervention, but the timeliness was compromised by delays in UNICEF's centralized procurement. The Government request for grantees to change their implementation to focus on the rehabilitation of damaged structures rather than providing TLS introduced substantial delays.

41. All of the FERs included aspects of teacher training in the proposals, but the evidence on the effectiveness of these trainings was largely subjective as the monitoring framework did not include specific indicators.

42. A number of measures had been adopted by grantees to encourage the participation of girls. Similar levels of coverage for boys and girls were realized in FER funded projects. While gender related protection issues were identified in the design of successive FER rounds, the effectiveness of the mitigating measures during implementation was not clearly monitored or reported on.

43. Grantees reported that children with disability were prioritized for support under the FER. However, no data was collected or reported on either baseline numbers of children with disabilities in the catchment of beneficiary schools, or the number of children with disabilities supported through the FER.

Conclusions

44. The ECW FER provided an appropriate vehicle for responding to the emergency related needs of learners in Mozambique and added value over other alternative mechanisms. The cyclone-FER fulfilled its core objective in helping to get children back to school quickly and the COVID-19 FERs were helpful in triggering a rapid response to the first phase of the crisis when schools were still closed and leveraging other resources.

45. The quality and effectiveness of the FER depends heavily on the skills and capacity of the national coordinating body. In the case of Mozambique, the ECW benefitted from a strong and experienced cluster team and the provision of knowledgeable in-country surge support at the start of the crisis was also critical. Information on FERs was heavily concentrated amongst cluster members and this was a problem, especially as the newly established clusters lacked inclusivity.

46. While the FER application process is perceived as relatively straightforward and timely, there are opportunities to improve the efficiency and clarity of the FER application and award processes. There is a strong argument for relaxing the overly onerous deadlines imposed on partners for their initial submission to support an improved quality of the first draft proposals.

47. Clarity on the available budget – both the total size of the window and the likely size of awards – is needed at the outset of the process. Further attention is needed on ensuring overall cost-efficiency. This includes better guidance on the assessment of the cost-efficiency of individual proposals at the point of grantee selection and the size of awards.

48. Consistent and transparent criteria and processes are needed during the review and award process, including mitigating concerns over potential conflicts of interest in the dual role of UNICEF and STC and coordination leads and implementing agencies.

49. The monitoring and learning processes associated with FER grants could be strengthened and improved. Reporting systems are effective in ensuring a level of accountability but include little information on higher level results and strategic priorities including gender and disability. In-country process level monitoring was lacking and there is no durable mechanism for capturing and sharing cross-learning between FER grantees.

50. There has been little progress towards the localization agenda with a clear tension between the necessity of using partners with both proven capacities to deliver in emergencies and to assure accountability, against the aspiration to nurture local capacity.

Niger

Methodology

51. The case study of the design, management and implementation of FERs in Niger investigated whether ECW's theories of how the FERs will result in beneficiary outcomes at country level are valid. In particular, it assessed whether the assumptions, explicit or implicit, that were made in designing the FER, hold in practice in Niger. The theory-based evaluation of FER implementation through desk work, country-level investigations and analysis of responses to the Evaluation Questionnaire, is complemented by assessment of the complementarity of ECW FER with other global mechanisms for funding EIE through consultation with global and country actors; a survey of grantees; an analysis of the FER global project database; and additional in-depth analysis of selected projects and grants.

Country and education context

52. Niger remains one of the poorest countries in the world in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. In 2016 it was 40 per cent lower than in 1960. In 2018 the country ranked last in the Human Development Index. The country is very vulnerable to regional economic shocks, e.g. recession in Nigeria and fluctuations in global commodity prices (especially oil and uranium prices). Around 45 per cent of children live under the monetary poverty line.

53. Two in three children under the age of five experience at least four deprivations simultaneously. Severe problems of undernutrition and malnutrition, which affect fifty per cent of all children under five, compromise cognitive development and can lead to chronic diseases, or death. Eight in ten children have experienced violent discipline.

54. Three quarters of girls in Niger are married before the age of 18. Girls also become mothers very early: one in three adolescent girls aged 15 to 19 have already given birth or are pregnant. The fertility rate is estimated at an average of 7.3 births per woman. The high birth rate, combined with malnutrition, multidimensional poverty, a lack of access to schools and low levels of literacy among parents, hinders the potential for human development.

55. The education system suffers from a number of chronic challenges: regional armed conflicts, which have led to widespread school closures and displacements; the massive expansion of the chronically underfunded education system due to the very high percentage of the population being under the age of 18; very low levels of literacy and numeracy skills, due partly to deficiencies in teacher skills; and persistent governance weaknesses.

Evaluation findings

Extent to which FERs in Niger are meeting their envisaged purposes

56. The Sahel Round 1 and Round 2 FERs were approved for three countries – Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso – in the Sahel region. However, in reality, they did not represent an

integrated 'regional' response, since there is little formal coordination between the country FERs.

57. Respondents felt the Niger FERs deliver quick funding to a strongly underfunded sector. FER funding seems likely to have been additional to other sources of humanitarian funding. Approved FERs are based on HRP's, and are strongly guided by the Education Cluster's needs assessments, with strong involvement of government actors at sub-national level. Overall, FERs are judged to be providing relevant services, well adapted to the situation on the ground. There was also a clear appreciation from grantees that ECW worked through the Education Cluster.

58. Challenges include: the questionable sustainability of 'traditional' forms of support to schools in the Sahel Round 1 and 2 FERs in the context of the security situation, although the Sahel Round 1 FER and the COVID-19 FERs enabled grantees to examine the possibility of providing distance and home-based models of education support; the scant focus on non-formal education in the FERs, which means that FER activities have struggled to reach many out-of-school children. The needs of learners, especially those crossing borders, were unlikely to have been fully taken into account directly. This is largely felt to be due to the speed of the FER approval processes, which precluded direct information gathering from beneficiaries.

Assessment of FER outcomes in Niger

59. Respondents valued ECW's global and national advocacy efforts, and reported that FERs have played a role in making EiE more prominent in Niger. The strong focus of the FERs on service delivery has helped to provide additional access to schools, despite grantee field-based activities being made significantly more difficult by the COVID-19 outbreak. However, increases in education quality have not been demonstrated across the Niger FER portfolio.

Assessment of whether ECW and Niger FER grantees are fulfilling their roles

60. While there were lacunae in the provision of information at cluster level in the first and second round of Niger FERs, information had been much better shared in the COVID-19 FERs application processes. Some respondents still voiced concerns about the process of selecting grantees in the fourth round FER. Furthermore, several respondents expressed a concern that the speed of the process (submitting applications in a matter of days) makes it very hard for national NGOs to respond.

61. ECW was much appreciated as a donor. The quality of ECW's support e.g. guidance, webinars, and emails explaining the application process, was felt to have improved over time. UNICEF had a conflict of interest in the first FER since they were both FER manager and sole funding recipient. FER grantees were felt to have fulfilled their roles. UNICEF was felt to have played an important and valued role as Cluster Coordinator, and that the coordination and operation of the Cluster had improved under successive rounds of FER funding. However, monitoring and evaluation of FERs is not coordinated as ECW communicated with individual grantees, and not collectively through e.g. the Education Cluster.

Conclusions

62. FERs are appropriate and relevant to the situation in the selected regions of Niger, as the situation facing Niger and the Sahel region is definitely very urgent and FERs are targeting

the right responses. FERs have reached high numbers of people in an otherwise markedly underfunded sector. However, the size and level of funding of the interventions is still quite small relative to the needs of the populations.

63. Despite the contextual challenges, FER stakeholders in Niger generally felt that the FERs have delivered education funding quickly in an otherwise markedly underfunded sector. Niger FERs have largely been rolled out as planned, except for a delay in Sahel Round 1 implementation and difficulties in reaching populations and undertaking activities post-March 2020. The COVID-19 FERs were launched to address these challenges. Overall, the FER modality is seen as promoting a rapid, more coordinated approach to EiE in Niger.

64. There is no strong evidence that development partners have been significantly involved, or that the development-humanitarian nexus has been strengthened. This may be due to the extremely quick turnaround for FER proposals, and short (six-month) implementation periods. No signs of FERs competing with other funds were noted.

65. The Sahel Round 1 and Round 2 FERs were regional in name only. Mainly due to the short application time, a lack of coordination resulted in there being no links between activities in Niger and the other two countries (Mali and Burkina Faso).

66. Country systems and capacities have delivered good ownership of FERs by stakeholders, and sound coordination in the framing of Niger FERs and relevant activities. The Education Cluster has been enlivened by ECW, and serves to disseminate information coming from ECW after overcoming initial issues regarding information sharing.

67. There is no strong evidence that the capacities of Niger national government authorities to assess, plan, implement, monitor and evaluate EiE responses have been developed, as per the FER Theory of Change. There is a sense that the ability of national NGOs to respond to FER proposals, and be involved in FER delivery, should be enhanced further. Sub-national actors seem to be usefully involved in cluster and FER activities.

68. FER outputs, e.g. the numbers of children assisted, learning materials delivered, teachers trained etc., have been largely delivered according to plan. In terms of outcomes, FER interventions seem to have contributed to restoring access to education and providing a basic level of education – mainly at the primary level – for crisis-affected children. But there is little evidence that increases in education quality are occurring across the education portfolio.

Nigeria

Methodology

69. The ECW FER evaluation investigates the FER modality, and its implementation at regional and country level through several data collection processes, including in-depth country case studies. Nigeria was selected as an illustrative case study of the use of the ECW FER to respond to a protracted complex emergency and COVID-19. The primary limitation to the Nigeria case study was due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The adjusted evaluation plan excluded travel for international team members to Nigeria and meant that the majority of interviews were conducted remotely.

Context

70. North-east Nigeria has faced a long, protracted conflict, witnessing insurgency from 2009 as Boko Haram, a non-state armed group, have carried out violent attacks on the north-eastern states. It was estimated that more than 20,000 people had been killed, more than 4,000 people abducted and 1.6 million people remained displaced. Nigeria is facing the added threat of the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly for 18 million IDPs in the Borno, Adamawa and Yobe (BAY) states.

71. Though basic education is free, it continues to suffer from low and inequitable access. Large numbers of children remain out of school, largely as a result of poverty with a need for parents to pay for school uniforms, learning materials and fees charged by schools. In addition, in some states a preference exists for educating boys and not educating girls and 'Western' education is often viewed as incompatible with Islamic teachings and a traditional way of life, especially for girls and women.

72. In the northern states of Nigeria, Islamic education plays a central role in the basic education system. Purely Qur'anic schools teach no formal subjects, and receive no state funding. Many students classed as out-of-school in Nigeria attend un-registered Qur'anic schools. Islamiyya schools, which integrate Qur'anic education with the state basic education curriculum, receive the same funding as state schools.

73. The crisis in the north-east has devastated an already struggling education system that is characterized by a limited number of qualified teachers, as well as a severe lack of infrastructure, learning and teaching materials and overcrowded classrooms. Throughout the crisis, especially between 2009 and 2015, education has been the object of deliberate and systematic attacks.

74. The 2018 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) estimated that 2.9 million school-aged children and education personnel are in need of emergency education support in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states. The response is coordinated through Education in Emergencies Working Groups (EiEWG) which are active at the national level and in north-east Nigeria.

75. ECW provided USD 2.5 million in 2018 through a conflict-FER to support the rapid construction and rehabilitation of classrooms, provision of essential education supplies, capacity building of teachers and provision of formal and non-formal education. The four grantees were UNICEF, Street Child, Plan International and Save the Children. A second FER, a COVID-19 FER totalling USD 1 million, was awarded in 2020 to the same grantees. The objectives included prevention of transmission, development of alternative approaches to education, including e-learning and radio programmes, and preparation for a return to school.

Evaluation findings

Relevance and appropriateness

76. Conflict related displacement in north-east Nigeria, combined with underlying large numbers of out-of-school children, resulted in massive unmet educational needs. The conflict-FER contributed to addressing this gap and also appropriately identified the need for advocacy for significant additional humanitarian financing to support the education sector. The primary objectives and activities of the FERs were appropriately aligned with the strategic priorities of

ECW – promoting access to education either through continued education or encouraging the return of out-of-school children.

77. Grantees were experienced operational partners but effectively limited to UN agencies and INGOs. No LINGOs were direct recipients of FER grants, although they were critical in enabling activities to be carried out in hard to reach areas.

78. The short duration of the FERs had limitations in addressing a protracted complex emergency – as well as the continuing needs of the COVID-19 response. The need for support in Nigeria was longer-term as the government capacity to re-establish schools was very limited. The initial phase of COVID-19 FER funding focussed on preventing the spread of the disease and mitigating the impact of school closures. The anticipated second phase of COVID-19 FER funding to focus on supporting the reopening of schools did not proceed.

79. The conflict-FER strategy included limited analysis of, and adaptation to, the social, political and security context of the north-east. This is significant given the centrality of attacks against education within the conflict. The opportunity to use schools as a platform for peace building is not adopted as a common strategic priority. The emergency response (and consequently the FER) was closely aligned with government policy, with less attention to humanitarian principles. The political objective of returning populations into potentially insecure locations required closer attention to the risks of 'doing no harm.'

Coverage and reach

80. Nigeria is experiencing a number of concurrent complex and natural disasters with negative impacts on education. There is a continuing debate on whether international humanitarian assistance should target additional (or alternative) crises within the country. In the north-east, the coverage of the FERs was limited and below ECW targets. The conflict-FER covered only five per cent of the funding gaps for the grantees and a small fraction of the total needs. The COVID-19 FER covered 13 per cent of the estimated needs.

81. The FER proposal emphasized the inclusion of girls and clear targets were set for the participation of girls. With Boko Haram recruiting young boys, there are gender related concerns for both boys and girls. However, there was a lack of detailed analysis of security risks associated with the FER, or the definition of clear mitigating activities.

82. The conflict-FER proposal also indicated that children with disabilities would be prioritized for inclusion. This was to be addressed through activities including awareness creation amongst parents and teachers and the provision of disability-friendly classrooms and latrines. However, the analysis of the specific challenges related to disability was quite superficial. Unlike gender, ECW did not have a dedicated disability expert and grantees reported less attention to the treatment of disability in proposals.

Coherence and connectedness

83. The FERs were closely aligned to the relevant humanitarian and government strategies for supporting education in the north-east of Nigeria. The conflict-FER was able to capitalize on a pre-existing HRP that had been developed for Nigeria. Similarly, the COVID-19 FER was closely aligned to a number of relevant government strategies.

84. In theory the EiEWG coordinated with the other sector working groups through membership the Inter-Sector Working Group. However, there was little record of the practical results of this inter-sectoral coordination.

85. There was good coordination with other sources of humanitarian financing for education and the different FERs complemented the use of other donor funds. However, there was little explicit attention amongst longer-term development actors on building on the conflict FER activities to provide longer-term solutions.

Management of the FERs

86. The awareness of the conflict-FER was focused on EiEWG partners based in the north-east. Many of the evaluation respondents based in Abuja – government, donor and implementing agency – had very little knowledge of the FER. This somewhat limited the range of applicants.

87. The award of FER grants lacked sufficient transparency and accountability. There was no open call for proposals or any submissions of interest prior to the decision being taken on grantees. The relatively large allocation to UNICEF consequently raised questions, despite an underlying rationale for the division of the funds.

88. The conflict-FER application and award process fell short of internal targets for confirming the awards and disbursing funds. However, the FER was still perceived as more rapid than many alternatives and in the context of an ongoing protracted emergency the delays were not problematic. The processing of the COVID-19 FER applications was noted to be very timely and enabled a very rapid response.

89. Cost-efficiencies were achieved by the FERs building on ongoing educational activities being implemented by the grantees. However, the overall efficiency was compromised by the overhead costs associated with the award of a number of small grants.

90. Reporting on the FERs was oriented to the purpose of accountability and there was little lesson-learning by ECW from the FER in Nigeria. The Nigeria case appeared to offer a particularly fruitful context for cross-learning given the diversity of approaches piloted by different partners.

Fund mobilization

91. Improvements in EiE funding over time appear to be primarily driven by global rather than local advocacy and preceded the ECW FER support. Major donors to education in the north-east, including DFID, the EU and Germany, had already committed increased funding prior to the entry of the ECW FER.

Coordinated approach to implementation

92. The coordination with Government occurred largely at State level, mediated through the EiEWG for the north-east. The ability of ECW to advocate and influence at federal level is limited by its small scale. This potentially has most relevance in the context of framing a MYRP for Nigeria.

93. Communities were involved during implementation but there was little evidence of involvement in the design of the FERs. There has been little exploration of what type of education parents would want for their children – for example formal or religious schooling.

Contribution to building country capacities

94. The conflict-FER facilitated improvements in the coordination capacity of the north-east EiEWG during the implementation period. However, it is notable that this investment in coordination came during implementation and did not benefit the design phase of the FER.

95. The FER grantees were selected for their pre-existing capacities and track record. Within the very limited funds allocated to three of the four grantees there was limited scope to invest in capacity building of the grantees as the budgets were heavily oriented towards the delivery of educational supplies. Capacity building of local partners – came from complementary sources.

96. The FER provided systems strengthening of the state and local government structures and training of staff – including teachers, training of trainers and school inspectors. However, the short duration of the FER funding meant that these activities had to be sustained using other sources of funding.

Effectiveness

97. The FERs were effective in bringing a number of learners into education, providing school materials to a larger number of learners already in school and maintaining access to education during the COVID-19 crisis. The quality of educational outcomes was supported through effective investments in teacher training that were associated with learning gains. A major component of the conflict-FER programme was a coordinated investment in teacher training.

98. Rapid response support for education could have a whole multitude of impacts on the health and wellbeing for children displaced by conflict. However, synergies of protection, health and WASH activities with education activities occurred at the agency rather than system level.

99. On aggregate the conflict-FER reached 45 per cent of girls, but more impressively, over half the out-of-school learners who joined the TLCs (50.5 per cent) were girls. There was limited attention to ensuring school safety within FER projects, for example the conflict-FER did not fund the erection of perimeter fencing of schools and TLCs. The effectiveness of including children with disabilities in FER projects was uncertain as results were not disaggregated by ability.

Conclusions

100. The FER activities were found to be generally effective in ensuring access to education, by both maintaining access to education and by bringing a number of learners into education. There are opportunities to further enhance effectiveness through improved logistics and capitalizing on schools as a platform for multi-sectoral interventions. While there is a strong policy commitment to the inclusion of children with disabilities, there was considerable room for improvement in how this is addressed through the FER strategies and activities.

101. The FER played a selective but strategically important role in strengthening key capacities of government and coordination bodies, but less in the case of local NGOs. Given the limited resources and short time frames of the FERs it is important to have realistic expectations of what can be achieved in terms of capacity strengthening.

102. Given the huge scale of unmet educational needs in north-east Nigeria a stronger priority should be leveraging ECW support to advocate for greater donor investment – both humanitarian and development – for the education sector in Nigeria. However, advocacy was not an explicit FER activity at country level.

103. There was a clear justification for ECW support to learners in north-east Nigeria. However, the short-term nature of the FER were not well suited to addressing the protracted crisis in north-east Nigeria. The FER would have benefitted from a social and political analysis as a basis for developing the response strategy.

104. The decision to share ECW FER resources amongst EiEWG members – rather than compete for them – had implications for diversity and efficiency.

Afghanistan

Context

105. In 2017, various humanitarian reports pointed to high numbers of documented and undocumented refugees returning from Pakistan. This can be seen as a particular emergency within a protracted crisis. The already strained education system was facing an enormous influx of students. The humanitarian reports stated that 2016 saw an increase of 567 per cent of returnees compared with 2015, and up to 1 million new returnees were expected in 2017, adding to the existing 3.5 million out-of-school children, of whom 75 per cent were girls. A high number of returnees moved to the eastern-central, northern and north-eastern regions.

106. Classrooms were overcrowded and lacking basic infrastructure, the education system faced massive teacher shortages. Along with supply-side problems, early marriage and child labour were also seen as major reasons for low attendance rates. Although the government had asked schools to also enrol children who did not possess the required documentation, undocumented children had difficulties accessing schools. A lack of gender-segregated sanitation facilities and a lack of female teachers – which was seen as a major driver of girls' enrolment – were further barriers to education.

Findings and conclusions

107. Two international NGOs (IRC and SCI) and one national NGO (WADAN) were selected to carry out activities funded by ECW's FER. Selection was made after the Ministry of Education and sector partners scored all the proposals submitted. All organizations explicitly tie their activities to the Afghanistan Humanitarian Response Plan, Humanitarian Needs Overview and/or the EiE Working Group's Education in Emergencies Response Plan for Afghanistan. These plans identified priority provinces in which the organizations implemented their projects, further basing their selections on organizational presence per province and selecting provinces with high numbers of returnees and IDPs. The interventions were also connected to education plans for the country. The National Education Strategic Plan highlights the importance and

added value of Community-based Education, which was the central component of the three proposals.

108. The number of days between the FER announcement and budget disbursement ranges between 178 for WADAN and 285 for IRC. Most of this can be explained through the long period between FER announcement and final proposal. The reason for this long duration is the low number of HACT-assessed organizations with an expertise in education. ECW/UNICEF organized a micro-assessment to allow a higher number of organizations to submit a proposal.

109. Some interventions were more crisis-sensitive than others. Regarding the content of the interventions, IRC's 'Healing Classrooms' sticks out as particularly conflict-sensitive. The Healing Classroom approach includes MHPSS as a transversal element in its teacher professional development component. In general, the proposals treated 'conflict' quite generically and do not explicitly discuss its specificities, except for the fact that women are particularly marginalized from education and that education facilities are frequent sites of attack. The proposals, however, did not raise the question whether, for example, schools would welcome students from different ethnic or religious backgrounds that were pitted against each other in the conflict.

110. The interventions included diverse instruments to increase girls' education from a rights-based perspective. For example, IRC targets the recruitment of 40 per cent female teachers as evidence clearly shows the presence of female teachers to be a key element in access and the retention of girls. The grantees did not pay significant attention to children with disabilities (CwD). Only one out of three grantees targeted CwD, but even in this case, the total number of CwD beneficiaries remains rather low (a total of 60 children with a disability out of a total of 10,000).

111. Communities seem to have had little voice in shaping the project's content but were helpful facilitators in strengthening the project's implementation and resilience in challenging circumstances. From a more academic perspective, the use of the term 'community' is very simplistic as it works from the understanding that communities are homogeneous groups, which is often not the case. Furthermore, 'communities' are not always benevolent and welcoming of all interventions, as WADAN's report notes: "The lack of willingness by entire communities to help and support disabled children is another challenge to the project." (WADAN 2018 Annual Report). Unfortunately, WADAN does not specify what that meant for the project. No information was available on the usefulness and impact of feedback mechanisms.

112. The ECW provided feedback on the proposals, but it is difficult to tell whether content-related feedback actually reached grantees and how it shaped the proposals. ECW also supported HACT mini assessments to increase the number of potential applications. This was a positive outcome but took a long time.

113. By and large, outcomes were achieved. Overall, due to the short time span after project finalization, the final reports are naturally limited to outcomes. In the case of IRC, the numbers of created CBEs and targeted students were higher than outlined. IRC was able to reach extra targets due to particular circumstances: devaluation of Afghan currency which resulted in savings; unexpected donation of textbooks; and communities handing over classrooms at no cost. STC largely met its goals, except for the share of different groups (returnees/IDP/host

communities). Notwithstanding the fact that WADAN reached higher targets than intended, the organization is critical of the project design in terms of its duration, as it ended in the middle of the school year.

114. During implementation, some schools closed temporarily due to reoccurring violence. Strong ties with communities allowed the NGOs to respond to this volatile context. The project also benefitted from a no-cost project extension to allow children to finish the school year

115. The grantees also identified a number of external challenges during implementation. SCI reported significant problems in recruiting qualified teachers. IRC faces some challenges due to drought and heat. As a result, it had to invest in water and other equipment. Official teacher salaries increased during the implementation of the project. Finally, WADAN and SCI complained about lengthy administrative government processes that slowed down project implementation.

Nepal

Context

116. Following intense rains, the HRP (Flooding Response Plan or Joint Response Plan – JRP) based on early assessments indicated that 790 schools have been affected in 24 districts. The FER grant was designed to provide humanitarian assistance to 90,865 school-aged children affected by flooding in the 12 most affected districts in the Terai region of Nepal. Activities focused on provision of educational materials, cleaning and repairing damaged WASH facilities in schools, and training teachers and school management committee (SMC) members on lifesaving messages and hygiene promotion.

Findings and conclusions

117. Selection of grantees followed a pre-agreed set of criteria. The Education Cluster co-leads (Save the Children and UNICEF) called together the Education Cluster Core Members group. Among these core members, it was agreed that the proposal would include organizations with an active presence in the affected region, technical expertise, and sufficient capacity to respond, including the needs of coordination, communication, and information sharing. Following these criteria, the four grantees were selected, and their participation was structured following geographical criteria. UNESCO took the lead on the teacher training portion of the work in the districts where UNICEF and Save the Children were active. Plan implemented the teacher training activities directly within their project. In the worst affected district (Rautahat), work was to be jointly undertaken by UNICEF and Plan. Both UNICEF and Plan had a presence in this district.

118. It is difficult to evaluate the transparency and inclusiveness of the process based on the documents available. The documents consulted suggest a relatively open and transparent process within the cluster group. Direct participation of local NGOs was limited. The Education Cluster Core Members group includes government representation but does not have a significant presence of local NGOs (MDRC is the only Nepalese NGO in the group). Nonetheless, three grantees include local organizations among their partners. These are Plan, Save the Children and UNESCO. UNICEF also relied on three partners for implementation, but

they are all international organizations (and members of the Education Cluster Core Members Group).

119. The grant process in Nepal was relatively fast. According to the FER database, the final proposal was submitted on 11 October 2017, the grant confirmation letter was issued on 30 October 2017 and funds for all grantees were disbursed on 10 November 2017 (Save the Children received them earlier on 7 November 2017). The delay between the final proposal and the disbursement of the funds took an average of 29 days. This is well below the FER average delay between the two same phases recorded for both 2018 (61 days) and 2019 (41 days). There is not enough data from other FER grants to estimate the average for 2017.

120. The ECW FER project was relevant to the context and was aligned with the HRP. Following the early response by the Government of Nepal, it was agreed that the FER proposal would focus on the 12 most affected districts. This decision was taken at the Education Cluster, where the Department of Education is represented. The three main activities agreed for the FER project are included in the HRP. The FER project also provided good coverage, especially when compared with the number of target beneficiaries. Geographically, the FER project covered 12 out of the 24 districts affected by flooding. The ECW project was implemented in the context of the education plans for the country and within existing coordination structures.

121. Efforts to reach the most marginalized varied from one partner to another and are often dependent on the nature of the activities undertaken. In general, there is evidence that the needs of vulnerable and marginalized groups (gender, disability, minorities, etc.) were considered, but there is limited evidence to conclude that marginalized and vulnerable groups were prioritized or intentionally targeted. For example, there is no gender data on the gender distribution of students in different schools. Also, the focus on marginalized population groups is most likely the result of the geographical focus, rather than an intentional targeting during the implementation of the activities.

122. Most grantees reached or exceeded the objectives set in the proposal with the exception of Save the Children. The final report does not discuss or indicate any challenges in relation to the distribution of individual learning materials and it is not possible to explain the shortfall. In general, performance in the total number of children reached (both total and with learning materials) has been significantly larger than expected for some grantees. This is explained by a broad definition of indicators that allow school levels activities to be counted as having reached all children. Moreover, the indicators are inconsistently applied by grantees.

123. There is limited evidence in the document database about whether or how the FER grant helped to raise the profile of education in emergency. The evaluation conducted by Plan does mention that the grant helped to strengthen the capacity of local organizations to coordinate and respond to emergencies. The final reports presented by UNICEF and UNESCO also mention that trainings at the school level have helped schools and local authorities gain a better understanding of school safety disaster preparedness and management. This is considered important given the decentralization process being implemented in Nepal and by which more responsibilities in relation to education (and other areas) are being devolved to local authorities. At the same time, grantees made significant efforts to coordinate the response among themselves as well as to coordinate with government and other actors. These

efforts could have helped to raise the profile of EiE among project stakeholders, but it is not possible to reach a firm conclusion from the information available.

124. Documents reveal limited information about the cost-effectiveness of the implementation. The analysis of project reports reveals that both Plan and Save the Children included much higher staff costs in the project than UNESCO and UNICEF. The analysis of spending categories reveals that UNESCO's did little direct implementation and it is essentially channelling funds to other organizations. UNESCO essentially manages the grant and monitors its implementation. Across all grantees, overall budget execution was very good.

125. The final reports indicate that grantees consulted and involved affected populations in the different stages of the project. A large number of meetings were held by grantees at different levels to coordinate implementation. Grantees that conducted activities at school level (repairs, WASH, etc.) informed school staff and students about the selection criteria and invited them to participate in the selection of beneficiaries and the identification of needs. School staff and students were also involved in monitoring and evaluation activities. Feedback and complaints mechanisms were set in place by all grantees.

126. Grantees reported a series of small issues that affected project implementation and/or delayed some of the interventions. None of these aspects seems to have had a significant impact on implementation. A summary list is provided below:

- Ongoing decentralization process (UNESCO and Save the Children)
- Small thefts of material (UNICEF)
- Project timing: the project comprised a holiday season and the start of a new school year. In addition, some of the activities were implemented during an active agricultural season making it difficult to find labour. Elections also took place in one province delaying implementation.
- Capacity and coordination of implementing partners was not always adequate or straightforward, requiring training and additional efforts from grantees (Save the Children).

Annex 9 Comparative analysis of other education funds

1. This annex assesses the complementarity and coherence of ECW's FER funding window with three other funds for education: the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) Rapid Response Window grants, OCHA's Country-Based Pooled Funds (CBPFs), and the Global Partnership for Education Accelerated Facility (AF).
2. In order to facilitate the reading, this annex starts by presenting, in summary form, the results of the analysis. The following sections provide a more detailed description of the different funds and contain the evidence that underpins the analysis.

Complementarity and coherence between the FER and other funds

3. The FER can be considered as a funding modality that, in general terms, complements existing sources of financing for EiEPC. Complementarity is generally achieved through coordination with other funds during design implementation and/or by differences in term of scope, size, grantee organizations and the time frame.
4. The table below discusses the complementarity between the FER and other funds based on the similarities and differences during set up and operation (e.g. triggers, grantees, administrative and coordination arrangements, time frames). This short summary table builds on the detailed information presented further down in the annex.

Table 26 FERs and complementary funds

Funds	FER complementarity	Highlights
CERF RRW	<p>The FERs complement CERF RRW grants insofar as they are education specific and can contract non-UN partners directly. CERF RRW grants are also coordinated through country-based structures: in principle they should be complementary to ECW FERs.</p> <p>The CERF shares many of the FER design characteristics, including a short implementation time frame, similar triggers, and field-level design and coordination through the cluster system. Two key difference, however, are that (i) the CERF RRWs are not education specific; and (ii) that the CERF can finance only UN agencies, which can in turn contract non-UN and local partners. CERF RRWs are supported through OCHA offices in the field.</p>	<p>Non-education specific</p> <p>Similar coordination structures to FER</p> <p>Rapid delivery</p> <p>Can finance UN agencies only</p>
CBPFs	<p>FERs complement CBPFs as they can respond very quickly in new emergencies, while CBPFs are being set up. Not all emergencies merit CBPFs. CBPFs have more flexible risk management procedures that allow direct grants to LINGOs more easily. CBPF education allocations are linked to country clusters through the strategic review process for proposals done by selected country cluster members: in principle they should be complementary to the ECW FERs.</p> <p>The CBPFs are also aimed at responding when emergencies occur or escalate, are closely coordinated with clusters and</p>	<p>Not always created</p> <p>Slow/longer delivery time frame</p> <p>More flexible procedures</p> <p>Similar coordination structures to FER</p>

Funds	FER complementarity	Highlights
	<p>finance education interventions, but also differ from FERs in key respects. As country-based funds with advisory boards, strategic and technical review committees, local operational manuals and a local humanitarian financing unit, they take longer to be set up once the process is triggered. Once set up, they can respond rapidly through the reserve fund mechanism. CBPFs fund all sectors. CBPFs are also flexible in terms of the type of organizations funded and they have more country-specific risk mitigation strategies.</p>	
GPE	<p>The key difference between the FERs and the GPE Accelerated Funding window is the way in which they are managed at country level, and size. The GPE Accelerated Funding can be much larger at up to 20 per cent of the ESPIC (e.g. the USD 11.8 million AF grant to Sudan, and a USD 15 million COVID-19 grant to Mozambique).</p> <p>AF grants are triggered through local education groups and managed by grant agents that manage the funds against the operational plan and budget. Complementarity between FERs and GPE Accelerated Funding funds depends on the degree to which the local education group, grant agent or government engages with the education cluster.</p> <p>AF Funds can be delivered fast, with a target period from initiation to disbursement of about six weeks. Disbursement to the grant agent, however, does not equal implementation as implementing organizations are only then contracted.</p> <p>FERs complement GPE Accelerated Funding insofar as they are channelled more through humanitarian networks, whereas GPE Accelerated Funding in practice deal more with government's response to crisis and emergency. GPE Accelerated Funding grants are managed by a single grant agent, whereas FERs are disbursed directly to implementing agents in most cases. In the pre-COVID AFs, the GPE funds focused more on systemic impacts, but the COVID-19 window targeted the most vulnerable.</p>	<p>Large size Rapid delivery More focused on government's response Work through grant agent</p>

Source: Global Interviews, UNOCHA CERF and CBPF Guidelines and Manuals, GPE Accelerated Funding and COVID-19 AF Guidelines.

Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) Rapid Response Window (RRW)⁴⁸

5. The CERF was established by the General Assembly in 2005. The three primary objectives of the Fund are to: 1) promote early action and response to reduce loss of life; 2) enhance response to time-critical humanitarian requirements; and 3) strengthen core elements of humanitarian response in underfunded crises.

⁴⁸ Based on OCHA (2012). CERF Rapid Response Window: Procedures and Criteria. OCHA; and CERF Secretariat (2017). CERF Rapid Response. Overview of Methodology. CERF Secretariat.

6. The CERF is a fund composed of a USD 50 million loan mechanism and an additional grant element with a funding target of USD 450 million per year. The CERF grant element is divided into two windows: the rapid response window (approximately two thirds of the grant element) and the underfunded emergencies windows (approximately one third of the grant element).

7. In particular, the CERF rapid response window (RRW) provides funding for life-saving humanitarian activities in the following contexts:

- sudden onset disasters,
- rapid and significant deteriorations of existing crises, and
- time-critical interventions.

8. RRW grants provide initial funds to start-up or scale-up essential humanitarian activities, and partners are expected to seek other resources to complement the CERF funding. The main features of the CERF RR are described in the table below. The application and implementation process is described in detail after the table.

Table 27 Main features of the CERF RRW

Amount available	The maximum amount applied to a crisis in a given year typically does not exceed USD 30 million , although higher allocations can be made at the discretion of the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) in exceptional circumstances.
Implementation time frame	All funds should be committed and project activities completed within six months of the date that the funds are disbursed from CERF to the recipient agency headquarters. In cases where agencies have had to begin expensing funds before this date in order to meet urgent priorities, the agency may specify an earlier start date, not exceeding six weeks prior to the disbursement date and not before the onset of the emergency.
Purpose/triggers	(a) sudden onset emergencies, (b) a rapid/significant deterioration of an existing humanitarian situation, (c) time-critical interventions.
Eligible organizations	UN Agencies (except OCHA) and the IOM As manager of the CERF, OCHA cannot receive grant funding but may apply for a loan. UN agencies may not pass on CERF funds to other UN agencies. When several UN agencies or IOM collaborate on a project, separate budgets should be presented for individual agency components of the project.
Criteria for approval	Proposed humanitarian projects should, where feasible, clearly: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - respond to the needs of a sudden onset emergency, rapid deterioration of an existing crisis, or time-critical intervention. - be based on recent, coordinated needs assessments, demonstrate access/capacity to implement, be essential for the humanitarian response, and prioritized by the humanitarian country team and the RC/HC through a consultative process. - comply with the Guidance on CERF Life-saving Criteria (26 January 2010) and any sectoral guidelines set by the ERC at the time of allocation.

- CERF rapid response funds should 'jump-start' rather than fully fund projects. CERF cannot fund 100 per cent of project requirements, except in rare circumstances.

Application process

9. The Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) is responsible for determining the process, tools, and entities involved in the establishment of funding priorities and the selection of proposals for funding based on the context and coordination forums in country. The CERF grant request is expected to be based on a field-driven process. The use of the humanitarian country team and the sectors/clusters is highly encouraged. The grant development process should be inclusive and transparent, involving UN agencies, IOM, national and international NGOs, government partners, and any other relevant in-country humanitarian actors. If NGO or government partners are not part of these established coordination forums, every effort should be made to engage them through ad hoc arrangements. Reference to the consultation process and stakeholders involved, the tools/criteria used to establish funding priorities and select activities for funding, and the arrangements for the implementation of activities forms part of the application package for CERF funding.

10. In countries where OCHA is present, the OCHA office may provide support including provision of guidance and technical support. In countries with no OCHA presence, the relevant regional OCHA office can provide technical support and in some cases may deploy a staff member on a surge capacity basis to support the prioritization and application process. In addition or alternatively, the RC/HC may decide to form an interagency task team including agency staff with CERF experience to support the prioritization process and the development of the CERF submission.

11. The application process includes the following **steps**:

- The RC/HC and the humanitarian country team review current needs and gaps in the overall humanitarian response, taking into consideration the funding situation of different sectors/clusters and up-to-date needs assessments.
- The RC/HC, in consultation with the humanitarian country team, determines priority sectors/clusters and/or geographic areas or beneficiary groups based on Step 1 for inclusion in the CERF request. Taking into consideration the unmet humanitarian needs, the funding situation of prioritized sectors/clusters and specific emergency programs therein, the RC/HC may suggest preliminary funding amounts for each prioritized sector/cluster. For countries with a Flash Appeal or Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), this document should form the basis for priority setting and project selection.
- Based on the guidance and overarching priorities provided by the RC/HC, sectors/clusters identify priority projects/activities for CERF funding. Projects should be selected based on available needs assessments data, their funding situation, compliance with the CERF Life-saving Criteria (26 January 2010), as well as agencies' operational capacity. In addition, expertise and comparative advantage, as well as the

ability to implement CERF grants within the time frame of the CERF rapid response window, should also be taken into account.

- Agencies prepare CERF grant proposals for prioritized projects. The suggested minimum amount requested per project is USD 100,000. As a general recommendation, funding should not be spread too thinly among many projects, but rather be focused on fewer high impact priority projects.
- The RC/HC, with support from OCHA and/or the interagency task team (where appropriate), ensures that drafted proposals meet the necessary requirements. The RC/HC also validates the specific amount requested by each proposal and agency.
- The RC/HC office with support from OCHA where present consolidates the application package and completes Parts I and II of the application template.
- The RC/HC endorses CERF submission and submits it to the ERC and the CERF Secretariat along with a cover letter.

Revision

12. Following the submission of the grant request, the package is reviewed by the CERF Secretariat in consultation with other branches of OCHA, including the Coordination and Response Division (CRD), and recommendations are prepared by the CERF Secretariat for the decision of the ERC.

Approval and disbursement

13. For those projects approved by the ERC, the recipient agency's headquarters will receive an approval letter to be counter-signed by an authorized representative of the recipient agency and returned to the CERF. The approval letter send to agency headquarters will be accompanied by the final approved version of the agency proposal. Once the CERF Secretariat receives a counter-signed approval letter from the recipient agency, funds are disbursed to the agency headquarters within approximately five working days.

Implementation

14. The implementation period for a rapid response grant is six months from the date of disbursement. During this period all funds should be committed and project activities completed. In cases where an agency has begun expending funds prior to the date of disbursement in order to respond to urgent needs at the onset of an emergency, an earlier start date may be specified in the agency project proposal. This date cannot exceed more than six weeks prior to the date of disbursement and not earlier than the onset of the crisis. Justification for the earlier start date should be provided in the project proposal.

15. Some modifications of the project are allowed:

- **No cost extension:** A no-cost extension can be requested only in cases where the inability to implement are clearly documented to be outside of the control of the recipient agency.
- **Budget Modifications:** minor adjustments of exiting CERF budgets are considered acceptable, and budget modifications that involve a cumulative shift of less than 15 per cent of the direct project costs (i.e the project total less project support costs) will

not require the prior approval of the ERC. However, in cases where modifications are expected to result in any increase in staff costs or a change in programme support cost (PSC), formal approval must always be sought from the ERC. The ERC may on an exceptional basis approve larger changes (beyond the 15 per cent) within existing projects, if these are due to external circumstances affecting project implementation and provided that the original project objective is retained.

Reporting

16. Narrative reporting is required at two levels:

- **Headquarters level:** Agencies should submit an annual headquarter-level report that follows the UNDG or agency standard reporting format by **20 April**. As part of the report, agencies should provide a global perspective on lessons-learned on accessing funds from the CERF and an analysis on the impact of CERF on the agencies' capacities to respond to humanitarian needs.
- **Field level:** At country level, it is the responsibility of the office of the RC/HCs to report on behalf of the humanitarian country team on CERF allocations through an annual report, which will be based on inputs prepared and submitted by the recipient agencies. The report provides a field level analysis of the challenges faced when prioritizing needs, project implementation arrangements, results achieved, and lessons learned. This will help to determine the added value of the CERF. An emphasis on lessons-learned contributes to the Fund's continual improvement. The RC/HC will be assisted by the OCHA country office, if there is one.

17. **Financial Reporting:** Financial reports on CERF grants are provided by agency headquarters for all projects received from the CERF. An interim financial statement should be provided by **15 February** and a final report by **30 June** of each year (financial status as of 31 December of the previous year) for all grants received the previous year and for all outstanding balances (amounts of the grant for which expenditures have not been reported) on grants received in previous years. For rapid response projects with an implementation-period *end date* between 1 January and 30 June of a given year, an interim report should be provided by **15 August** (status as of 30 June) of the same year.

Compatibility with other funding

18. The existence of a Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) or an Emergency Response Fund (ERF) in a country does not preclude the CERF from providing rapid response funds. Employing the CERF in combination with in-country pooled funds (i.e. ERFs or CHFs) provides the Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator (RC/HC) and the humanitarian country team with a powerful toolbox of humanitarian financing options for responding quickly to emergencies within a given country.

Country-Based Pooled Funds (CBPFs)⁴⁹

19. Country-Based Pooled Funds (CBPFs) are multi-donor humanitarian financing instruments established by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) and managed by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) at the country level under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC). While OCHA has managed humanitarian pooled funds at the country level since 1995, CBPFs are rooted in the 2005 Humanitarian Reform and the Secretary-General’s report “In larger freedom,” which calls for predictable and flexible humanitarian funding to meet the needs of vulnerable communities.

20. CBPFs support the delivery of the OCHA’s humanitarian coordination mandate. They receive unearmarked funding from donors and allocate it in response to priority humanitarian needs through joint planning and an inclusive and field-driven decision-making process. CBPFs operate in different contexts and respond to a broad range of crises. CBPFs should be therefore flexible and adapted to local contexts.

Table 28 Main features of the CBPFs

Amount available	Variable. CBPFs collect funds from donors to support local humanitarian efforts
Implementation time frame	There are no limits for the CBPF. See below. Projects funded through standard allocations should be implemented within a maximum of 12 months. Exceptions can be made by the HC when a longer duration is necessary to meet programmatic requirements.
Purpose/triggers	CBPFs are established by the Emergency Relief Coordinator at the request of the Humanitarian Coordinator and in consultation with the humanitarian community, when it is demonstrated that a CBPF can bring added value to the delivery of humanitarian operations.
Eligible organizations	Humanitarian actors. UN agencies, international and national NGOs, and organizations of the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement, can apply for and receive funding from CBPFs. International and national NGOs must undergo the capacity assessment process (described in Chapter 4) to become eligible to receive funding from CBPFs. All UN agencies are eligible to receive funding.
Criteria for creation	The following criteria need to be met for a CBPF to be considered: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Existence of HRP or similar humanitarian planning framework. ii. Indication of donor commitment, both at the country and capital level. iii. Sufficient support structures at country level to manage a CBPF. This is mainly related to i) OCHA’s capacity (OCHA’s presence is required), and ii) capacity and commitment of existing coordination structures (clusters or sectors). iv. Presence of, and buy-in from, potential partners in-country with capacity to deliver humanitarian assistance.

⁴⁹ Based on OCHA (2017). Operational Handbook for Country-Based Pooled Funds (Version 1.2); OCHA (2017). Policy Instruction. Country-Based Pooled Funds. Ref 2015/01; and OCHA (2020). About CBPFs. Invest in Humanity.

Creating and closing an CBPF

21. CBPFs are country-based funds managed within the global framework established by UNOCHA, and receive unearmarked donor contributions at country level. The funds are established according to need in rapid onset emergencies, do project rounds twice a year, but have a reserve window at country level which provides flexible funding when emergencies suddenly deteriorate. Each CBPF is coordinated by the country humanitarian coordinator, on behalf of the UNOCHA Emergency Response Coordinator, and has a country advisory board, strategic and technical review committees for sectors (comprising cluster members) and a humanitarian financing unit. CBPFs can finance non-UN and local organizations, and risk-adjust procedures according to the grant recipient (rather than require a HACT assessment to use the same procedure for all grantees). CBPFs finance all sectors.

22. CBPFs are established by the ERC at the request of the HC and in consultation with the humanitarian community. The decision to establish a CBPF follows a field-driven process, led by the HC and supported by the OCHA Country Office, which seeks to build consensus within the humanitarian community and assess the utility of a CBPF. OCHA's Coordination and Response Division (CRD) and Funding Coordination Section (FCS) support the HC and OCHA Country Office in this regard from headquarters level.

23. The creation of a CBPF involves the following **steps**:

- Decision to create a CBPF:
 - i. A concept note is developed by the OCHA Country Office in consultation with CRD and FCS and submitted to the HC.
 - ii. The HC submits the note to the ERC.
 - iii. The ERC, in consultation with the CBPF Governance Board (see below) at OCHA HQ, will make a final decision on the establishment of the CBPF and inform the HC in writing.
 - iv. OCHA informs key stakeholders, including donors both at the country and capital level, as required.
- Legal establishment of the CBPF. OCHA Country Office is responsible for initiating the legal establishment of the CBPF on behalf of the HC. The steps involved depend on what entity receives and manages donor contributions. When OCHA receives and manages donor contributions, the following steps are undertaken:
 - v. FCS Finance Unit requests that a project code for the new CBPF is created under the Country Trust Fund account code to receive donor contributions.
 - vi. Once the fund has been formally established, the OCHA Country Office drafts the Operational of the fund. The HC approves the Operational Manual which should include: fund scope and objectives; governance structures and membership; programmatic focus; allocation modalities and related processes; and accountability mechanisms and operational modalities.
- Setting up of the governance and operational structure. Following the formal establishment of the CBPF, the following steps should be carried out:

- vii. Ensure HC engages with two or three donors to approve a directly costed budget to staff the Humanitarian Financing Unit (HFU). Each CBPF is supported by an HFU that is costed directly to the Fund.
- viii. Establish the HFU structure and ensure that appropriate capacity and expertise are available.
- ix. Establish the Advisory Board (AB) and Review Committees.
 - x. Familiarize the humanitarian community with the processes and requirements of CBPFs. Provide coaching to prospective partners, clusters, and other stakeholders, as required.
 - xi. Initiate the due diligence and capacity assessment processes adapted to the fund based on the available options.
 - xii. Expedite resource mobilization activities to raise awareness and attract additional donors.
 - xiii. Develop CBPF website on OCHA's corporate domain.
 - xiv. Configure and activate the Grant Management System (GMS – see below) and organize necessary trainings and orientation sessions.

24. The **decision to close a CBPF** is independently taken by the ERC or upon recommendation from the HC. The decision to close a CBPF should be based upon the acknowledgement that the rationale and conditions justifying its creation are no longer valid.

Governance and management structure

25. CBPFs have two levels of governance. The **global governance** oversees CPBFs across all countries. It includes the following actors:

- **Emergency Relief Coordinator:** The ERC holds authority over and is accountable for all CBPFs. The ERC monitors the performance of each fund through FCS at Headquarters and makes decisions on their establishment, reorganization and closure.
- **CBPF Governance Board:** The Governance Board oversees the management of all CBPFs, providing advice to the ERC on key decisions pertaining to the CBPF. It ensures that all CBPFs are efficiently and effectively managed in compliance with existing corporate policies and standards as described in the Handbook.

26. The **local governance** structure is more important for the purpose of this annex as it is concerned with operational decisions. It includes the following actors:

- **Humanitarian Coordinator:** The HC acts as the custodian of the CBPF on behalf of the ERC. The HC decides the strategy for the use of the fund, and ensures that the fund is delivering on its key objectives and is managed in accordance with the Handbook. The HC is supported by an advisory board (AB) which advises the HC on the allocation of funds and other strategic issues.
- **Advisory Board:** The AB supports the HC in developing an overall strategy and overseeing the performance of the CBPF. The AB is consulted on key aspects of the management and strategic direction of the CBPF, including allocation strategies, resource mobilization and any other major decision taken by the HC related to the

fund. The AB also reviews direct costs of the fund prior to HC approval. The composition of the AB is determined by the HC in consultation with the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), contributing donors and NGOs. AB membership should be limited to 12 representatives. **Government representation** on the AB may be considered, depending on the country context. Adding AB members with observer status, including non-contributing donors, is encouraged to improve transparency. AB members are nominated by their constituencies:

- i. Chair: The HC chairs and convenes AB meetings
 - ii. OCHA Head of Office (HoO)
 - iii. Donors: Contributors to CBPF. Non-contributing donors may be included in the AB as observers
 - iv. UN Agencies
 - v. NGOs: National and international NGOs
 - vi. AB Secretariat: OCHA, through the Humanitarian Financing Unit of the Country Office.
- Review Committees: CBPF allocations pass through two types of project review: 1) a strategic review of project proposals in relation to the Allocation Paper determined by the HC and the AB or in relation to the fund scope and objectives as outlined in the Operational Manual, and 2) a technical review which assesses the technical soundness and quality of project proposals. Review committees should be established through a consultative process with a limited number of cluster members. The review committees should, as far as possible, have different compositions to fulfil these two functions.

Finally, the **management structure** is in charge of the administration and management of the CBPF at the country level. It includes two key actors:

- OCHA Head of Office (HoO): The OCHA HoO oversees the operation of the fund to support the HC. As such, the HoO is responsible for the effective management of the fund according to CBPF Policy Instruction and the Handbook.
- Humanitarian Financing Unit (HFU): The HFUs are responsible for the daily management of all programmatic and financial aspects of the CBPF on behalf of the HC and under the supervision of the OCHA HoO, in coordination with FCS. The three main functions of the HFU are summarized as follows: i) management of CBPF operations and policy advice to the HC and OCHA HoO; ii) CBPF Project Cycle Management; and iii) implementation of the CBPF Accountability Framework including a monitoring system.

Approval and disbursement of grants

27. There are two main allocation processes: standard and reserve. The HC uses the **standard allocation process** to support targeted priorities within the HRP. The process is informed by the AB and is conducted in close consultation with humanitarian partners to ensure the best possible use of resources. The process is transparent, which is essential for the fund to function properly. Transparency should be interpreted as the degree to which all

relevant information is communicated to key stakeholders in a timely manner and whether allocation decisions can be documented and rationalized.

28. The process of the standard allocation is executed through a number of steps which are outlined below. Projects funded through standard allocations should be implemented within a maximum of 12 months. Exceptions can be made by the HC when a longer duration is necessary to meet programmatic requirements. The grant ceilings are defined based on the partner risk level and project duration, as outlined in the Operational Modalities (see below). Steps of the standard allocation process:

- i. Allocation strategy development
- ii. Submission of project proposals
- iii. Strategic review
- iv. Preliminary approval by HC
- v. Technical and financial review
- vi. Final approval by HC
- vii. Disbursement: following signature of grant agreement by all parties, funds are disbursed within 10 working days.

29. The **reserve allocation** is intended for rapid and flexible allocation of funds in response to unforeseen circumstances, emergencies, or contextually relevant needs. The reserve allocation process is quicker and lighter than the standard allocation process. Reserve allocations require a strategy/case for funding which may of course be limited in scope and criteria when compared to Standard Allocations in order to ensure a rapid and flexible disbursement schedule.

30. When the HC has called for a limited competitive process, the reserve allocation proposals should undergo a competitive prioritization process through the use of scorecards. It is up to the HC to activate the reserve allocation to respond to emergency and/or unforeseen needs. In such cases, the HC maintains a certain amount of available funding for the reserve. No specific percentage is recommended: any funding that is not programmed through standard allocations could be allocated through the reserve in case of need.

31. Projects funded through reserve allocation should be implemented within a maximum of 12 months. Exceptions to this time frame can be made by the HC based on prevailing circumstances. The process of the reserve allocation is executed through a number of steps which are outlined below:

- I. Allocation strategy development
- II. Submission of project proposal
- III. Strategic review
- IV. Technical and financial review (may be combined with step 3)
- V. Final approval by HC
- VI. Disbursement

Monitoring and reporting

32. The main purpose of **monitoring** is to assess progress made towards set targets and to verify the accuracy of reporting submitted by partners. The HC is responsible for ensuring that a representative sample of CBPF-funded projects are effectively monitored through

appropriate monitoring modalities. The OCHA HFU is further responsible for coordinating monitoring efforts and ensuring that monitoring of projects is carried out.

33. CBPFs use **reporting** to ensure that activities carried out are on track to reach proposed project objectives. As far as possible, UN agencies and NGOs are treated equally in relation to their reporting requirements. Narrative and financial reporting requirements for NGOs are determined according to the Operational Modalities and risk assessment.

Compatibility and linkages with other funding

34. Cluster lead agencies support CBPFs at two levels: (i) at a strategic level, cluster leads should ensure that there are linkages between the fund, the HRP and cluster strategies; and (ii) at an operational level, cluster coordinators should provide technical expertise to the process of project prioritization and to the technical review of projects, and they should consult in revision requests.

35. To better ensure that the funds are used coherently and effectively to support humanitarian needs identified by the HC in consultation with the inter-cluster coordination, clusters shall be involved in a number of steps in the fund programme cycle:

- Application: wherever possible, proposals should be developed with programmatic guidance from the relevant cluster coordinator(s)
- Strategic and technical review of projects
- Monitoring and Reporting

Global Partnership for Education (GPE) Accelerated Funding (AF)⁵⁰

36. The accelerated funding (AF) mechanism allows the GPE to disburse up to 20 per cent of a GPE grant within eight weeks as emergency funding to respond to a crisis. The funds are used based on the education cluster needs assessment and agreed by the local education group and the education cluster.

37. Countries eligible for accelerated funding under these guidelines include those that are:

- eligible for education sector program implementation grant (ESPIG) funding;
- affected by a crisis for which a humanitarian appeal has been launched and published by the UN Office of Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs, with education as a part of that appeal; and
- able to demonstrate that GPE funds will not displace government and/or other donor funds, but will be in addition to other resources.

38. The implementation period for accelerated funding is one year, but an extension may be considered according to the nature of the activities and context. It is expected that by the end of the one-year implementation period, the application for the remainder of the country's indicative allocation will have been submitted.

⁵⁰ Based on GPE (2019). Guidelines for Accelerated Support in Emergency and Early Recovery Situations. Global Partnership for Education; & GPE (2020). Guidelines For Covid-19 Accelerated Funding Window. Global Partnership for Education.

39. The total amount of accelerated funding for emergency and early recovery activities will be based on the education cluster needs assessment and agreed upon by the local education group (LEG). It cannot exceed 20 per cent of the then-current indicative allocation for ESPIGs applicable to the country. Activities could include, but are not limited to, emergency activities such as temporary shelters, school meals and distribution of school supplies, as well as activities that are critical to establishing or rebuilding education services, such as classroom construction, teacher remuneration and school grants.

Table 29 Main features of the AF

Amount available	Up to 20% of the indicative allocation for the ESPIG to the country. The ESPIG allocation is adjusted accordingly. The COVID-19 funding window was USD 250 million globally.
Implementation time frame	One year, but extensions may be granted. The COVID-10 AF funding provides for implementation periods of up to 18 months.
Purpose/triggers	Countries affected by a crisis for which a humanitarian appeal has been launched and published by the UN Office of Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs, with education as a part of that appeal.
Eligible organizations	The LEG, in consultation with the education cluster, selects a grant agent to manage the emergency and early recovery funding. Selection of the grant agent should be guided by the terms of reference for grant agents, with particular attention to the agency's ability to operate in the emergency or post-emergency context and provide rapid scale-up of support. To avoid delays in the transfer of funds, grant agents must be selected from among agencies that have a Transfer Agreement for the GPE Fund executed prior to the submission of the application.
Criteria for creation	Countries eligible for accelerated funding include those that are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. eligible for education sector program implementation grant (ESPIG) funding; b. affected by a crisis for which a humanitarian appeal has been launched and published by the UN Office of Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs, with education as a part of that appeal; and c. able to demonstrate that GPE funds will not displace government and/or other donor funds but will be in addition to other resources. <p>In 2020 GPE announced a specific COVID-19 AF window. 67 ESPIG eligible countries could apply for this funding, including those that already have an AF grant.</p>

Application process

40. The AF application process includes a number of steps and has a total estimated time frame of seven to eight weeks until disbursement of the funds.

- I. The LEG in consultation with the education cluster initiates the process by verifying with the Secretariat whether the country is eligible for accelerated support to cover emergency and/or early recovery activities.

- II. Designation of a Grant Agent: The LEG, in consultation with the education cluster, selects a grant agent to manage the emergency and early recovery funding. Selection of the grant agent should be guided by the terms of reference for grant agents, with particular attention to the agency's ability to operate in the emergency or post-emergency context and provide rapid scale-up of support. To avoid delays in the transfer of funds, grant agents must be selected from among agencies that have a Transfer Agreement for the GPE Fund executed prior to the submission of the application.
- III. Development of the proposal: the grant agent develops a proposal in close collaboration with the LEG and the education cluster. The format and internal approval process of the proposal follows the grant agent's internal procedures for emergency assistance programs. The Secretariat will be in close dialogue with the LEG and education cluster through the coordinating agency during the preparation of the proposal. The Secretariat will immediately notify the Grants and Performance Committee (GPC) once it confirms that a request will be made by the LEG for accelerated support. The proposal must:
 - be based on the education cluster's emergency needs assessment and/or an assessment of early recovery needs;
 - provide information on the sources of financing for other emergency and early recovery activities planned and information demonstrating that GPE funds will not displace government or other donor funding; and
 - contain an operational plan indicating activities, budgets, implementation strategies and a description of how activities will be sub-contracted to other organizations as appropriate.
- IV. Application submission: The development partner group must endorse the proposal, and, where possible, the developing country government also endorses it. The coordinating agency submits the completed application package to the Secretariat.
- V. Application review: The Secretariat conducts a final readiness review of the application package with due attention to the relevance, quality and feasibility of the planned activities, and then prepares a summary for decision.
- VI. Decision: The Secretariat submits the application package to the GPC. The GPC will review the application package and make a decision, preferably using a non-objection process.
- VII. Transfer of funds: Following approval by the GPC, the Secretariat conveys the approval to the Trustee. The Trustee will send a commitment letter to the designated grant agent, who will in turn request a transfer of funds.

Governance

41. The accelerated funding (AF) relies on the governance created for the implementation of GEP grants. At country level, the main structure is the Local Education Group (LEG). The LEG is a country-led coordinating structure/platform for education sector planning and

dialogue. The LEGs are not a separate mechanism set up for GPE processes but are broader education aid coordination and policy dialogue forums that most countries have before joining the partnership. GPE promotes their strengthening. These platforms or groups are named differently in each country but are referred to as 'LEGs' by the GPE as a generic term. LEGs are at the core of GPE's country-level model, to provide support in a single country-led process and strengthen decision-making for effective and inclusive policy dialogue.

42. Another key element in the AF is the Grant Agent (GA). A GA is any GPE partner approved by the GPE Board of Directors to receive funds directly from the Trustee, and is expected to ensure that GPE grants are appropriately managed, are fully aligned with broader education sector developments and add value to the country-level processes and results. As of September 2020, the following agencies had been accredited as GAs:

- Asian Development Bank (ADB)
- Agence Française de Développement (AFD)
- Enabel (Belgian Development Agency)
- CARE USA
- Concern International
- Islamic Development Bank (IsDB)
- Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)
- Save the Children UK
- Save the Children USA
- Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)
- Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)
- UNESCO
- UNICEF
- The World Bank Group

In cases where the grant amount exceeds USD 5 million and the Grant Agent is an INGO, a grant level assessment will need to be conducted.

Reporting

43. Reporting follows the Policy on ESPIGs, notably Part IV (Reporting requirements) and Part V (Revisions to programs). Unless a more frequent report-back is requested as part of the grant's approval, the first progress report essentially serves as an implementation completion report. For programs with an implementation period of less than 18 months, the report should be submitted within six months of the closing date of the program. In the event that the implementation period is more than 18 months, a progress report on the first 12 months needs to be submitted.

Annex 10 Bibliography

In this bibliography we provide references for documents cited in the Inception Report. The bibliography is a work-in-progress that will be continually updated as the evaluation proceeds.

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